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Material Abstract 
This product of doctoral labour is a reappraisal of Russian Formalism.  It establishes 
the convergences between the thought of key Formalists Viktor Shklovsky, Boris 
Eikhenbaum, Yury Tynianov and German Idealist Philosophers Immanuel Kant and 
Georg Hegel.  The Formalists’ conceptualization of literary art is shown to be 
consistent with Kant’s programme of practical critique and Hegel’s objective 
dialectics, albeit without the reductive closures which Kant and Hegel programme 
into aesthetic theory.  On this basis, the Formalists’ dialogue with the Bakhtin School 
is reconsidered, along with the utility of Formalist critique for how we are to 
understand the cultural environment of the Soviet 1920s, and the practice of theory 
in the present context of its own death. 
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Preface  
Stupidity (incomprehension) in the novel is always polemical… (Bakhtin 2012: 158; 
2004: 403). 
 
Between the rogue and the fool there emerges, as a unique coupling of the two, the 
image of the clown.  He is a rogue who dons the mask of a fool in order to motivate 
distortions and shufflings of languages and labels, thus unmasking them by not 
understanding them (Bakhtin 2012: 159; 2004: 404-5). 
 
I 
Can academic writing ever be stupid?  Some scholars may be offended by the 
suggestion.  To call a doctoral thesis stupid is, for some, totally unacceptable and 
not exemplary of the ‘high seriousness’ academic writing deserves.  When Bakhtin 
speaks of stupid incomprehension he is, after all, talking about the novel.  The 
figures of the rogue, the fool and the clown who unmasks by stupid 
incomprehension are features of novelistic discourse.  Scholars, unlike their novelist 
counterparts, must maintain the ‘high’ languages of the academic disciplines, as if 
they are isolated from a contingency upon other alien discourses.  Yet for Bakhtin 
the clown’s distortions and shufflings of discourses are a reflection of an inherent 
social orientation that has been present throughout the entire history of the novel; an 
orientation which has emerged in modern times with 'extraordinary surface clarity’ 
(Bakhtin 2012: 160; 2004: 405).  This social orientation claims that the fool, clown 
and rogue are all real embodied speakers, actively engaged in the social world of 
heteroglossia; a world where words are beset by an internal dialogism that awaits 
the living response of another’s word.   
Within Bakhtin’s framework, the boundaries between the novel and its discursive 
others are problematic, and may even disappear entirely.  In ‘Discourse and the 
Novel’, Bakhtin hints that internal dialogization extends beyond the confines of the 
novel, noting that all discourse is beset by the internal dialogism (Bakhtin 2012: 37; 
2004: 284).  Tihanov has perceptively noticed that Bakhtin’s conceptualization of 
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genre extends beyond the generic confines of the novel, the relationship between 
life and art, parody, chronotope, dialogue and inner dialogism, and amounts to a 
conceptualization of a ‘rightful and unconditional reality’ and ‘an embodiment of 
modernity’, where the ‘novel’ denotes an emancipatory discourse that combines 
elements of historicism and an ethical understanding of humanity and its potential 
(Tihanov 2000: 112, 152,161).  For Bakhtin, the categories of the fool, clown and 
rogue have, over the course of the novel’s historical development, been ‘refined, 
differentiated and cut loose’ [utonchaiutsia, differentsiruiutsia, otreshaiutsia] from 
static images, but their importance has been preserved in dialogue and ‘the internal 
dialogic essence of language itself’, whereby those who speak different languages 
constantly fail to understand one another (Bakhtin 2012: 159; 2004: 405).  If the 
novel is, as Bakhtin implies, an emancipatory conceptualization of modernity, then 
we are all essentially clowns capable of engaging in the polemical unmasking of 
‘high’ languages, of which scholarship must surely be one.1   
Another proponent of an emancipatory conceptualization of modernity declared that:  
‘the University would have a certain autonomy (since only scholars can pass 
judgement on scholars)’ (Kant 1994: 27).  Kant’s insistence that only scholars can 
pass judgement on scholars may sound haughty to twenty-first century readers, but 
the ‘autonomy’ that Kant demands for faculty members is, in fact, more akin to 
                                                          
1 For Bakhtin’s later calibration of the disciplinary activity of the human sciences, see Bakhtin’s ‘The 
Problem of the Text in Linguistics, Philology, and the Human Sciences: An Experiment in 
Philosophical Analysis’ [Problema teksta] and ‘Toward a Methodology of the Human Sciences’ [K 
filosofskim osnovam gumanitarnykh nauk] (Bakhtin 1997; 306-26 and 7-10); and (Bakhtin 2007; 103-
31 and 159-171).  I am aware that recent scholarship on Bakhtin, along with his collected works, 
tends to compartmentalize Bakhtin’s thought into distinct periods (Tihanov 2000) (Brandist 2002), and 
foregrounds Bakhtin’s shifting intellectual influences as grounds for this division.  In light of the 
insights this scholarship provides, one must proceed with caution when outlining Bakhtin’s ideas 
regarding disciplinary praxis throughout his career.  For example, in ‘Epistemology of the Human 
Sciences’, Todorov outlines Bakhtin’s programme for the human sciences with citations from 
Bakhtin’s early aesthetic philosophy, texts by Voloshinov, his conceptualization of the novel genre in 
the 1930s, and Bakhtin’s later works on methodology (Todorov 1984: 25-42).    In light of recent 
scholarship, it is unlikely that an article such as Todorov’s would emerge in the present context.  I do 
not wish to get bogged down in the specificities of Bakhtin’s influences and the many inconsistences 
that pervade Bakhtin’s work here. I do, however, contend that Bakhtin’s thought is (implicitly and 
explicitly) consistently aware as to how method shapes both its object and its practice in academic 
discipline.  
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Bakhtin’s emancipatory programme of polemical stupidity.  In The Conflict of the 
Faculties, Kant suggests that a university should have two faculties, one of which is 
a philosophical faculty that is tasked with evaluating and critiquing all aspects of life, 
and therefore concerns itself ‘with the interests of the sciences, that is, with truth: 
one in which reason is authorized to speak out publically’.  ‘Reason is’, so Kant 
continues, ‘free and admits of no command to hold something as true’ (Kant 1998: 
29).  This scholarly autonomy is therefore entirely consistent with Kant’s 
emancipatory account of autonomous reason provided in The Critique of Pure 
Reason and The Critique of Practical Reason, where the critical praxis of freedom is 
entirely predicated upon the finite nature of all knowledge. Neither the properties of 
consciousness nor those of the thing-in-itself are ever knowable. Kant’s paradoxical 
account of consciousness’s ‘conditions of possibility’ famously reject any access to 
the roots of the tree of knowledge, deny the subject access to both consciousness 
and the thing-in-itself; and insist upon a fundamentally antinomic structure of 
consciousness where the faculties of the mind and their given object are located in 
mutually constitutive opposition to one another.  Such is the price for the subject’s a 
priori freedom and its capacity for contradiction.  In Kant’s ontological framework, 
freedom exists as an a priori fact of reason that can never be accounted for in a 
determinate formulation.  Its combination with the faculty of the imagination enables 
the misunderstanding of accepted truths and their polemical contradiction.  This 
Kantian variety of idealism encompasses not merely consciousness and its 
limitations, but also the problematic status of all that is at hand in the material world, 
and the antinomic relationships which constitute consciousness, thing and the free 
practice of critique through which we come to objectively reflect upon the world and 
participate in all aspects of life.   
It is unlikely that Kant would have countenanced the suggestion that the 
philosophical faculty he proposes should be considered a faculty of clowns.  
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However, there are certainly areas of convergence between Kant’s and Bakhtin’s 
emancipatory programmes for modernity, in that both insist on the need to 
polemically engage with absolute claims to truth and hierarchical orders to obey.  
Both insist that the site of this engagement must be public, and both remain 
convinced that being human is innately moral and carries the ethical burden of living 
up to such a high moral standard.   
Dieter Henrich has economically summed up Kant’s praxis of critique as a principle 
of insight and a principle of real connection (Henrich 2003: xxiv).   The following 
analysis is consistent with Henrich’s remarks, in that it is has been written in 
accordance with a theoretical agenda that provides an insight into its material 
objects of inquiry and which provides an ethical basis for how that analysis is carried 
out.  The autonomy which Kant grants his philosophical scholars is categorically not 
the immunity from judgement which their disciplinary superiors claim for themselves, 
but is indeed an acceptance of the finitude of all knowledge, and the accompanying 
ethical and emancipatory obligations to fulfil their critical duty accordingly.  I shall 
stop short of stating that this analysis was written by a clown, or that it is in any way 
stupid. Nevertheless, I remain staunchly opposed to those who reinforce the 
arbitrary hierarchies of disciplinary life and those who would insist on absolute 
‘truths’, be it in terms what scholars must engage with and how they should go about 
it.2  Kant argues that national life is enriched by allowing scholars of philosophy to 
go about their practice of critique without official censor.  I shall make no such bold 
                                                          
2 My opposition here is against what Bourdieu has termed the ‘ordinary professor’ in Homo 
Academicus, which in some ways can be viewed as an evolution of the Theological Faculty sketched 
by Kant.  For Bourdieu, the ordinary professor seeks to preserve the hierarchies and disciplinary 
praxis of the university at the expense of the autonomous critique demanded by Kant.  It is certainly 
true that Bourdieu perceives the fragility of evaluating a particular individual as a ‘professor’, and that 
such evaluations are not confined to those who work within the walls of the academy (Bourdieu 
provides the amusing example of Lenin giving a lecture in Paris from Trotsky’s memoirs).  
Nevertheless, Bourdieu correctly contends that there is a substantive difference between those who 
work within the university to perpetuate the university as such, and those who work within the 
university to pursue an ethical commitment to their given area of research (Bourdieu 1990).  For the 
latter, Henrich’s principle of insight and real connection applies; for the former, academic discipline 
serves as both the principle of insight and connection. 
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claims here, but I believe that disciplinary life is indeed enriched by those who seek 
alternatives to its language of ‘high seriousness’, and seek a broader scholarly 
praxis informed by ethical connection at all levels. 
II 
The product of such committed engagement is not, however, an analysis of the 
convergences between Kant and Bakhtin.  What follows is a reappraisal of Russian 
Formalism that is also a work of literary theory.  Kant and Bakhtin are at once 
peripheral and central to its primary focus.  To the best of my knowledge, the 
Formalist theory of Shklovsky, Tynianov and Eikhenbaum written in the decade 
following the Revolution never explicitly engages with the work of Bakhtin, the 
broader Bakhtin Circle or Kant in the first decade that followed the Russian 
Revolution. Their Formalist theory from this period cannot in any way be regarded 
as a historically grounded dialogue with either Kant or Bakhtin.  Yet as Renfrew has 
noted, the methodological preoccupations of Russian Formalism cannot be 
separated from the Formalists’ attempts to found literary theory as a discipline in 
and of itself (Renfrew 2010: 3), and in this regard the Russian Formalists are indeed 
comparable to both Kant and Bakhtin in terms of how they conceptualized the praxis 
of literary theory and the ethics which inform how that study was to be undertaken.  
For those even slightly familiar with Russian Formalism, the Bakhtin Circle and Kant, 
the assertion of shared premises between the three parties may seem perverse, and 
perhaps the work of a clown who has misconstrued his scholarly ‘high-languages’ 
and succeeded only in making a fool of himself.  Nevertheless, it shall be argued 
throughout this analysis that it is possible to discern convergences between the 
three schools of thought once two fundamental propositions are accepted.  First, 
such opponents of Russian Formalism as Trotsky were absolutely correct when they 
dismissed the movement as exemplary of idealism.  Second, Formalism’s principle 
innovation in the history of literary theory can only be termed dialectical materialism.   
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This paradoxical state of affairs rests upon Formalism’s many opponents’ and mis-
appropriators’ capacity to be right and yet totally (and not a little tragically) wrong.  
The idealism which Trotsky thought he had identified in Russian Formalism was 
entirely consistent with the idealism viciously and crudely attacked by Lenin in 
Materialism and Empiro-Criticism (Trotsky 1991: 138-154) (Lenin 2002).  From this 
perspective, any suggestion that the mind has any constitutive role in how we 
apprehend the world is tantamount to the religious faith that has repressed the 
proletariat for centuries.  The idealism of which certain Russian Formalists were in 
fact guilty is a far more complex phenomenon: German idealism, specifically the 
thought of Kant and Hegel.  In addition to those elements of Kant’s philosophy 
already noted, Hegel’s objective dialectic further develops Kant’s antinomic 
structures, and explicitly renders these dynamic relationships in their historical 
aspect.  Hegel’s historicism insists that all knowledge be grounded in its own 
historical context and that philosophy must be engaged with the adequate 
comprehension of historical reality in all its evolving complexity.  Any philosophical 
conclusion which fails to account adequately for finite historical reality in its 
becoming is, for Hegel, an anachronism (Hegel 1977: 14-21).  For both Kant and 
Hegel, the finite illusion is therefore a material reality, and any crude ‘materialism’ or 
‘positivism’ untenable and therefore no less illusory.  Russian Formalism is in no 
way preoccupied with thought and its properties, but it discerns these relationships 
in literature’s immanent properties and in how literature relates with that which it is 
not, that is, with the life-world beyond its material boundaries.  In will be established 
here that the Formalists consistently argued that literature was dynamic and driven 
by unspecified and inexplicable needs.  Whether literary or extra-literary, the 
elements which constitute literature and what it is not were consistently designated 
‘material’; the relationships in which this material functions were, in certain key texts, 
termed ‘dialectical’.  Hence the Formalists can be said to have practiced, even at the 
most basic and nominal of levels, dialectical materialism in literary studies.   
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III 
The suggestion that the Formalists established a praxis of dialectical materialism in 
literary studies goes beyond the mere determinate properties of their method, and 
can even be conceptualized as exemplary of Henrich’s principle of insight and 
practical engagement.  However, there are certain glaring problems involving the 
application of the term which need to be addressed before the evaluation can be 
pursued further.  Žižek has written at (great) length ‘in and on’ the properties of 
dialectical materialism, and can be regarded as rescuing the term from its use by the 
reified intellectual forces active in the Soviet Union and beyond, and which include 
Stalin amongst their number (Žižek 2012) (Žižek 2014) .  For Žižek, post-Hegelian 
dialectical critique is the antithesis of officially sanctioned culture.  Inspired by 
Hegel’s finite treatment of the dialectic, Žižek contends that all dialectical analysis 
fails in some way, and asserts that the practitioner of dialectical analysis is a moron 
(Žižek 2012: 1-3, 8).    The failures of dialectical materialism are, of necessity, driven 
towards what is at hand, concrete and actual.  For this particular reappraisal of 
Russian Formalism, two instances of the ‘actual’ are of acute significance, and 
which pertain to ‘then’ and ‘now’.  Kant died in 1804 and Hegel in 1831.  Neither 
philosopher could be said to be ‘at hand’ during the heyday of Russian Formalist 
thought.  Kant was hopelessly lost in the convoluted, dense discourse of neo-
Kantianism, and attacked by Husserl, Shpet and Bergson (Schmid 2009: 157-168) 
(Bergson 1910: 222-240).  Lenin’s Philosophical Notebooks had not yet provoked 
the reappraisal of Hegel’s significance, and indicated Lenin’s intellectual move away 
from the crude materialism of his earlier Materialism and Empiro-Criticism 
(Anderson 1995).  The historical boundaries between German Idealism and the 
Soviet 1920s preclude the possibility of any actual, historically grounded dialogue 
between Kant, Hegel and the Russian Formalists.  This lack of immediate contact 
risks the accusation of hypocrisy, as the very element of the ‘at hand’ and the 
‘material’ in dialectical criticism is lost, and any resulting assertion of similarities 
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between German Idealism and Russian Formalism could be dismissed as an 
anachronism.  Žižek’s response is simply to assert that this anachronism is to be 
welcomed, and all the phenomena of intellectual culture from Kant up to the present 
should be regarded as a continuation of the same problems of emancipation 
critiqued by the German Idealists (Žižek 2012: 8).  This intervention is at once 
unwelcome and most welcome.  From the crude standpoint of positivism or 
materialism, it is a disaster, as it risks perpetuating the understanding of ‘idealism’ 
as a structure that is timeless, abstract and ‘blocks’ the social.  Yet, on a more 
moronic level, Žižek is implicitly arguing that anachronism is always the de facto 
state of affairs, and a core aspect of the moronic failures of dialectical criticism.  The 
necessarily historical attribute of all knowledge means that it always comes 
afterwards, and the dialectical relationship with the unobtainable ‘before’ results in a 
profoundly paradoxical relationship between those elements constituted by its 
dialectical grip.   
The contradictions, illusions and failures of dialectical criticism are of necessity 
historically grounded and actual.  The utility of Žižek’s embrace of the anachronistic 
presence of German Idealism in intellectual phenomena, as well as Hegel’s own 
paradoxical treatment of anachronism, are their acceptance that phenomena can 
only be present in intellectual life once they are contradicted, and these phenomena 
accordingly live on throughout history in a deeply paradoxical manner which direct 
and linear models of historical development or evolution are entirely incapable of 
conceptualizing.  Shklovsky’s figure of the knight’s move is entirely consistent with 
this dialectical paradox; as is Tynianov’s insistence that anachronism is a necessary 
attribute of literature’s dialectical evolution, where the phenomena of the past 
epochs emerge in historical presents in unexpected, yet necessary ways.   
Accordingly, Tynianov asserted that Shklovsky’s Zoo…Or Letters Not about Love 
manifests many convergences with the work of Heine (Tynianov 1977: 166).  The 
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Russian Formalists expressed a profound contempt for ‘metaphysics’ and embraced 
all aspects of the materiality of literary art yet, in positioning themselves against 
such theoretical phenomena, they inadvertently replicated many of the core 
attributes of Kant’s and Hegel’s thought some 100 to 130 years after the fact. 
IV 
The ‘now’ element of dialectical immediacy concerns this analysis’s status as a work 
of theory.  Once again the problem of anachronism rears its head, as theory is now 
commonly acknowledged as being dead (Tihanov 2004b).    This moment in 
intellectual history is worthy of a doctoral thesis of its own, and a thorough 
examination of this matter is beyond the scope of the present study.  However, a 
few remarks are necessary at this preliminary stage.  Tihanov’s article is of interest 
in on a number of levels, not least of which is a quietly polemical demonstration of 
the crucial significance of central and eastern European intellectuals in the origin 
and development of literary theory.   The article concludes with demands for 
recognition and praise for those involved in this process, and unambiguous disdain 
(which I strongly endorse) for those who joyfully proclaim theory’s demise (Tihanov 
2004b).   Rabaté and Osborne have provided similar voices of disapproval, and 
noted that such loud proclamations of theory’s death are all too clearly examples of 
attempts at ‘fashionable’ debates where the interests of marketing and sales are not 
difficult to discern (Rabaté 2002: 8) (Osborne 2011: 19-20).  However, Rabaté and 
the editors of the volume in which Osborne’s essay appears are keen to differentiate 
between either ‘Theory’ and ‘theory’ or theory and ‘Theory’.  Whilst the choice and 
size of the typography may differ, there is a convergence at work here.  All wish to 
differentiate between a theory that ‘offers a diluted form lacking in both intellectual 
substance and institutional prominence’ (Eliot and Attridge 2011: 1-2), and a theory 
that is prepared to challenge such a ‘diluted form’ of itself and whatever problems it 
identifies in the socio-politico matrix at large.  Whether ‘Theory’ or theory, this 
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ethically committed praxis is entirely consistent with my elaboration of post-Kantian 
critique here, and it is this variety of theory of which, like Rabaté, I believe our 
historical present is in urgent need.  It is precisely this variety of post-Kantian 
critique that enables us to denounce both ‘fashionable’ declarations of joy at theory’s 
demise and superficial engagements with theory’s dominant topoi. 
Rabaté’s commendable verdict in The Future of Theory is that the only way out the 
current malaise is more ethically engaged theory (Rabaté 2002: 1-20, 141-50).  
Rabaté is convinced that literary theory is the product of German Idealism and, 
mindful of Hegel’s drive to adequately critique epochal reality, is profoundly 
suspicious of attempts to pronounce the death of such critical inquiry in the ‘now’.3  
Rabaté identifies a constant drive towards the ethical and the political in the best 
literary theory, and valorizes its restless trajectory towards an emancipatory future 
through its endless critique of the present.  Whereas Bakhtin identifies the figures of 
the clown, rogue and fool as the emancipatory essence of discursive modernity, 
Rabaté prefers the figure of the Lacanian hysteric as paradigmatic of the theorist.  
Drawing upon Lacan’s well-known Seventeenth Seminar, Rabaté defines the 
hysteric as indefinable, a figure who is constantly opposed to any manifestation of a 
‘Master’, and one who prefers to conceptualize meaning as immanently unstable 
ambiguous.4  Hysteria 'gives birth to a discourse and maintains a quest for truth that 
always aims at pointing out the inadequacies of official, serious, and 'masterful' 
knowledge’ (Rabaté 2002: 8).  As such, the hysteric has obvious similarities with 
Kantian critique and Bakhtinian clowns, and it is telling that Lacan notes how 
‘masterful’ knowledge and its restrictive and controlling understanding of 
signification can accrue around the disciplinary discourses of the university (Lacan 
2007: 31-8, 43-53 & 147-8).    
                                                          
3 For a further treatment of Rabaté’s suggestions regarding the future trajectory of theory, see (Rabaté 
2014). 
4 Rabaté’s argument is a continuation of Žižek’s The Most Sublime Hysteric: Hegel and Lacan. See 
(Žižek 2014b). 
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The reappraisal of Russian Formalism undertaken here marks a return to the 
moment that, potentially, signals a determinate origin of objective literary theory.  
Through foregrounding the necessarily practical aspect of this School, both in terms 
of how it conceptualizes the problems of ‘how to write’ and ‘how to be writer-theorist’ 
in the face of institutional and political pressures, the intention here is to 
problematize the reified understanding of ‘theory’ that was asking for its own death; 
or, in other words, its accepted status as some variety of post-modern abstraction 
that has nothing whatsoever to do with the material world.5  On the contrary, 
Russian Formalist theory manifests an ethics of fidelity to textual sources, patient 
and considered reading and a challenge to the norms and restrictions of the 
academy which conflict with and impede theoretical research.  In short, the appeal 
of Russian Formalism’s iteration of dialectical materialism is that it managed to be 
both innovative and ethically committed to its source material precisely due to its 
adherence to an objective (if paradoxical) methodological orientation.6  
V 
Consistent with these more general attributes of German Idealism, dialectical 
criticism and literary theory, this analysis has three particular conclusions that 
                                                          
5 There is little point regurgitating the well-known narrative of theory’s decline here, which includes 
Alan Sokal’s infamous article in Social Text, the death of prominent French intellectuals and shifting 
hegemonies in the academic disciplines.  However, it is important to emphasise that the distinction 
between ‘Theory’ and ‘theory’ is almost always lost on theory’s critics.  A telling example is Cook’s 
enthusiastic response to the publication of Theory’s Empire: An Anthology of Dissent, an anthology of 
essays that takes a highly oppositional stance to theory (Patai and Corral 2005).  Cook complains 
that: ‘It has always seemed to me that the principal purpose of Theory was ultimately to give English 
departments a sense of purpose and keep at bay the terrifying thought that humanities didn’t really 
matter in cash-strapped universities’.  Alienated by the emergence of women’s, slave and LGBT 
writing on the university curriculum thanks to ‘Theory’s’ institutional hegemony, Cook prefers the 
stability of the classics and the canon (Cook 2005).  An ethically engaged critique might question why 
Cook’s parochial comments are confined to the English department and indeed hostile to the inclusion 
of genres of writing which cause him such institutional insecurity.  This variety critique has no such 
qualms as to the importance of the humanities, and it is precisely its own theoretical capacity to 
critique both itself and its object which serves to banish such anxiety.    
6 Žižek says that one of his books devoted to dialectical materialism ‘contains chapters in—not on—
dialectical materialism: dialectical materialism is not the book’s topic; it is, rather, practiced within 
these pages’ (Žižek 2014: 1).  As with Žižek’s above cited remarks on the failures of dialectical 
materialism, his words are once again productive with regard to conceptualizing the dialectical 
materialism practiced by the Formalists.  However, I remain to be convinced that Žižek’s and Rabaté’s 
enthusiasm for Lacan is worth pursuing with regard to the Formalists, particularly the insistence that 
sexual desire and its discontinuities are the touchstone of all intellectual life. 
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conflict with previous scholarly appraisals of Russian Formalism.  These concern the 
evolution of Russian Formalism, who was and who was not a ‘so-called’ Formalist, 
and Formalism’s reception by the Bakhtin School.  Regarding the first point, Russian 
Formalism can be said to span the period from 1914 to 1929, with two key texts by 
Viktor Shklovsky signalling the beginning and the end of the movement.  This brief 
period spans war, the Bolshevik Revolution, Civil War, the New Economic Policy 
and the onset of the Cultural Revolution.  In the words of D. Ustinov, the closing 
years of this period are marked by an ever more forceful ‘no’ in intellectual life 
(Ustinov 2001: 247-250), and ever increasingly levels of ideological conformity came 
to plague Soviet culture in the march towards the high-Stalinist culture of the 1930s.   
Since Viktor Erlich’s ground breaking study, scholars of Russian Formalism have 
consistently sought to link the evolution in Formalist science to these rapidly 
changing historical contexts.  The fact that Tynianov, Eikhenbaum and Shklovsky all 
come to incorporate the problem of ‘life’ into the purview of Formalist literary science 
has been (and is still) consistently mapped in conformity with these historical shifts 
towards Stalinism.  Accordingly, there are usually two or three different stages of 
Formalism: a ‘high’- Formalist period devoted to the device, followed by a sharp 
rupture towards art’s relationship with life, and an eventual ‘pragmatic’ stage that 
maps Formalism’s compromises with the ideological demands of the Cultural 
Revolution (Khanzen-Leve 2001).  This study does not disagree that the 
determinate preoccupations of Formalism did change, however I have preferred to 
argue that Formalism evolves dialectically, with the ‘content’ of early Formalist 
critique of literary structures maintained in how it conceptualized new analytical 
material and their role in objective literary praxis.  Accordingly, the turn to the 
problems of the relationship between art and life and the praxis of literary critique in 
the period of the Cultural Revolution do not, I argue, constitute clear ruptures with 
what came before. 
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This seemingly pedantic distinction is made upon the basis that it is wrong to 
evaluate Formalism purely with regard to the determinate objects of its analysis.  
The turn to ‘life’ and ‘genre’ may signal a determinate departure from the 
preoccupation with material, device and sound, but Formalism was first and 
foremost a preoccupation with the constructive relationships between the elements 
which constitute literary art.  These constitutive relationships remain dialectical and 
paradoxical throughout the history of Russian Formalism, be it in terms of the 
relationship between devices threaded together into a narrative, the relationship 
between different literary genres and art’s many and diverse relationships with life.  
Accordingly, it is argued here that Russian Formalism’s evolution is non-linear and 
manifests consistencies and ruptures simultaneously.  It is striking that scholars of 
Russian Formalism detail the movement’s hostility to causal determinism and 
authorial intention, yet ignore these warnings in how they construct the Formalists’ 
relationships with one another through personal correspondence and their 
capitulations to the demands of the epoch.  The deeply paradoxical point here is that 
precisely through staging the anachronistic comparison between Formalism and its 
German Idealist forebears, the ‘immediate’ ideological pressures active in historical 
context of the Soviet 1920s and their causal linking with epochal compromises can 
be re-evaluated along with Formalism itself. 
VI 
As to who was and who was not a Formalist, it is important to acknowledge that 
there was not a coherent body of Formalists in the 1920s who all followed the same 
‘so-called’ Formal method.  It has become a cliché of critical discussion of Russian 
Formalism to note that there is not one distinct Russian Formalism, but rather 
Russian Formalisms.  It could even be argued that there is not a Shklovsky, but 
many Shklovskys, whose work cannot be reduced to a coherent theoretical 
perspective.  In outlining his concept of the literary personality, Tynianov observed 
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that Pushkin the historical individual is completely different from the Pushkin seized 
upon by the Russian Symbolists and the Pushkin identified by other epochs 
(Tynianov 1977: 259; 2000: 35).  In the current epoch of the death of theory and 
proclamations of crisis in the humanities this analysis has seized upon its own 
Russian Formalism and passed over the work of certain card-carrying Formalists.  
Following Shklovsky’s use of the term, this analysis argues that Russian Formalism 
can be seen as a poetics of non-recognition, by which it is meant that it resisted any 
reified understanding of literature, be it in terms of immanent structural analysis or 
literature’s relationship with life.  Non-recognition was not just one device of literary 
form best exemplified by the brainless knight Don Quixote who fails to recognize the 
world around him ‘as it is’, but an objective methodological principle of brainlessness 
that consistently refused to provide determinist accounts of art and the laws which 
govern literary form.   It will not come as a surprise to many readers that this 
‘Formalism’ encompasses the work of such brainless knights as Shklovsky and 
Tynianov; but it may be unexpected for some that Eikhenbaum has also been 
included.  It is commonly acknowledged that Eikhenbaum’s essay ‘Literary Byt’ was 
a key attempt to address the problem of art and life.  Yet, it is argued here that 
Eikhenbaum’s essay on Gogol΄ (a supposedly ‘high’ Formalist celebration of 
autonomous device, concrete sound and self-valuable zaum) already programmes 
the dialectical treatment of authorial intention, colliding genres and material that 
comes to dominate the thought of Shklovsky and Tynianov in the mid to late 1920s.  
On this basis, the works of Tomashevsky, Yakubinsky, Brik, Polivanov and Vinokur 
are not included here.  Jakobson’s influence upon the movement is not denied, but 
the fact remains that he was absent from the immediate material world of the Soviet 
1920s and that, as a member of The Moscow Linguistic Circle and not OPOIAZ, his 
thought is inclined towards a reified and rigid understanding of literature that lacks 
the dynamism and paradoxes of Shklovsky, Eikhenbaum and Tynianov.7 
                                                          
7 For an insightful discussion of the differences between OPOIAZ and Moscow Formalism, see 
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VII 
Russian Formalism’s scholarly reception has been greatly influenced by the 
contemporary thought of Mikhail Bakhtin and the Bakhtin Circle.  Bakhtin’s thought 
is in many respects a response to the perceived failures of the Formalist method 
and its preoccupation with material literary things.  ‘Dialogue’, ‘heterglossia’ and 
‘polyphony’ have to no small extent received a positive reception in English 
language scholarship precisely because they are regarded as providing a historically 
grounded alternative to the structuralist school of literary criticism which Russian 
Formalism is accused of having inspired.  For Linda S. Kauffmann, the appeal of 
Shklovsky’s Zoo… is its tendency towards heterglossia and its move away from the 
‘devices’ of Russian Formalism (Kauffmann 1992: 44).   In emphasizing the 
movement’s many parallels with the thought of Kant and Hegel, the Russian 
Formalism which emerges across the pages of this thesis is very different to that 
identified by Bakhtin and the Bakhtin Circle in the 1920s; but it is a Formalism in 
which the features of a Bakhtinian clown engaged in polemical stupidity can be 
clearly discerned.  Accordingly, this analysis problematizes both Bakhtin’s reception 
of Formalism and those elements of his early aesthetic philosophy which are held to 
provide alternatives to the extra-historical dictates of synchronic literary laws; yet 
remains sensitive to the convergences between Formalism and Bakhtin’s 
emancipatory conceptualization of the novel.  Bakhtin and Formalism are not an 
‘either/or’ proposition, and in many ways their thought can be described as 
complementary.  However, Bakhtin’s treatment of embodiment in his early aesthetic 
theory has been taken, so to say, at its word as a viable alternative to Russian 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
(Dmitriev 2009b: 70-95).  Dmitriev’s study is of particular interest, given that it includes a discussion of 
the Moscow Linguistic Circle, the State Academy of Artistic Sciences in Moscow and various 
academic and artistic circles in Moscow at the time.  It is, however, subject to a disappointing 
positivism in how it understands intellectual influence and the exchange of ideas.  As I shall argue in 
chapter four of this analysis, Tynianov formulates a highly productive conceptualization of how the 
literary personality emerges in different epochs.  Dmitriev is particularly unsympathetic to 
reconstructions of Russian Formalism from the 1960s onwards, and prefers to confine himself to 
historical documents and data.  As such, I would argue that Dmitriev remains blind to some of the 
insights that the Formalists had to offer for those engaged in academic labour.  For another example 
of Dmitriev’s approach directed at Formalism’s legacy in the west, see (Dmitriev 2010: 63-91). 
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Formalism when, potentially, it is the latter and its dialectical treatment of 
materialism that provides a potential alternative for the praxis of literary theory and 
how it conceptualizes its own history as a discipline. 
VIII 
Hegel begins the Phenomenology of Spirit with a critique of the very idea of a 
beginning (Hegel 1977: 1-2).  In his first two Critiques Kant establishes the 
essentially anachronistic nature of critique: it must always come afterwards.  Kant 
did not, however, believe that this insight necessitated a radical restructuring of 
philosophical discourse.  As Guyer has noted, the structure of the Critique of Pure 
Reason is (with the one exception of the section titled ‘The Transcendental 
Aesthetic’) generic and conforms to the structure of a contemporary textbook on 
logic (Guyer 2006: 51-3).  Hegel takes a more radical approach to the structure of 
philosophical discourse and argues that the idea of a beginning in philosophy is 
misleading.  Hegel sees no worth in organizing philosophical argument in a way that 
manifests a conventional beginning, middle and an end as his variety of dialectical 
reasoning is incompatible with such an a structure.  It is worth repeating that Hegel’s 
orientation is no less emancipatory than Kant’s or Bakhtin’s, and his rebellion 
against the reified structures of then contemporary philosophical discourse is 
consistent with his ethical drive towards freedom.   
Given that this analysis is a doctoral thesis, and as such is compelled to work within 
much more restricted confines, Hegel’s ethical (and liberating) critique of structure 
cannot be replicated here.  Nevertheless, I have tried to remain true to the spirit of 
such emancipatory critique, if not the letter.  Like Kant, my argument has a broadly 
conventional structure, and the subsequent analysis has eight chapters, each of 
which has a title which identifies a paradox that is exemplary of post-Kantian 
modernity in general or Russian Formalist critique in particular.  The first chapter 
treats the paradox of objectivity in the thought of Kant and Hegel.  It proceeds from 
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the proposition that all of the philosophers and theorists critiqued here are 
contradictory, and their work occasionally stages a retreat from an open, liberating 
contradiction to the surety of reified closure.  Rather than glossing over such 
contradictions, I contend that they are to be welcomed, and explore how Kant’s and 
Hegel’s ground-breaking treatment of objective critique is contradicted by both 
philosophers’ reductive aesthetic theory.  The discussion of Kant’s philosophy 
argues that Kantian consciousness is a structure of mutually constitutive 
contradictions, where the world and the faculties of the mind are opposed to one 
another.  It is largely consistent with Henrich’s account of Kant’s philosophy, but 
includes the additional element of motion, as well as the import of Kant’s practical 
philosophy as it is articulated in the essay ‘What is Enlightenment?’.  The sections 
on Hegel are limited to Hegel’s dialectic and the role of anachronism in Hegel’s 
thought.  The aesthetic philosophies of Kant and Hegel are staged as reductive 
contradictions of both philosophers’ emancipatory account of objectivity. 
The subsequent five chapters establish Russian Formalism as an objective 
aesthetic theory that, unlike Kant and Hegel, does not retreat into reified closure.  
Russian Formalism, it shall be argued, is a manifestation of a paradoxical critical 
paradigm that facilitates many insights into literary art and the life world that resides 
beyond its material parameters.  It is also a paradigm that demands an 
emancipatory engagement with its broader cultural environment, but one where that 
engagement is undertaken on the basis that an author-critic is a finite being active in 
an objectifying world where impersonal method is beyond intentional control.  For 
this finite being to be free, she must polemically contradict others yet never forget 
her own ultimate brainlessness in the face of the objective world.  It is, ultimately, a 
paradigm of dialectical materialism.  Accordingly, the second chapter explores 
Shklovsky’s treatment of device, narrative, ostranenie, non-recognition and literary 
material, and considers how he identifies literary structures that cannot be reduced 
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to automatized closure.  I establish the convergences between Kant’s structure of 
mutually constitutive contradictions and Shklovsky’s calibration of literary art’s 
paradoxical properties.  I do acknowledge some convergences with Hegel, but I 
consider the extent to which Hegel’s ambiguous treatment of sense certainty is 
different to Shklovsky’s concept of ostranenie.  The third chapter argues that 
Eikhenbaum’s analysis of Gogol΄’s The Overcoat replicates Shklovsky’s elaboration 
of paradoxical structures in its analysis of the category of the grotesque.  
Eikhenbaum’s polemical critique of traditional deployments of the author in literary 
criticism is also considered, as is the apparent consistency between how 
Eikhenbaum categorizes authorship and the broader category of the grotesque.  
Historically, Kant has not been regarded as a supporter of grotesque, but I argue 
that alienation and paradoxical differences figure in his philosophy in a way which is 
analogous to Eikhenbaum’s critique of the grotesque in Gogol΄. I also consider the 
validity of Bakhtin’s objections to Eikhenbaum’s calibration of skaz.   
The fourth chapter is devoted to Tynianov, and outlines how his conceptualization of 
literary facts, genre and constructive relationships replicate the same tendency 
toward objective paradox provided by Kant, Hegel, Shklovsky and Eikhenbaum.  In 
addition to considering Tynianov’s programme for literary theory and its role in 
cultural construction, I argue that Hegel’s dialectical logic manifests itself in many 
aspects of Tynianov’s theory, particularly in his critique of an author’s ‘orientation’, 
which he exposes as a ‘literary fact’, or, in other words, an impersonal objectification 
active in the life context around literature. Chapter 5 provides a much needed re-
evaluation of Eikhenbaum’s treatment of the ‘literary environment’ and establishes 
the many consistencies between this later concept and his earlier conceptualization 
of authorship articulated in the Gogol΄ essay. Eikhenbaum’s discussion of an 
author’s social class reveals an interesting manifestation of anachronism in 
Formalist critique, and offers many apparent convergences with Tynianov’s concept 
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of the literary personality. The sixth and seventh chapters concern two of 
Shklovsky’s theoretical novels: Zoo… and Third Factory; and critique Shklovsky’s 
treatment of ethical commitment in the face of attempts to limit authorial freedom in 
statist Soviet culture and in the brainless modernity of impersonal objective method 
which he and his fellow Formalists have set in motion. Both novels complement 
Eikhenbaum’s and Tynianov’s conceptualization of authorship as being alienated 
from an objective literary structure, but both Zoo… and Third Factory provide a 
stronger iteration of Kantian freedom, in that both novels imply that this alienation is 
painful, and one where the free play with objective literary structures is necessarily 
finite.  The final chapter provides a highly sceptical response to the Bakhtin Circle’s 
criticisms of Russian Formalism in their work from the Soviet 1920s.  It includes a 
comparison between the modernity staged by Shklovsky in Zoo…, Konstantin 
Vaginov’s novel The Goat Song and the Bakhtin Circle’s early aesthetic philosophy.  
I argue that Bakhtin and Medvedev’s accounts of Russian Formalism are highly 
problematic, both in terms of their descriptions of Formalism and the alternatives 
which they offer to Formalist thought.  The chapter does, however, conclude with a 
possible point of convergence between the two schools of thought in Bakhtin’s 
conceptualization of genre from his writings on the novel. 
Hegel’s contempt for reified structures which manifest a beginning, a middle and an 
end extended to his views on semantics.  Bencivenga contrasts Hegel’s views on 
semantics with those of Aristotle, and argues that Hegel consistently rejects any 
variety of reified semantics where the determinate meaning of a word can be fixed.  
The meaning of any given term is, for Hegel, never fixed. It will dialectically evolve 
and assume new meanings, and the practical site of its application in any one 
present is the best indicator as to its meaning, albeit in a trajectory towards its own 
negation (Bencivenga 2000: 16-41).  Once again, the genre of the doctoral thesis is 
particularly ill-suited to such a dialectical logic, and I am duty bound (albeit not in the 
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Kantian sense) to provide a few definitions of certain terms which will recur over the 
pages of this analysis. 
Even at this preliminary stage, it will hopefully be clear that by ‘dialectics’ I do not in 
any way endorse the reified paradigm of thesis – antithesis – synthesis.  The sense 
in which I use the term here is broadly consistent with that sketched in Chapter 1, 
where I summarise Hegel’s dialectic of objectivity.  In this iteration, dialectics can be 
said to exhibit a trajectory of thesis to synthesis, but it is categorically not a reified or 
abstract relationship.  In contrast, this dialectic manifests a dynamic, historically 
grounded site of struggle between two opposing and yet contingent positions.  
Shklovsky argues in Third Factory that abstract formal schemas are utterly 
inadequate to cultural phenomena, and it is important to study the phenomena in 
question in their contingent surroundings (Shklovsky 2002: 378; 2001: 64-5).  By 
contingent surroundings, it must be noted that the very terms themselves have an 
important mediating influence on any one given instance of the dialectic, be it in 
terms of the relationship between opposing terms or the broader historical context in 
which they are situated.  Accordingly, it shall be argued that Shklovsky’s treatment 
of narrative, Tynianov’s concepts of authorial intention and constructive functions, 
and Shklovsky’s parody of crude dialectical materialism in Third Factory are all 
examples of dialectics.      
My use of the term ‘ethics’ is informed by both Foucault and Critchley.  For Foucault, 
there is not one ethics, but an infinite variety of ethics that can be grouped under the 
heading ‘care of the self’ (Foucault 2000: 253-80).  There are a number of such 
ethics which could be used to critique Russian Formalism, such as how Shklovsky’s 
ostranenie suggests an ethics of pleasure.8  However, my analysis is largely 
confined to what could be termed an ‘ethics of objectivity’ or a ‘scientific’ ethics.  The 
philosophies of Kant and Hegel are, from the very outset of their most well-known 
                                                          
8 See Emerson’s discussion of Shklovsky’s aesthetics of arousal in (Emerson 2005: 637-44). 
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works, actively engaged in formulating philosophical propositions on an objective 
and scientific basis (Kant 1998: 106-24) (Hegel 1977: 3-7) (Hegel 2010: 45-57).  
Russian Formalism is no less concerned with providing an objective, scientific basis 
for literary studies.  Whether it be practical Kantian critique or the disciplinary praxis 
of laying bare the device, these scientific ethics all pertain to experience.  For 
Critchley, ethics cannot exist as a formal or abstract category removed from 
experience, and he accordingly refers to ethical experience which ‘is an activity 
whereby new objects emerge for a subject involved in the process of their creation’ 
(Critchley 2012: 14).  This variety of experience gives rise to an ongoing circle of 
experience, whereby the subject is endlessly disappointed with experience (be it 
with the world or with itself), which in turn gives rise to a new ethical demand to 
contend with whatever current disappointment plagues the subject.  Formalist 
literary theory can usefully be critiqued on such an ethical basis, where the material 
object of their literary studies emerged along with the discipline itself.  In the 
following analysis the terms ‘ethics’, ‘disappointment’ and ‘demand’ are all used in 
this sense outlined here. 
Critchley himself provides a positive response to Foucaultian ethics which, after 
Foucault, he summarises as the work of the self upon itself (Critchley 2012: 11).  
However, Critchley is concerned that Foucault’s ethics are continually preoccupied 
with the mastery of the self.  This is, so Critchley argues, incompatible with that 
variety of post-Kantian self which is always divided, and which always gives rise to 
the demands and disappointments of ethical experience.  I do not agree with 
Critchley on this point, and Foucault’s suggestion that the care of the self is a 
‘practice of freedom’ hints that he is not entirely blind to Kantian critique (Foucault 
2000: 284).  Indeed, there is a continuous undercurrent in this analysis which argues 
that Foucault’s philosophy (be it early or late) can be productively deployed 
alongside Kantian critique, be it as a complimentary gesture or to contradict the 
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validity of a given proposition.  Throughout this analysis, Foucault’s concepts of 
‘genealogy’, ‘historical ontologies’ and impersonal ‘discursive formations’ that cannot 
be attributed to a single voice are productively deployed to both critique Formalist 
theory and explain a particular discursive strategy. 
All the above definitions and the subsequent analysis are, of course, entirely of the 
moment of their writing and await their impending contradiction by their readers, or 
the author in a subsequent work. 
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1: Objectivity  
‘Here a strange, unexpected course is revealed in human affairs, as happens 
elsewhere too if it is considered in the large, where almost everything is paradoxical’ 
(Kant 1996: 22). 
‘The figure of thought that dominated the theoretical work of the so-called Russian 
Formalists, exerting a centripetal force on often disparate positions, was paradox’ 
(Renfrew 2010: 1). 
I 
Amongst the broad corpus of scholarship concerned with early Soviet intellectual 
culture, two recent interventions stand out due to their ostensibly paradoxical 
conclusions.  In the first, Galin Tihanov maintains that Russian Formalism, as an 
offshoot of late modernity, shares common characteristics with Marxism, positivism 
and classical Freudian psychoanalysis (Tihanov 2004a: 52-8).   Since Viktor Erlich’s 
ground-breaking study of Russian Formalism in the mid-1950s, these three trends 
have been regarded as opposites (and disciplinary rivals) of Russian Formalism as it 
sought to establish itself in post-Revolutionary cultural life (Erlich 1965: 19-32 & 171-
211).  The fundamental opposition between the three disciplinary fields emerges 
most acutely around the tipping point of the aesthetic.  One way or another, all three 
trends insist that art is a representational form that replicates (or sublimates) a state 
of affairs which exists elsewhere, beyond the literary work of art.  Nominally, the so-
called Formalists were steadfastly opposed to such a representational paradigm that 
insisted on art’s relationship to any matters beyond the text, be they the world of ‘life’ 
or the psychology of the author intentionally writing a given text.  Despite such 
irreconcilable differences Tihanov concludes that all three areas of intellectual 
endeavour aspired to scientific status, and were competitors in the field of rational 
enquiry into the objective laws of human activity (Tihanov 2004a: 57-8).  By 
implication, aspirations towards scientific status, rationality and the discernment of 
laws governed and determined by objective principles all foster contradiction, 
paradox and struggle in human affairs.  Instead of providing a calm order of 
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measured enquiry, the objective serves to limit human intention and self-
determination, and fosters alterity and disciplinary conflict. 
The second paradoxical intervention concerns not Russian Formalism, but one of its 
more enduring critics.  In Towards a New Material Aesthetics, Alastair Renfrew 
argues that the thought of the Bakhtin Circle is an attempt to reconcile overlapping 
iterations of the two dominant forces in twentieth century intellectual life: materialism 
and idealism; life and art; fact and value.  The more inter-determinate categories of 
heterglossia, voice, dialogue, embodiment and genre are, Renfrew argues, 
counterpoised in the thought of the Bakhtin Circle by the more reified and broadly 
materialist terms of carnival and chronotope (Renfrew 2006: 118-141).  Rather than 
glossing over this contradiction, Renfrew implies that it is to be welcomed. Instead of 
undermining the on-going utility of the Bakhtin Circle’s thought, Renfrew argues that 
this contradiction actively reinforces it, demonstrating its capacity for ‘deconstructive 
synthesis through negation’ (Renfrew 2006: 13-16 & 21).  Renfrew’s programme, 
whereby concretely inter-determinate dialogue serves to negate reified and crudely 
determinate material(isms) is certainly appealing, and reverberates with positive 
echoes of elements of Hegel, Marx and Foucault.  Yet Renfrew’s choice of such 
terminology as ‘synthesis’ and ‘negation’ is itself paradoxical, for it implies Bakhtin is 
a variety of thinker which he nominally was not: dialectical.9  Bakhtin uses the term 
dialectic infrequently, and he appears staunchly opposed to those forms of the 
dialectic which have endured in a wide spectrum of twentieth-Century thought. 
Hegelian dialectics are, for Bakhtin, geared towards teleological closure. Negation is 
a concept with which Bakhtin is profoundly reluctant to ‘tarry’, and, in his early 
philosophy, is even actively hostile towards.10  There is none of the ‘restlessness’, 
                                                          
9 There is an additional irony to Renfrew’s suggestion that Bakhtin practices a deconstructive 
synthesis through negation, as Bakhtin and Renfrew himself can in no way be regarded as exemplars 
of the deconstruction practiced by, among others, Derrida. 
10 For an example of Bakhtin’s hostility to negation in his early philosophy, he specifically 
differentiates cognition from the embodied aesthetic event by designating cognition as negative.  As 
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‘openness’ and productive struggle which figures as diverse as Bakhtin’s 
contemporaries Shklovsky and Yury Tynianov, as well as such later figures as Jean-
Luc Nancy, Jacques Lacan, Fredric Jameson, Robert Pippin, Stephen Houlgate, 
Theodore Adorno, Judith Butler, Raya Dunayevskaya, Jean-Michel Rabaté, Louis 
Althusser and, most vocally, Slavoj Žižek have, in one form or another, identified in 
dialectics in the aftermath of Hegel.  Despite their nominal preoccupation with 
distinct critical debates, Renfrew’s remarks complement Tihanov’s perceptive 
critique of Formalism and its methodological opponents, where a paradoxical 
convergence emerges between nominally divergent positions.  In both cases, a 
collective self-identity predicated upon difference in the face of its other – that is, 
Formalism in the face of Marxism, Bakhtin in the face of dialectics – collapses 
through common methodological precepts that come to constitute the object of their 
respective critical praxis.  
These general problems of paradox fostered by the impersonal forces of objectivity, 
method and dialectics have, perhaps surprisingly, a very specific point of origin that 
would prove prescient for much of the subsequent trajectory of literary theory: 
Bakhtin’s reception of Russian Formalism.  Tihanov’s suggestion that Formalism 
exhibits the qualities of positivism implicitly echoes Bakhtin’s reaching more or less 
the same conclusion in his early unpublished essay ‘The Problem of Material, 
Content and Form in Literary Art’, albeit without the negative connotations which 
positivism carries for Bakhtin.  Renfrew’s discussion of Bakhtin’s more inter-
determinate, embodied dialogue is specifically calibrated as Bakhtin’s efforts to 
overcome what he regarded as Marxism’s and Formalism’s reified accounts of what 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
such, the ethical and the beautiful are alien to cognition.  In addition, Bakhtin is at pains to 
differentiate how the aesthetic event overcomes determinate language from cognition’s negative 
capacity to overcome determinate language with algebraic symbols and abbreviations   (Bakhtin 
2003: 304-8; 1990: 296-300). For Bakhtin’s attitude towards Hegel, see (Tihanov 2000: 153-9) and 
(Côté 2000: 20-42).  Côté’s study is of particular relevance for the present study, given that he notes 
how Bakhtin’s concept of dialogue effectively replicates the features of Hegelian dialectics despite 
Bakhtin’s ostensible opposition to the teleological closure provided by the Hegelian paradigm.  As 
such, Bakhtin’s reception of Hegel could be regarded as ‘non-linear’ or even dialectical. 
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constitutes literature’s material.  Renfrew even goes so far as arguing that such 
ostensible opposites are, in their conceptualizations of literary material, two sides of 
the same coin.   Indeed, the ‘Problem of Material, Content and Form in Literary Art’ 
is commonly accepted as Bakhtin’s attempt to provide an alternative basis for the 
objective analysis of literary texts that does not, despite its very objectivity, succumb 
to the positivist appeal of reified material things, be they in the ‘materialist’ world of 
life or the material, thingly object of literary art itself (Bakhtin 2003 : 265-324; 1990 : 
257-318).  
Yet, in providing an alternative to Formalism’s reductive attraction towards 
‘positivism’, is not Bakhtin himself guilty of a reduction that distorts Formalist theory 
in some way?   The paradoxes of objectivity clearly problematize direct and 
simplistic readings of influence and reception—be they positive or hostile—at the 
level of general theoretical inquiry and, inevitably, the particular level of Bakhtin’s 
reception of Formalist thought.   In the chapter from which the opening quotation is 
taken, Renfrew is at pains to emphasize that conventional, positivist understanding 
of historical change, cultural exchange and inter-personal influence are self-
evidently inadequate to the material events of twentieth-century cultural history:  
This, consistent with figures of paradox, shift and nonlinear succession that have 
driven the current essay, implies not only an alternative to straightforward, positivist 
models of direct filiation or ‘influence’, but also a quite particular effect of that non-
linearity.  Bakhtin, in other words, was partially and indirectly instrumental in 
conditioning the context of his own reception  (Renfrew 2010: 15). 
These remarks state the core concern of an essay that underlines the complex inter-
connection between Bakhtin and Russian Formalism, and in many respects 
compliments Renfrew’s own preference for deconstructive synthesis through 
negation stated in his earlier Material Aesthetics.  Ostensibly a text which argues 
that the reception of Bakhtin’s thought in post-war literary theory was, to no small 
extent, indirectly conditioned by Bakhtin himself, Renfrew adopts the Formalist 
terminology of paradoxes and knight’s moves to account for the mis-
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comprehensions and contradictions that mark debates over the nascent disciplines 
of literary studies and linguistics in the early Soviet Union, and which effectively 
continued in the reception of Bakhtin’s thought in the hands of Roland Barthes and 
Iulia Kristeva during the transitions from structuralism to post-structuralism and 
beyond  (Renfrew 2010: 9-15 & 19-21).    On this basis, it is in no way given that 
Bakhtin’s reception of Russian Formalism amounts to the ‘truthful’ summation of the 
movement’s contribution to early Soviet intellectual culture, regardless of how 
productive the Bakhtin Circle’s resulting capacity for deconstructive synthesis 
through negation may be in cultural studies.   
This analysis will push the topoi of paradox, shift and nonlinear succession to 
altogether more radical extremes, providing a basis upon which certain Russian 
Formalists’ aspirations towards scientific status, objective laws and their co-requisite 
conceptualizations of material can be recognized as being pervaded by 
contradiction, non-linearity and negation in a manner entirely consistent with those 
statements regarding the nature of literary evolution with which Renfrew perceptively 
critiques Bakhtin’s relationship with Formalism, Soviet linguistics, Barthes and 
beyond.  The radicalness of the knight’s move here resides not in the non-linear 
trajectory which is pursued beyond Formalism in the field of twentieth-century 
literary theory, but in its retrospective glance to a distant figure, historically and 
geographically removed from the Revolutionary decade that followed the Bolshevik 
Revolution, in late eighteenth-century Königsberg.  This turn to Kant is categorically 
not an attempt to establish the ‘Kantianism’ of Russian Formalism or figure the 
Russian Formalists as sympathetic Kantians who read and positively understood 
Kant, and wrote literary theory under the direct influence of Kantian philosophy.  
Such a move would be absurd and, as already noted, such positive accounts of 
influence and reception are inadequate.  Rather, the turn to Kant is undertaken on 
the basis that the Bakhtinian alternative to what he regards as Formalism’s scientific 
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reification of literary material is not merely a distortion of many attributes of Russian 
Formalism, but, more importantly, a solution to a problem that did not and still does 
not exist.  This problem is objectivity, and it is, I argue, in Kant’s Critique of Pure 
Reason and Critique of Practical Reason that the paradoxical attributes of objective 
knowledge are already realized, and objectivity is shown to be something altogether 
more profound than abstract empirical knowledge.  It is vitally important not to 
confuse positivist science of material objects with objectivity.  The latter term, unlike 
the former, is capable of accommodating paradox, both in terms of its object and in 
its awareness that objective method itself constitutes its object.  Indeed, in its 
Kantian formation, it is precisely objective knowledge that is capable of 
accommodating empirical, positivist science and those elements which, of necessity, 
remain beyond the reach of such empirical knowledge.  In addition, Kant himself 
appears to contradict the radical figuring of objective knowledge in his earlier 
Critiques in The Critique of the Power of Judgement, and it is precisely his reductive 
conceptualization of art that allows him to do so.   
Ultimately, the wager here is that Formalism provides an objective account of art in 
a manner analogous to the treatment of objective knowledge in the first two 
Critiques, and which resists that problematic moment of closure provided by the 
third Critique.  Yet, Bakhtin’s ‘correction’ of ‘positivist’ Russian Formalism maintains 
precisely the Kantian error of the third Critique, where art affords the human subject 
a unitary relationship with the natural world. 
There is no denying that the Russian Formalists showed great disdain for 
metaphysics.  The Formalists’ dislike of metaphysics prefigures Renfrew’s 
suggestion that Formalist and Marxist conceptualizations of literary material are two 
sides of the same coin.  For the Formalists, Oleksandr Potebnia’s influential concept 
of thinking in images, textual manifestations of an author’s class ideology, and 
representations of the life world’s socio-economic reality are all metaphysics, and 
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should be dismissed from objective literary studies (Tynianov 1977: 270; 2000: 46) 
(Eikhenbaum 1987: 431-2; 2002: 60-2).  How is this possible?  The objective study 
of literature should make no recourse to elements outside of the text, particularly 
when engaged in the study of the construction of verbal art.  In addition, the 
Formalists consistently rejected any iteration of the laws of literary construction as 
being representational or in any way causal or determinist.  Therefore symbolic 
images, authorial intention, social class, representational determinism all perpetuate 
the metaphysical paradigm of object and the thing-in-itself that lies beyond.  The 
object (in this case literature), is forever stuck in a subordinate role to the abstract 
thing-in-itself to which it has no access, and is merely an inferior copy.     In the 
‘Potebnia’ essay and the well-known ‘Art as Device’, Shklovsky clearly sees himself 
as providing an alternative to such ‘Kantian’ dualisms of ‘fact’ and ‘value’ with a new, 
scientific discipline of objective literary study where meaning is held to be immanent 
to literary form and categorically not located in an ‘elsewhere’ beyond the text, and 
which is discerned by the reader through physical sensations which demonstrate the 
existence of a concrete literary construction (Shklovsky 1919: 4) (Shklovsky 1929: 7-
23; 1998: 1-14).  As will be argued throughout this analysis, the material object-
structures sought by the Russian Formalists share a great deal in common with 
those transcendentally deduced by their Kantian forebear, and in seeking to provide 
an alternative to ‘metaphysics’, they inadvertently and indirectly provide an objective 
methodological insight that comes close to realizing the potential of Kant’s objective 
philosophy beyond the reductive ‘fact’ and ‘value’ binary that both Kant and 
Formalism are incorrectly deemed to perpetuate.     
In what follows, it will be argued that Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason provides an 
account of the conditions of possibility of consciousness (or, more specifically, 
synthetic a priori cognition) which, in turn, provide an objective, universal basis for 
the a priori morality of the categorical imperative, human autonomy and the natural 
30 
 
sciences. These conditions of possibility are structural yet, of necessity, 
contradictory and paradoxical. Within this overall structure of consciousness, the 
faculties of reason, understanding and imagination are located in opposition to one 
another; and this immanent matrix of contradictions is itself located in opposition to 
both the sensory intuitions of the natural world and the material ‘thing-in-itself.’  The 
Critique of the Power of Judgement constitutes something of a retreat from its more 
radical predecessor, in that the natural sciences, and the properties of the 
understanding and determining judgements which predominate in such disciplinary 
activity, are regarded as a destructive force that isolates, exploits and destroys the 
resources of the natural world out of self-interest.  To counter-pose these forces, 
Kant argues that the beauty of the natural world and works of art are purposive.   
For Kant, when the subject beholds a beautiful artwork the accompanying feeling of 
pleasure, aesthetic ideas and judgements all lack any expression of the personal 
interest or gain that predominates in the determining judgements of the natural 
sciences, and therefore guarantee human moral freedom and limit the destructive 
reach of the natural sciences.  The radical contradictory structure of consciousness 
in the first Critique is, in terms of the subject’s relationship with the natural world, 
exempted from the potentially destructive forces of objectivity and method; and 
human autonomy is guaranteed through analogy with the beauty of art and the 
natural world.  
In Russian Formalism, some one hundred and thirty years of knight’s moves after 
Kant’s critiques, and in a revolutionary intellectual climate largely hostile to 
‘idealism’, these tensions between the demands for an objective methodology of 
scientific enquiry and an autonomous art which might, possibly, guarantee human 
freedom are debated, thematized and problematized to startling and endlessly 
productive effect; the competition over rational, objective inquiry into the human 
contradicted with concerns over autonomy, morality and what significance should be 
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granted to the human body’s physical sensations.  Or, in other words, might not 
Kant and Russian Formalism provide complementary moments of radical insight 
whose effects have hitherto lacked the scholarly attention they deserve? 
II 
The Kant who provides an account of consciousness’s conditions of possibility, the 
natural sciences and autonomous, a priori moral freedom is admittedly less familiar 
than the conventionalized ‘idealist’ Kant, who insists that human subjectivity is 
alienated from the material world of the thing-in-itself.  This latter Kant, thought 
erroneously to be a continuation of the Cartesian ‘hopelessly riven I-think’ (Holquist 
and Kliger 2008: 613),11 is by far the more familiar, and is doubtless exemplary of 
the ‘metaphysics’ identified by the Russian Formalists themselves.  The former, 
more radical Kant has received its most sympathetic reception in the work of Dieter 
Henrich.  For Henrich, Kant’s concept of the thing-in-itself lacks the pejorative, 
alienating status accorded to it by Kant’s more un-sympathetic readers, of whom 
Lenin is a particularly vicious example. In Materialism and Empiro-criticism, Lenin 
regards Kant’s philosophy as being typical of idealist, dualistic nonsense that is 
tantamount to an expression of religious faith, and which therefore denies the 
human subject empowering, scientific knowledge of the material world and 
perpetuates the oppression of the proletariat by the capitalist apparatus’s religious 
and scholarly apologists (Lenin: 2002).12  Henrich acknowledges this 
conventionalised meaning of the thing-in-itself as a ‘thing to which we do not have 
any access’ (Henrich 2003: 49), but insists that this does not foster a dualism in 
                                                          
11 For Kant’s own refutation that his Critique of Pure Reason amounts to such an ‘I think’ (or, in Kant’s 
own words, a ‘refutation of psychological idealism, and a strict proof (the only possible one, I believe) 
of the objective reality of outer intuition’), see (Kant 1998: 121-22 & 321-333). 
12 Lev Trotsky would repeat the crude materialist terms of this mis-guided attack on idealist 
philosophy in his no less misguided attack on Formalism in Literature and Revolution [Literatura i 
revolutsiia], equating the Formalists’ ‘idealist’ emphasis on literary form with religious dogma  (Trotsky 
1991: 138-53).  Given the Formalists’ propensity to dismiss a materialist life-art determinism, authorial 
class-ideology and Potebnia’s thinking in images as equally idealist or metaphysical, it is apparent 
that the accusation of ‘idealism’ in the Soviet 1920s is an altogether different discursive formation 
from the German idealism of Kant and Hegel, and effectively provides an indirect, positive reception 
of Kant and Hegel’s refutation of a similar ‘idealism’ and ‘metaphysics’ some 120 years previously.   
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Kant’s thought.  Once the thing-in-itself is conceptualized amongst the many topoi 
that exemplify Kantian thought (which include appearance, the given and its being 
given in spatio-temporal form, sensibility and intellect, understanding and reason), it 
emerges as just one component of what Henrich conceptualizes as a multi-
dimensional structure composed of active and passive elements, and which cannot 
therefore be reduced to a mere dualism.  Kant, so Henrich argues, demands that the 
human subject is active and is therefore not the passive, deluded and dis-
empowered subject identified by Lenin. It is this activity of the self, which processes 
the material givens of the thing-in-itself and appearance that Henrich and, for that 
matter, Theodor Adorno, regard as constitutive of an ontology in Kant’s philosophy, 
and it is precisely the complex, multi-dimensional structure of Kantian thought that 
sets this ontological praxis in motion (Henrich 2003: 49-52) (Adorno 2001: 85-8, 93, 
125-6, 164-5).13 
This co-extensive interest in the complex structures of thought, and conceiving 
thought itself as a practical activity has consequences for the implicit relationship 
between form and content.  As Henrich notes with regard to this self-as-praxis: 
‘What I am thinking is something different from the structure ‘I think’ and is 
contingent in relation to it.  There is no determinate thought that is analytically 
implied in the thought ‘I think’.  The self is, therefore, empty, and is an activity that 
requires an object be given to it in order for it to exist’ (Henrich 2003: 43 emphasis 
added).  Form and content are therefore contingent upon one-another, and it is only 
over time that the subject’s identity emerges through repeated acts of synthesis: ‘No 
self is possible unless it exists in such a way that there is an original relationship 
                                                          
13 Adorno is, I think, entirely correct when he notes that Kant’s effort to ‘salvage’ ontology through a 
philosophy of contradictions is implicitly dialectical, and one where ontology is possible only through 
its impossibility.  It is important to note that Adorno’s insistence that Kant’s philosophy manifests a 
‘block’ that precludes knowledge of the social world (and a Marxist ethical engagement with social 
problems) merely reflects Adorno’s own preference for dialectical critique, and is accordingly only one 
side of the delicate balance that is counter-posed with Kant’s paradoxical edifice of contradictions 
(Adorno 2001: 170-9). 
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between it and something that is not itself but can be given to it’   (Henrich 2003: 
42). According to Henrich’s reading, Kant’s own conceptualization of transcendental 
idealism should in no way be regarded as a variety of that idealism that seeks to 
make the content of the natural world an image according to the categorical forms of 
the mind.  Kant’s notorious remark that nature is constituted by the categories of the 
mind should not necessarily be understood as a typical statement of ‘value’ that 
amounts to a flight from the material world of ‘fact’; nor, pace Lenin, does it amount 
to imposing the value of the mind on the content of material facts, yet all the while 
leaving some ‘true’ status of the material thing-in-itself ‘elsewhere’ beyond the 
reaches of knowledge.   Kant’s orientation towards objectively accounting for 
consciousness’s conditions of possibility is a transcendental deduction of how the 
mind must be in order for sensory perception (and the subsequent objective, 
scientific accounts of the natural world) to be possible.  Kant’s overall philosophical 
system is, therefore, a unitary construction, but it is an immanent construction 
composed of disparate elements that are fundamentally and of necessity other to 
themselves.  It is, in short, a paradoxical, mutually constitutive contradiction.14 
It is important to emphasize that the radical otherness and inaccessibility of the 
thing-in-itself is replicated in Kant’s denial of the possibility of self-consciousness.  
As the mind is an act of spontaneity, and not something which can be intuited 
sensuously it remains a blank spot in Kant’s thought. It is only through repeated 
historical acts of synthesis that the formal properties of the mind can be objectively 
figured in Kant’s transcendental deduction.  As Kant himself notes: ‘…I am 
conscious of myself not as I appear to myself, nor as I am in myself, but only that I 
am.  This representation is a thinking, not an intuiting… and I therefore have no 
cognition of myself as I am, but only as I appear to myself’ (Kant 1999: 259-60). As 
                                                          
14 As will become apparent in the subsequent chapters, this insistence on an immanent construction 
of mutually constitutive contradictions is replicated in Shklovsky’s and Eikhenbaum’s 
conceptualizations of literary art, and Tynianov’s attempt to conceptualize literary art’s constructive 
relationship of general and particular, life and genre.  
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with the thing-in-itself, knowledge of the self and the properties of consciousness 
can be intuited through sense (in the case of consciousness, inner sense), but such 
sensory intuition can, for Kant, only ever be a representation of consciousness 
through the activity of consciousness itself: ‘[consciousness] intuits itself not as it 
would immediately self-actively represent itself, but in accordance with the way in 
which it is affected from within, consequently as it appears to itself, not as it is […] 
as far as inner intuition is concerned we cognize our own subject only as 
appearance but not in accordance with what it is in itself’’ (Kant 1999: 258-9).  
Accordingly, as Andrew Bowie notes, the self-conscious I in Kant is an emptiness 
that empirical intuition will never be able to apprehend (Bowie 2006: 20-1).  What is 
more, as Kant notes in Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics, this representation 
of the I is ‘nothing more than a feeling of an existence without the least concept and 
it is only a representation of that to which all thinking stands in relation’ (Kant 2004: 
86).  The whole contradictory edifice of Kantian thought is predicated upon the 
subject’s two-fold alienation from the thing-in-itself and the subject-in-itself.  As 
Henrich notes, Kant correspondingly denied the possibility of accessing the roots of 
the tree of knowledge (Henrich 2003: 38), where we are provided with a definitive, 
all-encompassing explanation for why things are as they are before the fact of 
existence.  Knowledge is only ever possible after the spontaneous act of synthesis 
of the manifold, and the subject is spatially and temporally removed from any 
original ‘truth’ that might serve as the root of all possible knowledge, be it of the 
natural world or the identity of the self.15  
III 
Given Kant’s insistence on contradiction, paradox and the subject’s necessary 
inability to access these roots of knowledge, it is entirely fitting at this stage to 
                                                          
15 As will become apparent, Shklovsky, Eikhenbaum and Tynianov all accordingly refuse to provide a 
root explanation of why the literary object is as it is, for such representational-determinist explanation 
of art amounts to ‘metaphysics’.  Instead they merely ‘specify’ the qualities and attributes of literary art 
as a unitary system of contradictions.  
35 
 
emphasize the truly radical significance of his philosophy.  The co-constitutive 
nature of the great many contradictions which are the subject are not intended as a 
mere description of the subject and the conditions that make its consciousness 
possible.  The very act of critique, of philosophy itself, is itself constitutive of the 
dynamic praxis of subjectivity.  For Kant, the discipline of metaphysics and its 
subject-object are mutually constitutive of one-another in a manner entirely 
consistent with those elements of consciousness he describes in the Critiques.  In 
other words, (object)-ive method and its object are mutually constitutive.    
In light of the present discussion, the one near constant topos of the Critique of Pure 
Reason that best conveys this radical relationship between method and object is 
Kant’s paradoxical treatment of motion.16   Motion holds a particular fascination for 
Kant, and could even be said to be one of the key ‘devices’ that hold the whole 
contradictory ontology together, and which allows the narrative of the first Critique to 
progress from the proclamation of his own Copernican Revolution in philosophy in 
the introduction, to the transcendental deduction of the forms of Time and Space in 
the Transcendental Aesthetic, through to the transcendental analytic and logic, and 
on to the Doctrine of Method.  At the simplest of levels, Kant is excited by motion 
because it presupposes something in addition to the representations of time and 
space elaborated in the Transcendental Aesthetic, and therefore pertains to 
empirical experience.  The a priori forms of time and space, in and of themselves, 
do not alter; it is only objects within time and space that shift and alternate, and 
therefore the additional elements of empirical experience and the determining 
faculty of the understanding are required for an object to be recognized as being in 
motion: ‘[f]or this there is required the perception of some existence and succession 
                                                          
16 Kant’s paradoxical treatment of motion is, in terms of the Formalists’ ‘non-linear’ reception of his 
thought, of considerable importance.  Tynianov will insist that literature and the literary fact are 
dynamic, and engaged in constant movement.  In Zoo, Shklovsky expands on his earlier treatment of 
narrative as both static and restlessly dynamic, and hints that modernity itself is denoted by the 
paradoxical tension between stasis and movement.    
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of its determinations, thus experience’ (Kant 1998: 180).   To offer an example which 
is already familiar, it is only through temporal experience that the contradictorily 
opposed determinations of the knight on the chess board can be successively 
encountered.  This, in turn, facilitates the concept of time, which pertains to the 
understanding, and therefore explains the possibility of the mind’s capacity for 
synthetic a priori cognition and the empirical, scientific theory of the laws of physical 
motion.17   Motion is, therefore, crucial to Kant’s account of the conditions of 
possibility of consciousness, where the synthetic a priori cognitions of 
consciousness must be so in order for empirical experience to be not only possible, 
but also objectively valid: ‘But motion, as description of a space, is a pure act of the 
successive synthesis of the manifold in outer intuition in general through productive 
imagination, and belongs not only to geometry but even to transcendental 
philosophy’  (Kant 1998: 179-80).18 
The essential paradox of Kant’s treatment of motion is revealed in the phrase ‘the 
successive synthesis of the manifold’.  Kant has said that motion requires empirical 
experience beyond the representations of time and space, yet he also insists that 
consciousness itself cannot intuit itself and lies beyond the reaches of empirical 
experience.  Kant therefore distinguishes between motion as the determination of an 
object, and motion as the activity of the subject, that is, the very act of synthesis of 
the manifold in time and space.  With this activity, the motion of the subject’s 
consciousness produces the concept of succession.  The inner intuition of the I is a 
production of the imagination through its affecting inner sense.  Were the self not a 
                                                          
17 The fundamental import that Kant grants this paradoxical theory of motion is demonstrated in the 
following remarks: ‘Only in time can both contradictorily opposed determinations in one thing be 
encountered, namely successively.  Our concept of time therefore explains the possibility of as much 
synthetic a priori cognition as is presented by the general theory of motion, which is no less fruitful 
(Kant 1998: 179-80). 
18 Kant adds: ‘‘Here I add further that the concept of alternation, and, with it, the concept of motion (as 
alteration of place), is only possible through and in the representation of time – that if this 
representation were not a priori (inner) intuition, then no concept, whatever it might be, could make 
comprehensible the possibility of an alteration, i.e., of a combination of contradictorily opposed 
predicates (e.g., a thing’s being in a place and the not-being of the very same thing in the same place) 
in one and the same object (Kant 1998: 179-80). 
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dynamic activity in motion, where contradictory intuitions are processed by the 
contradictory structure of productive consciousness successively, then Kant’s whole 
project would fail.  Kant insists that the immanent production and successive 
determinations of inner sense be ordered in time, and that the subject is, by virtue of 
this motion, denied access to the root truth of consciousness as it is in and of itself:  
…hence we must order the determinations of inner sense as appearances in time in 
just the same way as we order those of outer sense in space […] if we admit about 
the latter that we cognize objects by their means only insofar as we are externally 
affected, then we must also concede that through inner sense we intuit ourselves 
only as we are internally affected by ourselves, i.e., as far as inner intuition is 
concerned we cognize our own subject only as appearance but not in accordance 
with what it is in itself (Kant 1998: 258-9). 
Kant argues that even when there is no empirical motion, which is to say that there 
is no motion, there is still motion in the productive activity of the consciousness.  The 
Kantian self is dynamic, a constantly moving praxis of intuition and production, but, 
to repeat, it is a dynamic praxis that always comes afterwards, be it the given 
material of intuition or the productive affectation of inner sense.  If it is to constitute 
the subject, the material object has to come before its cognitive processing.   
Henrich, who does not explicitly address the paradoxical figuring of motion in Kant, 
argues that this insistence on the dynamic subject that emerges through processing 
its object renders Kant’s entire project historical, be it in terms of how Kant 
understands the activity of the self, or, no less significantly, how Kant understands 
the objective function of critique in the discipline of metaphysics.   Kant’s accounting 
for the conditions of possibility is, cliché as it is to say it, an attempt to overcome the 
impasse between Humean scepticism on the one hand and dogmatic rationalism on 
the other.  Kant’s project of critique must, of necessity, come after these moments in 
the history of philosophy, and, if Kant is to succeed, these moments must be shown 
to be illusory, just as, analogously, Shklovsky sees himself as rejecting the illusion of 
Potebnian thinking-in-images in preference for the objectively determined material 
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work of literature.  Accordingly, Henrich argues, the concept of the beginning 
becomes highly problematic, as ‘one cannot get to the truth all at once at the 
beginning’   (Henrich 2003: 32). Instead of the ‘truth’, Henrich sees Kant as 
demanding that philosophy must develop a system of metaphysical statements and 
proofs that accommodates contradiction, that accommodates the movement of the 
dynamic self in its cognitive activity, and that therefore accommodates that moment 
of illusion that came before it.  Kant’s philosophy, which argues that form and 
content, object and representation, self and object are mutually constitutive within 
the parameters of his immanent ontology, is therefore radical, in that it has profound 
implications for the study of philosophy and how that philosophy constitutes its 
object.   
IV 
It should be emphasized that this dynamic, mutually constitutive relationship of 
method and its object cannot be figured as a variety of world view [Weltanshauung / 
mirovozrenie] that explains human identity and all objective phenomena according 
to some all-encompassing schema.19  The fact that the subject, and therefore the 
discipline of metaphysics, comes afterwards insists that there is a ‘crack’ in 
ontology, that is, a gap that cannot be bridged, and there cannot be one total 
schema capable of explicating everything.  On this basis, Žižek argues that Kant 
should not be understood as creating such a world-view philosophy: ‘One can say 
that, at least with Kant’s transcendental turn, the exact opposite happens: does Kant 
not fully expose a crack, a series of irreparable antinomies, which emerges the 
moment we want to conceive reality as All?’ (Žižek 2012: 8).20   In his attack on Kant 
in Materialism and Empiro-criticism, Lenin clearly sees himself as the true radical, 
                                                          
19 The problem of world-view will resurface periodically throughout this analysis.  Boris Paramonov 
has controversially argued that Formalism, particularly in the work of Shklovsky, amounts to a 
‘Hegelian’ world-view where literature comes to self-consciousness (Paramonov 1996: 35-52). 
20 That Žižek discerns a ‘crack’ in Kant’s ontology is consistent with Adorno’s account of the Critique 
of Pure Reason.  See above, n. 4.  
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exposing Kant’s insistence on the subject’s disempowering alienation from the thing-
in-itself as tantamount to an apology of religious faith and bourgeois capitalism.  In 
exposing such ‘ideology’, Lenin effectively closes the gap between subject and 
object, and locates the ‘graduated flunkies’ of academic discipline within the praxis 
of capitalism.   Michael Heinrich, like many others before him, argues that much of 
the content of Marxist-Leninism, of which Materialism and Empiro-criticism is a 
particularly crass example, is a world-view that explains all phenomena under a 
totalizing schema that accounts for identity, history, social relations and economics 
under an intentional theory of the proletariat’s domination by the bourgeoisie.  Kant 
insists that the identity of the human subject is contradictory.  Lenin is unequivocal in 
arguing that the subject’s identity is its social class, and the laws of historical 
development clearly determine its future trajectory towards the revolutionary seizure 
of power (Heinrich 2012: 25-6, 92, 221-2). 
In contrast to the world-view that would drive the Bolshevik Revolution, where 
‘objective’ convictions as to the path of world history and impatience would combine 
to combustible effect, Kant’s own Copernican Revolution in philosophy dramatizes 
the contradiction at the heart of Kantian objectivity, where the dynamic praxis of the 
finite self and determinations of the natural world made under the rubric of the 
natural sciences are, paradoxically, mutually constitutive.   Copernicus proclaimed 
that the old certainty that the heavenly bodies orbited the earth was an illusion and, 
in accordance with Newton’s theory of gravity, that the heavenly bodies and the 
earth orbited the sun.  Paul Guyer perceptively notes how it is tempting to regard 
Kant as mistaken in his allusion to Copernicus.  It is easy to imagine a pragmatic 
materialist such as Lenin stating that Kant’s concept of the thing-in-itself does the 
exact opposite to Copernicus’s thought, in that Kant’s ‘idealism’ argues that it is the 
subject’s consciousness that creates the universe, and therefore he perpetuates the 
pre-Copernican universe of the heavenly bodies orbiting the earth, with the subject 
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standing in for the earth.  Accordingly, Kant grants the individual (earth) the most 
significant role in the motion of the galaxy and its determination (Guyer 2006: 49-
51).  Yet this reading rather misconstrues Kant’s position in the introduction to the 
Critique of Pure Reason, where he argues that it was Copernicus’s going against 
then established material fact through speculative reasoning, which entails the 
dynamic interplay of the oppositionally situated faculties of imagination, 
understanding and reason.  Copernicus was then subsequently able to demonstrate 
the illusionary quality of the preceding truth, and objectively establish the validity of 
his speculations through recourse to empirical data. Kant’s ‘radical’ revolution 
correspondingly wants to account for the possibility of both of these phenomena of 
speculation and empirical sensory experience, the motion of the mind and motion 
observed in the empirical world. 21 Kant’s revolution is grounded in an objectivity of 
illusions and paradox; the Bolshevik Revolution in reified material certainty that aims 
to overcome illusions and class contradictions. 
There is a potential danger of over-emphasising the ostensible parallel between the 
self-in-motion and the physical motion discernible in the natural world and, on the 
basis that both spheres share the common term ‘motion’, argue that Kant is in thrall 
to the certainties of the natural sciences and tries to establish a consciousness that 
merely replicates the structures of the natural sciences in order to justify their 
possibility.   It is certainly tempting to extrapolate further from Kant’s obvious 
                                                          
21 It is accordingly apparent that Kant’s conditions of possibility are of an entirely different order to 
those outlined by Michel Foucault in The Order of Things [Les Mots et les Choses].  For Foucault, the 
conditions of possibility are the effective structural grounds of knowledge, the changes and evolution 
in which facilitate ruptures in knowledge.  For example, Foucault provides a well-known quote from 
Berkeley’s A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge, where Berkeley argues 
against cause and effect and instead insists on a relationship between sign and signified.  
Summarizing this quote, Foucault states that ‘The knowledge that divined, at random, signs that were 
absolute and older than itself has been replaced by a network of signs built up step by step in 
accordance with a knowledge of what is probable.  Hume has become possible’ (Foucault 2002: 66).  
Thus Foucault argues that Humean scepticism is made possible by the structural conditions of 
knowledge established by Berkeley.   It will be argued here that this is anathema to Kant, who entirely 
rejects such an idealist-determinist configuration of the properties of knowledge.  For Kant, the 
conditions of possibility are how the mind must be in order to guarantee the contradiction of all 
preceding illusions and facilitate an endless variety of contradictory, objectively formulated 
propositions. 
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attraction to Copernican and Newtonian theories of motion.  His insistence that there 
is always motion even when there is no motion has manifest parallels with the 
Copernican image of the world in constant motion around the sun, even when this 
fact is not always apparent to sensory experience.  Kant’s drive to provide an 
objectively valid account of metaphysics that provides a reliable basis of scientific 
enquiry could be (and has been) construed as Kant’s desire for a mathematical 
theory of consciousness, or even a mathematical ontology of the world.  Such a 
Kant is clearly subject to the gravitational pull exerted by the natural sciences and 
their capacity for establishing objective truths, a gravitational pull to which the 
Russian Formalists will find themselves subject to no small extent.22  It is not difficult 
to imagine how, from the perspective of a Foucauldian genealogy, Kant’s discursive 
formations figure the then ‘warranted knowledge’ of the natural sciences as 
historical ontologies of meaning and power that serve to naturalize the natural 
sciences, and their accompanying objective claims to empirical truth.23  From this 
perspective, the human subject that emerges from the first Critique is effectively a 
means to this end.   
Yet Kant’s radical insistence that certain aspects of the world and ourselves are 
beyond the reach of such empirical knowledge must not be discounted here.   Kant’s 
resolution to locate certain components of the structures of consciousness beyond 
sensory apprehension is undeniably accompanied by a strong zeal to formulate a 
systematic account of metaphysics on an objective basis, but such objectivity does 
not amount to a total endorsement of facts arising from empirically observed data as 
the only viable basis for human knowledge.  By objective, Kant is understood to 
                                                          
22 Bakhtin’s criticism of Formalism’s attraction to positivist science is made in ‘The Problem of 
Content, Material and Form in Verbal Art’ (Bakhtin 2003: 266; 1990: 257-8), and is discussed at 
length in the final chapter. 
23 Like the Formalists’, Michel Foucault has also been frequently (& incorrectly) labelled ‘idealist’ 
(Eribon: 1989, 162-4 & 174).  My use of the terms ‘historical ontology’ and ‘discursive formation’ are 
taken from (Foucault 2000b: 262-3) and (Foucault 2002: 34-54), and are indicative of a departure 
from the reified structuralism of The Order of Things.     
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mean a basis which can be said to proceed from universally valid principles in a 
manner akin to the natural sciences, and which does not proceed ‘from contingent 
individual sentiments and emotions of the moment’ (Hegel 2010: 84-5). As such, 
Kant demonstrates his ambivalent attitude to the sciences.  The drive towards an 
objective account of the forms of intuition, the formal categories of the 
understanding, and towards an account of consciousness which justifies the natural 
sciences is contradicted by his intention to locate certain elements beyond the reach 
of such objective inquiry, even though such elements can indeed be objectively 
critiqued.   This apparent paradox in Kant’s thought is explained through his 
insistence on a priori moral freedom as the de facto condition of the human.  Kant 
remarked in a letter to a friend that: 
I am a scientist by inclination.  I know the thirst for knowledge and the deep 
satisfaction of every advance of knowledge.  There was a time when I believed all 
this knowledge could be the honour of mankind and I despised all those who were 
bereft of such knowledge.  Rousseau has corrected me.  I learned to honour man, 
and I would consider myself less worthy than the average worker if I did not believe 
that all this [meaning ‘philosophy’] could contribute to what really matters—the 
restoration of the rights of mankind. (Kant, cited from Henrich 2003: 55) 
This restoration of the rights of mankind is, however, predicated upon a strict 
insistence upon human finitude, be it in terms of absolute access to the sensory 
material world or to the properties of self-consciousness.  It is equally an injunction 
to submit to the moral law of the categorical imperative.  Freedom, as Henrich notes, 
is autonomy precisely because it is a self-originating law that we impose upon 
ourselves without the slightest possibility of its being deductively demonstrated 
according to objective, scientific principles.  Hence Kant’s paradoxical concept that 
freedom is the fact of reason from the Critique of Practical Reason, upon which 
factual status is conferred precisely because it is self-evident that the subject must 
submit to its law in accordance with the categorical imperative (Kant 1996: 164-5).  
Accordingly, the critical results of the activity of reason provide the objective 
principles for the activities of the empirical sciences, and the source of laws which 
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we impose upon ourselves.  Henrich therefore insists that reason is practical for 
Kant.  By practical reason, Henrich sees Kant as denoting ‘not only the origin of the 
law, but also a sufficient cause of action in accordance with the law. In other words, 
it is an ethical demand, and provides both laws and the motivating impulses for 
doing actions that are in accordance with these laws’ (Henrich 2003: 57-8).  Like the 
thing-in-itself and the properties of self-consciousness, freedom, if it is to grant any 
meaningful concept of autonomy, must remain beyond the grasp of sensible 
intuition, a fact that ‘cannot be deduced from any proposition or principle’ (Henrich 
2003: 58). 
Like the a priori forms of intuition and categories of the understanding, it is possible 
to deduce transcendentally the structural properties of freedom after the event of the 
subject being constituted through what is given to it.  It is through freedom that the 
mutually constitutive, contradictory determinacy of the worlds of the intellect and the 
sensible, form and content, are ascertained: ‘Because freedom is a kind of causality, 
it determines not only laws that belong to the intelligible world, but also actions 
whose effects are known in the sensible world.  So we cannot speak about freedom 
unless we speak about the intellectual and the sensible worlds… [Freedom is] a 
principle of insight and a principle of real connection’ (Henrich 2003: 58).24  
Accordingly, it is through freedom that the contradictory impulses towards scientific 
truth and a capacity for moral autonomy can co-exist within the range of objective 
human activities and even within objective consciousness itself (note that it is to the 
faculty of reason that Kant attributes freedom and not to that of the understanding).  
It can even be said that freedom is the dynamic movement between contradictions, 
be it those of the mind or the practical activity of the subject faced with the illusory 
                                                          
24 Over the subsequent chapter, this analysis will return to the question of Kantian freedom in terms of 
the Formalists’ conceptualization of the creative author and her role in literary creation, that is, with a 
view to arguing that their insistence upon a contingent material object and objectively determined laws 
of literary construction do not necessarily imply the author has no freedom in the face of that which 
she is not.   
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material world.  This motion between contradictions allowed Copernicus to advance 
human knowledge, precisely because the mind’s capacity for speculative reason is 
free and ought to contradict the illusory discourses of established truths.  
Contradiction is, for Kant, an indispensable attribute of freedom and the praxis of 
critique itself.  In a typically celestial analogy, Kant notes that it may occur to a dove 
that flight would be easier in a vacuum, for it would not meet the resistance of the 
air.  Plato, according to Kant, made a similar decision when he left the material 
world of the senses and the narrow limits it sets for the understanding, daring to ‘go 
beyond it on the wings of the ideas, in the empty space of pure understanding.’  
Neither the dove nor Plato realize that the prolonged flight of philosophical thought 
requires contradiction if it is to sustain itself.  Plato, Kant concludes, ‘did not notice 
that he made no headway by his efforts, for he had no resistance, no support, as it 
were, by which he could stiffen himself, and to which he could apply his powers in 
order to put his understanding into motion’ (Kant 1998: 129). 
From this vantage point, it is by no means impossible to map the convergences 
between Kant’s first Critique, practical philosophy and the essay ‘What is 
Enlightenment?’, where he argues that enlightenment is the human being’s 
emergence ‘from its self-incurred minority’  (Kant 1996: 17).  The path of this 
emergence entails the exercise of the subject’s reason in private and public, taking 
responsibility for the arts, sciences and publishing criticisms of state legislation with 
a view to its improvement.  It is only through encountering the resistance of public 
contradiction that the struggle onwards towards enlightenment is possible.  This 
ontology of contradictions is, as has already been argued in the present discussion, 
a very delicately poised system, and attempts to bridge the gap that Kant insists 
pervades all aspects of knowledge can disturb its balance.  On the basis of the 
essay ‘What is Enlightenment?’, the price for freedom’s dynamic, precarious 
balance is the socio-political structure of enlightened monarchy, where the monarch 
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does everything within her power to preserve the moral freedom of her subjects.  
The alternative of absolute democracy is, for Kant, impossible: 
But only [a monarch] who, himself enlightened, is not afraid of phantoms, but at the 
same time has a well-disciplined and numerous army ready to guarantee public 
peace, can say what a free state may not dare to say: Argue as much as you will 
and about what you will; only obey! Here a strange, unexpected course is revealed 
in human affairs, as happens elsewhere too if it is considered in the large, where 
almost everything is paradoxical.  A greater degree of civil freedom seems 
advantageous to a people’s freedom of spirit and nevertheless puts up 
insurmountable barriers to it; a lesser degree of the former, on the other hand, 
provides a space for the latter to expand to its full capacity… (Kant 1996: 22) 
It is not difficult to imagine Lenin insisting that Königsberg’s ultimate graduated 
flunkey is prepared to pay too heavy a price for such a paradox, and that the 
imperative to ‘only obey’ in the face of a large army reveals a conservative tendency 
towards the oppression of those ‘average workers’ to which Kant regards himself as 
being superior, and the masked ideology of religious faith.  Viewed from this 
perspective, Kant’s pretensions towards restoring the rights of mankind should 
therefore, of course, be judged with suspicion.   
Whilst such objections to Kant’s thought must be acknowledged, it is no less 
important to acknowledge that the many subsequent contradictions of Kant’s 
precarious balance of contradictions risk distorting his entire project.  In light of the 
current discussion that has argued that this paradoxical balance of contradictions 
can be figured in historical terms, and thereby map history in non-linear knight’s 
moves, it must be noted that this paradigm is not applicable when figuring those 
contradictions of Kant’s thought where the precarious balance is lost.  Neither 
Lenin’s stubborn insistence that idealism equates to repressive religious dogma,25 
                                                          
25 It should be noted that Kant is most insistent that, if the subject is to emerge from its self-imposed 
minority, then it must free itself from religious dogma and religious explication of all worldly 
phenomena.  Kant also insists that the task of the ruling monarch in this society-towards 
Enlightenment is to ‘leave it to his subjects to do what they find it necessary to do for the sake of their 
salvation’, and only react negatively when the mutually beneficial law of the categorical imperative is 
violated by one self-interested subject seeking advantage over others (Kant 1996: 20).  It is 
debateable whether the Soviet Union ever lived up to such a utopian formulation, both during and 
after Lenin’s lifetime.  
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nor the argument that Kant conjures a mathematical self in order to justify the 
oppressive authority of the natural sciences are adequate to the full paradox of 
Kant’s thought when it is considered ‘in the large’.  Lenin clearly believes himself to 
be the true radical when he effectively plugs the gap between thing-in-itself and 
subject with the argument that such idealism is an illusion that masks religious and 
bourgeois-capitalist ideology. Yet is not Kant the true radical here, in that he insists 
that the gap cannot be bridged and, correspondingly, that reality is of necessity an 
illusion and a contradiction?  In terms of Lenin’s world-view iteration of Marxism, it is 
certainly possible to map a degree of continuity through contradiction from Kant to 
Lenin concerning their shared desire for the restoration of the rights of mankind 
through the unmasking of illusions,26 but the full import of Kant’s philosophy of 
contradictory structures cannot be said to figure in Lenin’s thought beyond his reified 
and crudely materialist iterations of class struggle and proletarian revolution, be it in 
the dogmatically rational Materialism and Empirio-Criticism or elsewhere in his work. 
Unlike Kant, Lenin sees no need to separate the fields of science and freedom, 
arguing that any suggestion that freedom pertains to some ‘value’ beyond the 
reaches of empirical knowledge is idealist obfuscation.  Freedom can be objectively 
determined in the objective reality of proletarian solidarity, organization and 
revolution, and therefore empirical ‘fact’ must be separated from the illusory field of 
‘value’.  Kant does separate all elements of knowledge into distinct spheres, but he 
also insists on their contradictory interaction once the act of consciousness is set in 
autonomous motion, and the outcome of this process is open-ended in a way which 
Lenin is not prepared to admit.  As Andrew Bowie notes, ‘Kant’s separation of the 
spheres of epistemology and ethics into different aspects of ourselves mirrors the 
ways in which the spheres of science and technology become separated from the 
                                                          
26 There is a crucial difference here.  Lenin insists that Kant’s brand of idealism is itself illusory, but it 
is an illusion that masks reality as it is determined by the parameters of empirical science and the 
historical certainty of ‘Marxist’ historical laws.  Kant denies this and insists that all claims to the real 
are illusory and must be so if we are to be free. 
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spheres of law and morality in modernity’ (Bowie 2003: 24).  Yet, such a separation 
is not, Bowie argues, programmed by Kant himself. Kant should not be understood 
as initiating the modernity of ‘fact’ and ‘value’ of which Lenin’s Materialism and 
Empirio-criticism is so crude an example.  Bowie perceptively notes that ‘[t]he last 
thing Kant would have wanted are the concrete consequences of the division 
between what will become reduced in much of the philosophy of the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries to “fact” and “value”.  What he sought were ways of unifying 
understanding and reason without falling back into “dogmatic rationalism”’ (Bowie 
2003: 25).   
Kant’s practical variety of transcendental idealism therefore problematizes this 
modernity of ‘fact’ and ‘value’ even before it has been initiated, and is, potentially, an 
example of how what Renfrew terms a deconstructive synthesis through negation 
serves to limit and problematize much in modernity that would come after the 
Critique of Pure Reason.  Russian Formalism will provide an unexpected opportunity 
for Kantian paradoxes to emerge ‘in the large’ through how it objectively figures the 
aesthetic object and its ostensible autonomy from all other fields.  However, Kant 
himself would make a significant step towards bridging the gap which he 
programmes in all areas of knowledge in the first Critique, and, crucially, it is the 
field of art and the feelings it provokes in the human body to which he turns in order 
to make this regressive move. 
V 
Kant’s desire to avoid dogmatic rationalism and his commitment to the practical 
would lead him further away from the objective, scientific mode of engaging with the 
natural world in the Critique of the Power of Judgement.  In the third critique, Kant 
still adheres to the demand for a universal, objective discipline of philosophical 
inquiry, yet his reasoning is directed toward a conceptualization of the natural world 
which differs from that found in the Critique of Pure Reason.  The natural world 
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found in the third Critique is both a unified system and one which is a priori endowed 
with a higher principle that, by analogy, guarantees the moral subject’s freedom.  
The reasoning with which Kant arrives at this conceptualization of nature is found in 
the introduction to the third Critique, where Kant formulates the concept of the 
reflective judgement, which differs from the determining judgement so prevalent in 
the natural sciences (Kant 2000: 3-51, 66-8).    Kant is particularly pre-occupied with 
a determining judgement that will prove troubling and productive for the Russian 
Formalists in equal measure in how they figure genre: the move from the general to 
the particular (Kant 2000: 15-17).  Bowie notes how, for Kant, this move towards the 
particular is, in the natural sciences, a move of domination over the object, isolating 
and codifying the properties of a given object in a manner which anticipates its 
exploitation  (Bowie 2003: 25-7).  The higher principle in the natural world discerned 
by Kant is that it is purposive and productive.  Nature is, therefore, serving as a 
substitute for the Kantian subiectum, and, through analogy, accounts for a purposive 
synthesis of intuitions through the faculties of the understanding.  In order to 
establish the validity of this analogy, Kant differentiates between physical sensation, 
which pertains to the objective experience of the natural world, and our feeling of the 
natural world (Kant 2000: 11-13).27   
In contrast to sensation, feeling is not a representation of an object and relates 
solely to the subject, and provides no knowledge whatsoever about the object that 
provokes such feelings.  Equally, this feeling cannot be reduced to the subject’s self-
interest, for if feeling were reduced to interest then it would merely facilitate the 
domination of the object.  Such a dis-interested feeling pertains to the judgement of 
whether an object is beautiful or not, and such a judgement cannot, for Kant, be 
accompanied by any manifestation of self-interest or the prospect of material 
                                                          
27 In emphasizing the distinction Kant makes between feeling [Gefűhl] and sensation [Empfindung, 
Sinnesempfindung], and their significance regarding reflecting and determining judgements, I am 
following Bowie’s account of Kant’s aesthetics (Bowie 2003: 28-32).  
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advantage.  The historical accumulation of judgements of whether an object is 
beautiful or not, grounded in the subject’s autonomous feelings of pleasure, are 
judgements of taste that are based in the universal ground of common sense.  As 
Bowie writes: ‘The feeling of pleasure upon which judgement is founded derives 
from the sense of a harmony in nature, which the understanding, that activity of the 
subject which can be seen in some sense as dominating the object, cannot 
establish’ (Bowie 2003: 30-1).  In order to distance the judgement of taste from the 
potentially dominating power which often accompanies a determining judgement, 
Kant terms the judgement of taste an aesthetic judgement.  Kant argues: ‘By the 
designation ‘an aesthetic judgement about an object’ it is therefore immediately 
indicated that a given representation is certainly related to an object but that what is 
understood in the judgement is not the determination of the object but of the subject 
and its feeling’ (Kant 2001: 25).  Such aesthetic judgements are accompanied by the 
free play of the cognitive faculties of the understanding and the imagination, and as 
such can equally be considered as objective and subjective, and therefore merit the 
paradoxical term aesthetic judgement, which is, so Kant argues, a variety of the 
broader reflective judgement which he initially uses to counter-pose the oppressive 
power of determining judgement.  
The extent to which Kant has moved on from the precarious structure of antinomies 
in the first Critique towards a unitary structure which can be said to sublate such 
contradictions is apparent in the following passage: 
Thus an aesthetic judgement is that whose determining ground lies in a sensation 
that is immediately connected with the feeling of pleasure and displeasure.  In the 
aesthetic judgement of sense it is that sensation which is immediately produced by 
the empirical intuition of the object, in the aesthetic judgement of reflection, 
however, it is that sensation which the harmonious play of the two faculties of 
cognition in the power of judgement, imagination and understanding, produces in 
the subject insofar as in the given representation the faculty of the apprehension of 
the one and the faculty of presentation of the other are reciprocally expeditious, 
which relation in such a case produces through this mere form a sensation that is 
the determining ground of a judgement which for that reason is called aesthetic and 
50 
 
as subjective purposiveness (without a concept) is combined with the feeling of 
pleasure (Kant 2001: 26-7).   
Thus the power of judgement Kant advances in the third Critique is an attempt to 
overcome the contradictions that exist in the first Critique: between reason and the 
understanding; and appearance and the given. On the basis of such ‘reciprocally 
expeditious’ activity, Kant proceeds to argue that this power of judgement, and the 
purposive art and nature with which it is analogous, guarantees autonomy.  The 
aesthetic judgement is, so Kant argues, universally and of necessity valid, as its 
determining ground resides in feelings of pleasure and displeasure and in a rule of 
the higher, productive faculty of cognition.  Such a rule, like that of categorical 
imperative and its status as a fact of reason, is legislative and, through the faculty of 
reflection, demonstrates autonomy.  This autonomy, inevitably, cannot and indeed 
must not be demonstrated empirically and cannot be demonstrated as objectively 
valid.  Kant terms this autonomy ‘heautonomy’, as it is only to itself that the power of 
judgement bequeaths its autonomy, and provides no law to nature or freedom.  It 
exists solely ‘for comparing present cases to others that have been given to it and 
thereby indicating the subjective conditions of the possibility of this combination a 
priori.’ (Kant 2001: 27-8). 
VI 
Many of the tensions that run through the current discussion are restaged to 
dramatic effect in the work of Hegel.  Along with Bakhtin and Kant, Hegel is yet 
another figure whose work is pervaded by a stark contradiction, where one more 
open-ended strand of his thought serves to contradict and limit a tendency towards 
reification and closure.  In Hegel’s case, the stakes are undeniably higher than with 
either Bakhtin or Kant, with questions of totalitarian domination, martial conflict and 
a teleological determination of history’s trajectory in uneasy tension with open and 
ambiguous iterations of determinacy, social inter-relationship and a dynamic praxis 
of dialectical reasoning that resists final closure.   Hegel’s early work on love aside, 
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it is possible to summarize (albeit crudely) the works which fall into the two opposing 
sides.  The first, ‘greater’, Logic best exemplifies the latter tendency, whereas The 
Philosophy of Right and The Philosophy of History, exemplify the latter, with the 
Phenomenology of Spirit sitting uneasily in both camps.  It is therefore Hegel’s 
treatment of the mind and logic that is the more open ended, whereas his discussion 
of historical events in the material world tends to provide more troubling conclusions.  
And, as with Kant, Hegel’s contribution to aesthetics lacks the truly radical potential 
of his critique of the properties of consciousness and its potential for autonomous 
cognition, and, like Kant, Hegel denies the aesthetic that same contradictory 
ontology bequeathed to consciousness in its dynamic activity.   
If Hegel’s thought merely reiterated those same problematics in Kantian thought that 
would paradoxically re-emerge in some aspects of Russian Formalism, there would 
be little point in incorporating a critique of his philosophy into the current discussion.  
Yet, with one far reaching contribution, Hegel’s thought provides an additional 
deformation of Kant’s treatment of antinomies, motion and the conditions of 
possibility of objective knowledge; and, a contribution that it is vital to address in 
order to adequately grasp the theories of Eikhenbaum, Tynianov and, particularly, 
Shklovsky.   This contribution is perhaps the ultimate expression of that tradition in 
modern European thought that does not conceive of form and content dualistically, 
and rather conceptualizes the two terms as mutually constitutive of one-another.  It 
is, of course, Hegel’s dialectic.  Conveniently, Hegel’s most renowned formulation of 
the term is found in his account of objectivity in The Encyclopaedia Logic, and, given 
its location in that open-ended, paradoxical and more radical strain of his thought, 
succinctly demonstrates the dynamic, ambiguous contradictions that of necessity 
beset all objective knowledge.  Furthermore, Hegel’s thought is worth including here 
because, like Kant, his disappointing treatment of aesthetics foreshadows the 
52 
 
reception of Formalist thought in the Soviet 1920s, particularly at the hands of 
Bakhtin.   
According to his above-mentioned definition of objectivity, Hegel argues that Kant 
provided a new definition that contradicted conventional usage of the term.  For 
Hegel, the popular linguistic usage of objectivity in everyday life denoted ‘what is on 
hand outside of us and reaches us from the outside by means of perception’ (Hegel 
2010: 84). Kant, so Hegel argues, provided an alternative usage which has since 
become conventional, and if a proposition was said to be objective, then it was 
understood as being universally valid and making no recourse to external elements 
in order to prove its validity, and which therefore does not proceed from ‘contingent 
individual sentiments and emotions of the moment’ (Hegel 2010: 84).  Kant’s 
transcendental deduction of the validity of synthetic a priori cognition argued that, 
when formulated on the correct critical basis, the properties of the mind and 
cognition itself can be said to be objective.  Whereas previously the workings of the 
mind could not be said to be objective because they are not ‘on hand outside of us’, 
they were subsequently held to be objective because, according to Kant, his act of 
objective critique constitutes objective propositions that do not require recourse to 
any external elements in order to prove their validity.  Sensory intuition of the 
material world, that is, that which had previously been held to be objective in popular 
every-day usage, is thus rendered subjective in Kant’s thought, because it cannot be 
said to be objective until it is shown to be universally valid and not contingent upon 
other external factors.  Hegel contends that, significant as Kant’s argument was, it is 
still ultimately subjective ‘insofar as thoughts, despite being universal and necessary 
determinations, are, according to Kant, merely our thoughts and distinguished from 
what the thing is in itself by an insurmountable gulf’ (Hegel 2010: 85).  True 
objectivity, Hegel believes, lies in recognizing that ‘thoughts are not merely our 
thoughts but at the same time the in itself of things and of the object-world 
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[gegenständlichen] in general’ (Hegel 2010: 85). Like Kant, Hegel is here insisting 
that thought is a practical activity, but he goes a step further.  Kant is prepared to 
tolerate a mutually constitutive contradiction, where the material objects of the 
natural world are other to consciousness, both in terms of the thing-in-itself being 
other to the forms of intuition and the categories of the mind, and how the material of 
sensuous intuition is other to the faculties of understanding, reason and the 
productive imagination.  Yet Kant also demands that despite this radical, immanent 
otherness that exists within the mind, the dynamic activity of consciousness is 
constituted through being conscious of something, that is, through the mind being 
conscious of that which it is not.  For Hegel, this is ultimately ‘subjective’, and the 
material objects of the natural world are the concrete reality of thought itself in its 
historical development. 
As already noted, Henrich argues that Kant’s project of practical critique is of 
necessity historical, and objective knowledge is always constituted through coming 
afterwards.  In Hegel, this implicit historical aspect of objective knowledge in Kant’s 
thought receives explicit iteration in his insistence that all objective knowledge is 
immanently dialectical.  Indeed, Hegel’s treatment of objectivity is all too obviously 
an example of his own dialectic at work.  Crudely put, Hegel’s dialectics involve a 
moment of sensory immediacy which is disturbed by determinacy’s power of 
negation, where any given proposition is shown to contain that which it is not, which 
in turn is overcome by the movement to the third, a position which incorporates 
elements of both the preceding elements and returns sensory to immediacy.  In this 
instance, the ‘objectivity’ of immediate, sensory experience of the ‘at hand’ material 
world is contradicted by the determinate Kantian ‘objectivity’ of the mind and its 
universally valid cognitions.  Hegel’s own concept of objectivity sublates the two 
preceding moments by insisting on the sensory immediacy – the concrete reality – 
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of objective thought itself in its dialectical becoming.28  The argument that 
consciousness is dialectical is comparable to Kant’s insistence that consciousness 
is a practical activity that is set in motion, as it moves from sensory immediacy 
through the negative moment of difference and contradiction, before the historical 
moment of sublation and the return to sensory immediacy.  Kant’s objective critique 
is itself an example where the dynamic motion of the mind is both the object of 
Kant’s study and the practical, methodological process by which Kant undertakes 
that study.  In the Encyclopaedia Logic Hegel sees this process, where thought 
examines itself through the practical activity of thought, as being of necessity 
dialectical, and a constant movement towards negation and sublation.  Hegel makes 
a particularly bold claim for this objective synthesis between the forms of thought 
and their practical activity: ‘This is the activity of thinking that will soon be considered 
under the name of dialectic, about which a preliminary remark must here suffice, 
namely that it is to be regarded not as something brought to bear on thought 
determinations from outside of them, but instead as immanent in them’ (Hegel 2010: 
84).  The dialectical motion of objectivity moving from sensory immediacy, to 
universal necessity and on to the concrete immediacy of thought itself is, for Hegel, 
the immanent condition of thought itself.  And in the greater Logic, Hegel offers the 
definition of life as the concrete and dialectical becoming of the concept, that is, the 
site where sensory immediacy is followed by the objective becoming of thought itself 
as immanent to the material object (Hegel 2010: 676). 
                                                          
28 According to the argument being advanced here, it is arguable that Hegel’s dialectical account of 
objectivity does itself disturb the precarious balance of Kant’s thought, in that it fails to recognize the 
concrete, practical consequences of the object being constituted through the given, and therefore fails 
to appreciate the concrete nature of reason in Kant’s thought.  Indeed, when advancing the concept of 
the fact of reason in the second Critique, Kant does appear to explicitly differentiate between 
subjective and objective in the sense that ‘subjective’ pertains to the mind and objective to the 
material world.  He nevertheless insists that an objective account of the fact of reason is possible, in 
the sense that it is a universally valid proposition that does not require any supporting additional 
elements (Kant 1996: 164-66). However, it is more important to emphasize how Hegel’s objective 
dialectic establishes the implicit historical, dynamic and practical attributes of Kantian objectivity in a 
single epistemological - ontological figure.  
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Within the confines of the two works which share the title The Science of Logic, 
Hegel’s insistence that objective thought is both object and its praxis has genuinely 
radical implications.  The dialectical workings of critique must, of necessity, 
constitute oppositions and contradictions as the moments that emerge during the 
trajectory beyond sensory immediacy.  Yet, as John Burbidge correctly points out, 
these oppositions are not simply moments of radical difference and otherness that 
emerge through negation, but are conditioned by each other, and moments of 
opposition and contradiction effectively continue in any subsequent sublation, and 
which therefore need not of necessity be deemed to have overcome the opposition 
in a positive synthesis (Burbidge 2007: 101-5).29  As a result, Hegel’s entire 
philosophical system is one where contingency is not overcome in the drive towards 
an ‘absolute idea’, but is immanently (and paradoxically) present within thought 
itself, and what is actual or ‘real’ in Hegel’s Logics is always a moment in the on-
going dialectical trajectory of objectivity. Accordingly, form and content emerge as 
mutually constitutive of one-another in the absolute idea.  If thought-praxis is to be 
objective in the sense Hegel intends, then it must be contingent if it is to have that 
very universal objectivity, just as the universal properties of synthetic a priori 
cognition require a contingent object to be given to them in Kant.  And like Kant, the 
dialectical movement of thought is constitutive of drives towards advancing 
knowledge and the moral good, and the demand for objectivity in life is ethical:  
In other words, the idea in and of itself involves integrating the theoretical drive for 
truth with the practical drive to achieve the good.  Not only does each complement 
the other, but each on its own shows up the limitations of the other… When theory 
and practice continually check and reinforce each other we have a way of 
integrating concept and actuality that is valid in all respects  (Burbidge 2006: 103).  
Hegel’s insistence on immanent dialectical movement results in the present taking 
on an acute significance in his thought.  The drives which Burbidge identifies in 
                                                          
29 Burdbidge’s insight will prove particularly useful with regard to Tynianov’s dialectical figuring of 
literary functions, especially the relationship between material and constructive function advanced in 
‘The Literary Fact’, as well as Tynianov’s argument against authorial intention. 
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Hegel’s dialectical logic are relentlessly focused on accounting for the now, that is, 
the practical context of their own present.  In the preface to the Phenomenology of 
Spirit, Hegel demands that this present is always historical, and the practical activity 
of the mind always comes after a given state of affairs.  The idea of the beginning is, 
for Hegel, utterly invalid. ‘Religion’, ‘Love’, ‘Substance’, ‘Absolute’, ‘Subject’ and the 
other dominant topoi of then contemporary philosophy are pre-established.  But they 
are, Hegel insists, constantly changing and it is the task of philosophy to adequately 
conceptualize the specificity of given proposition in its dialectical evolution (Hegel 
1977: 1-4, 10).  This results in a paradoxical (and highly productive) 
conceptualization of anachronism in Hegel’s thought.  On the one hand, all human 
cognition is anachronistic as it comes after an oppressive morass of pre-determined 
content.  Yet, on the other hand, Hegel insists that any iteration of content is of 
necessity finite, and this predetermined content must never be regarded as fixed or 
reified.  For Hegel any account of reality which does not address finite dialectical 
reality in its full complexity is itself an anachronism, as it does not adhere to that 
ethical drive to account for truth.   If an objective and scientific philosophy is to 
conceptualize adequately its present reality it must account of this paradoxical 
tension between the anachronistic nature of all knowledge, and the anachronistic 
nature of reified or ‘universal’ iterations of ‘truth’.30   
Abounding in such a fertile admixture of contingency, possibility, necessity, truth and 
the moral good, the dynamic, dialectical practice of objective thought shares many 
                                                          
30 A useful, if challenging, example from Hegel’s thought can be found in his treatment of ‘pointing’ to an 
object in the present ‘now’ which he makes during his elaboration of sense-certainty in the Phenomenology.  
Hegel proceeds from stating that ‘The Now is pointed to, this Now. ‘Now’; it has already ceased to be in the act 
of pointing to it.  The Now that is, is another Now than the one pointed to…’. The ‘Now’ accordingly takes on 
an acute historical significance, where a given now must contain within itself the ‘plurality of Nows all taken 
together’.  By the same logic Hegel argues that: ‘The Here pointed out, to which I hold fast, is similarly a this 
Here which, in fact, is not the Here, but a Before and Behind, an Above and Below, a Right and Left’.  Hegel 
sums up this argument by stating that: ‘It is clear that the dialectic of sense-certainty is nothing else but the 
simple history of its movement or of its experience, and sense-certainty itself is nothing else but just this 
history’ (Hegel 1977: 63-4).  For an accessible critical discussion of Hegel’s argument here, see (Houlgate 2013: 
33-42). 
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of the radical properties of Kantian critique before the ‘reciprocally expeditious’ 
closure between subject, art and the natural world in the Critique of the Power of 
Judgement.  In both cases, the practical activity of life itself is the dynamic, objective 
activity of reason and the struggle for the good.  However, like Kant, Hegel’s 
treatment of aesthetics is a contradiction that serves to undermine the radical and 
even emancipatory potential of objective thought: 
We must admit, of course, that the work of art has not in itself movement and life.  
An animated being in nature is within and without an organization appropriately 
elaborated down to its minutest parts, while the work of art attains the semblance of 
animation on its surface only, but within is common stone, or wood and canvas, or 
as in the case of poetry, is idea, uttering itself in speech and letters.  But this aspect, 
viz., its external existence, is not what makes a work into a production of fine art; it is 
a work of art only in as far as, being the offspring of the mind, it continues to belong 
to the realm of mind, has received the baptism of the spiritual, and only represents 
that which has been moulded in harmony with the mind (Hegel 2004: 33).  
Žižek contends that the most positive attribute of dialectical critique of all cultural 
phenomena is that it fails in some way, or, in other words, that it fails to provide 
absolute answers demanded by worldviews and simplistic identity politics.31  Yet 
when Hegel writes, in the above passage, that ‘the work of art has not in itself 
movement and life’, and is merely constituted by its material properties of wood, 
stone or canvas, there is the sense that there is definitely an apparent failure, albeit 
not quite the variety Žižek evidently has in mind. On the basis of Hegel’s dialectical 
figuring of objectivity, knowledge is shown to be constituted of contradictions, and 
thereby maintain a trajectory towards what is ‘at hand’ in the material world and the 
activity of the mind with a view to the transitory, fallible nature of all determinate 
propositions as they lie in an endless move towards sublation.     Yet Hegel’s 
                                                          
31 Žižek’s argument is again consistent with Adorno’s conceptualization of the post-Kantian, ‘cracked’ 
ontology:  ‘It is true that one finds in Hegel a systematic drive to cover everything, to propose an 
account of all phenomena in the universe in their essential structure; but this drive does not mean that 
Hegel strives to locate every phenomenon within a harmonious global edifice; on the contrary, the 
point of dialectical analysis is to demonstrate how every phenomenon, everything that happens, fails 
in its own way, implies a crack, antagonism, imbalance, in its very heart.  Hegel's gaze upon reality is 
that of a Roentgen apparatus which sees in everything that is alive the traces of its future death’ 
(Žižek 2012: 8).   
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contradiction of such objective dialectics is a contradiction of a different order, in that 
it is a contradiction of precisely that dialectical knowledge identified by Žižek that will 
always fail, and hints at a reified or ‘monologic’ proposition.  Dieter Henrich’s 
Between Kant and Hegel includes an account of German Idealism where the entire 
philosophical movement is to no small extent calibrated as a contradiction of Kant’s 
multi-dimensional construction of paradoxes and oppositions, particularly with 
regard to Kant’s injunction against accessing the roots of the tree of knowledge.  
The contradictions of Kant’s system of contradictions made by Fichte, Jacobi, 
Schiller, Schelling, Reinhold and Hegel are, for Henrich, frequently reductive 
treatments of Kant’s philosophy and struggle to contain the full, radical scope of the 
‘all crusher’s’ paradoxical system.  Though Henrich does not explicitly address the 
Critique of the Power of Judgement in Between Kant and Hegel, Kant’s turn to 
aesthetics is precisely such a reductive move away from his position in the Critique 
of Pure Reason, and paves the way for subsequent, reductive contradictions of his 
own thought.  Hegel’s suggestion that art is now dead and does not have in itself 
movement and life is a clear contradiction of his own programme for objective 
dialectical knowledge, in that he commits the same ‘subjective’ error that he 
identifies in Kant’s thought, insisting that it is art that is not a dynamic, contradictory 
thing immanently alive with objective conceptual contradictions.  It is the latter that 
insists on the failure of all critical propositions, while the former fails precisely 
because it is an absolute proposition that does not accommodate the fallible, illusory 
nature of all determinate propositions in their endless trajectory towards negation 
and sublation. 
It is important to emphasize that these striking contradictions in the thought of Kant 
and Hegel do not undermine their ongoing utility in critical praxis.  As noted above, 
Renfrew discerns a contradiction in the Bakhtin Circle’s thought between open, 
inter-determinate, embodied dialogue and crude materialism, and identifies in this 
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tension the possibility of a deconstructive synthesis through negation.  It is not 
difficult to discern such a deconstructive synthesis between Kant’s and Hegel’s 
writings on aesthetics and their respective treatments of objective knowledge.  Kant 
implicitly argues that the aesthetic is autonomous precisely because it is a substitute 
for the autonomous moral subject.  Hegel argues that the aesthetic is not 
autonomous and requires the subject’s critical activity to give it life beyond its 
material properties.  For Kant and Hegel it is the subject and its conceptual activity 
that bestow the aesthetic with its ‘essential’ properties, and the latter becomes a 
substitute for the former; and in both instances the contradictory figurings of 
objective knowledge as paradoxical are lost, and, through the aesthetic’s 
substitution it is effectively denied the radical, paradoxical and finite constitution that, 
in their own ways, Kant and Hegel accord knowledge of self and the material world 
through the objective praxis of critique.    
In Hegel’s case this contradiction is all the more surprising, given that it is precisely 
art to which Hegel turns in order to assert the importance of Kant’s contribution to 
the philosophical conceptualization of objectivity:  ‘Thus, for instance, one demands 
that the judgment about a work of art be objective and not subjective, and by this is 
meant that the judgment should not proceed from contingent individual sentiments 
and emotions of the moment, but instead should take into consideration the 
universal points of view as they are grounded in the essence of art’ (Hegel 2010: 
85).  It would be disappointing indeed if the ‘essence’ of art were nothing more than 
the material stuff of wood and canvas which await human cognition in order for them 
to be designated artistic.  Hegel’s demand that objectivity be of necessity the 
dialectical becoming of concrete thought has to require that the aesthetic object, if it 
is to be judged objectively, be deemed immanently dialectical, and subject to those 
same antinomic contradictions that constitute the act of critique for both Kant and 
Hegel.  Kant grants the aesthetic autonomy through denying it any specificity as art 
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qua art, and makes it a substitute for the a priori morality of the subject through its 
purposiveness.  Art must therefore remain unknowable due to its capacity to 
provoke pleasure in the beholding subject, and is correspondingly denied any 
empirical inquiry into that aspect of its objective properties.  Hegel performs the 
same trick in reverse, by insisting that the artwork is knowable in its material thingly 
aspect, but any aesthetic qualities are discerned purely by the mind.  In neither case 
does objective knowledge of art reside in its being dialectically constituted of 
contradictions (material and structural, historical and of the present, autonomous 
and contingent), which, in Žižek’s interpretation, Hegel insists is the necessary state 
of the thing.  
Hegel’s disinclination to critique art according to his own terms of objective, 
immanently dialectical knowledge is all the more disappointing, given his insistence 
that art ‘invites us to intellectual consideration, and that not for the purpose of 
creating art again, but for knowing philosophically what art is’ (Hegel 1975: 11).  
Kant’s turn towards the aesthetic’s unificatory promise was to no small extent driven 
by an anxiety over the reductive properties of determining judgement and anxiety 
over how to proceed from the general to the particular.  Hegel’s imperative to know 
philosophically what art is particularlizes art, but in doing so deprives art of the 
dialectical richness of philosophy as conceptualized by Hegel in the Logics.  For 
Hegel, art ‘has lost for us genuine truth and life, and has rather been transferred into 
our ideas instead of maintaining its earlier necessity in reality and occupying its 
higher place’ (Hegel 1975: 11).  Yet all philosophy seems to offer art is the crudely 
schematic recognition of form and content:  ‘What is now aroused in us by works of 
art is not just immediate enjoyment but our judgement also, since we subject to our 
intellectual consideration (i) the content of art, and (ii) the work of art’s means of 
presentation, and the appropriateness or inappropriateness of both to one another’ 
(Hegel 1975: 11). In his formulation of the absolute idea so valorized by Burbidge, 
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Hegel acknowledges the mutually constitutive relationship of form and content in 
concrete intellectual activity.  In this banal treatment of art’s dependency upon 
precisely such philosophical thought, all Hegel can provide is a dualistic iteration of 
form and content and observations as to the appropriateness of their relationship.  
Hegel insists that the ‘philosophy of art is therefore a greater need in our day than it 
was in days when art by itself as art yielded full satisfaction’, and even suggests that 
such philosophical activity is undertaken with a view towards ‘intellectual 
consideration’, and not promoting further artistic creation (Hegel 1975: 11).  Yet with 
these remarks Hegel risks depriving his philosophy of ‘truth and life’, and, in 
effectively proclaiming the death of art, invites the death of a reductive, idealistic 
philosophy at the hands of the equally crude and schematic Lenin in Materialism 
and Empiro-criticism, who would doubtless, and not without justification, perceive 
the workings of a haughty abstract idealism in these remarks. 
Kant and Hegel clearly failed to live up to their own demands for objectivity when it 
came to the aesthetic.  Over the subsequent pages of this analysis, it will be argued 
that just such an objective account of verbal art is provided in certain examples of 
Russian Formalist thought, where a radical materialist poetics constitutes a 
contradictory, paradoxical literary object-construction.  Again, the orientation here is 
categorically not to assert that the theory of Shklovsky, Tynianov and Eikhenbaum is 
in any way Kantian or Hegelian.  The Formalists were uniformly hostile to 
metaphysics or any instantiation of ‘idealist’ structures that insist meaning lies 
beyond the text’s material boundaries.  The assertion here is that precisely in 
differentiating themselves from these crudely schematic ‘metaphysics’ and 
‘idealisms’ the Formalists facilitated the knight’s move of paradoxical objectivity from 
Königsberg to the post-Revolutionary Soviet Union.   
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2: Device 
I 
By way of an opening remark to his ruthlessly incisive demolition of Andrei Bely’s 
anthroposophic prose, Viktor Shklovsky proclaims that ‘the particular elements 
constituting literary form will sooner quarrel with one another than co-habit’ 
(Shklovsky 1929: 205).   Elsewhere in his Theory of Prose [O Teorii prozy], 
Shklovsky defines art with the analogy of a difficult, crooked road that doubles back 
on itself, where the walker feels the stones beneath her feet (Shklovsky 1929: 24-5).  
This contorted road complements his more well-known analogy of art as the knight’s 
move, a strange L-shaped trajectory that differs from the regular horizontals, 
verticals and diagonals performed by all the other pieces on the chess-board 
(Shklovsky 1990: 74).   Shklovsky’s primary objection to Bely’s Kotik Letaev and the 
other texts of his anthroposophic epopee is that they are tainted by an ideology 
incompatible with art’s inherent tendency towards quarrel, contradiction and 
confrontation.  Bely’s anthroposophic ideology is manifest in Kotik Letaev, which can 
be understood as Bely’s eccentric attempt to relay the story of his Moscow 
childhood in accordance with the anthroposophic world view of Rudolf Steiner.  This 
world view is essentially symbolic, and posits a root to all knowledge in the shape of 
a realm of truth that lies beyond material existence.  Prior to birth, the subject 
pertains to this symbolic realm, and after birth the child retains an affinity with the 
symbolic realm that gradually diminishes as he grows through adolescence and into 
adulthood (Bely 1988: 214-389).  Bely’s narrative is accordingly a highly dubious 
variety of inverted Bildungsroman, where the pre-determinate state of childhood is 
the most elevated state of existence, as the correspondences between material 
reality and the symbolic are most apparent.32 In his critique of the novel, Shklovsky 
                                                          
32 For critical discussion of Bely’s engagement with anthroposophy, see (Alexandrov 1985: 104-139); 
Gerald Janachek’s introductory essay ‘From the Depths of Memory’ in (Bely 1999: xi-xxii); (Elsworth 
1983: 37-53); and (Hutchings 1997: 141-67).  It is something of a cliché in studies of Bely’s prose to 
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discerns a unitary two-tiered structure between the world of reality and a symbolic 
realm of truth that lies beyond, the correspondences between the ‘real’ and the 
symbolic falsely proclaiming the validity of the anthroposophic world view, and art’s 
capacity to manifest a truth beyond itself.  In both the ornamental prose essay and 
other writings on Bely, Shklovsky concedes that such a two-tiered literary structure 
is not without interest, in all likelihood because a double-layered structure has the 
potential to immanently contradict itself and, in the case of Bely’s work, serve to 
negate and undermine the author’s original intention.  But it is the fact that Bely 
insists on a complementary relationship between the unified fields of reality and truth 
that he is undone by the contradictory properties of art itself.  Shklovsky ruminates 
that any notion of a work of literature being a unity is ‘more likely than not a myth’ 
(Shklovsky 1929: 215). 
As an alternative to ideology, unity and meaning ‘beyond’ the material limits of 
literary art, Shklovsky proposes that art is device.  The devices Shklovsky discusses 
in his Theory of Prose include the pun [kalambur], the stepped structure 
[stupenchatoe stroenie], parody, retardation [zaderzhanie], laying bare the device 
[obnazhenie priema], defamiliarization [ostranenie] and non-recognition [ne-
uznavanie].   These devices are, Shklovsky believes, pervasive in world literature 
and, if indeed it needs repeating, objective proof that so-called ‘ethnographic’ 
accounts of literature are totally invalid.  By ethnographic, Shklovsky understands 
any of the then popular critical activity which claims that the material world of life 
determines art’s content.  Shklovsky argues that it is impossible to account for 
similarities in verbal art between indigenous cultures in the new world and that of 
European culture in positive terms of influence and social exchange.  Accordingly, 
the objective, scientific study of literary art must insist that its object is autonomous 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
cite Shklovsky’s observation in the ‘Ornamental Prose’ essay that Bely was then the most influential 
of all Russian writers.  Few, however, acknowledge the derisive tone and withering criticisms 
Shklovsky makes of Bely’s anthroposophic prose in the same essay.   
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from life.  In addition, there must be universal laws which govern the form and 
construction of verbal art that, of necessity, must be conceptualized as immanent to 
literary art and which are categorically not the result of social forces determining 
literary form (Shklovsky 1929: 25-27).  The ‘materialism’ of the ethnographic school, 
and Bely’s anthroposophic ‘beyond’ are accordingly two sides of the same coin, in 
that both demand that the truth content of art is elsewhere, beyond its material 
boundaries.  Shklovsky’s project in the Theory of Prose is therefore twofold and 
paradoxical: first, he is interested in objectively determining the laws that govern 
literary structures; and second, he believes that these laws facilitate clashes and 
contradictions within literary form, and that these contradictions are immanent to 
literary art and require no recourse to external elements to guarantee their objective 
validity.  The concept of the device is Shklovsky’s solution to what, in light of the 
discussion in the previous chapter, is all too obviously a paradox reminiscent of 
Kant’s account of human consciousness, where the structures of the mind must be 
located in contradiction to one another in order to account for consciousness’s 
conditions of possibility, and simultaneously deny any access to the roots of the tree 
of knowledge that would, like either Bely or the ethnographic school, provide a total 
unitary theory of meaning that explains all and, as a result, limits human freedom.     
Shklovsky’s critique of Bely’s failed autobiographical project, purportedly written in 
the comfortable environment of exile in Dresden, is consistent with his already noted 
opposition to Ukrainian philosopher Oleksandr Potebnia’s concept of thinking in 
images, an opposition which is immediately proclaimed in Russian Formalism’s 
programmatic text ‘Art as Device’ [Iskusstvo kak priem], and more extensively 
elaborated in Shklovsky’s essay ‘Potebnia’.  As already noted, Shklovsky is 
staunchly opposed to Potebnia’s formulation that art provides almost instantaneous 
access to a unitary understanding of a wide variety of phenomena, or explicates a 
complicated phenomenon beyond the image in simple terms.  In other words, art’s 
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images provide access to a realm of truth content beyond the material properties of 
the work of art itself.  For Shklovsky, this paradigm is inadmissible, and is a variety 
of transcendental hogwash that has no role to play in any objectively codified 
poetics of literary art, which, if it is to have any validity, must not locate meaning 
beyond the material limits of the work of art itself (Shklovsky 1929: 7-10).  
Shklovsky’s argument against the ethnographic school is based on the same 
demand that a truly objective study of literature cannot locate meaning beyond the 
limits of the text and, as with Tynianov and Eikhenbaum, any attempt to establish a 
unitary, deterministic correspondence between art and life is metaphysics.  For 
these Russian Formalists, any differentiation between the ‘content’ of Potebnia’s 
invocation of a transcendental ideal and the ethnographist’s recourse to material 
reality does not merit serious consideration.  In both instances the underlying 
structural relationship is the same, with art explained by a deterministic 
correspondence with a posited ‘beyond’ that lies outside its boundaries.  As will 
become apparent, the Russian Formalists’ primary interest is in contradictory 
constructions and the laws and relationships that provide the conditions of possibility 
of these constructions.  In their work in the post-Revolutionary decade, Shklovsky, 
Eikhenbaum and Tynianov are first and foremost inclined to interpret (and dismiss) 
critical arguments on the basis of structural elements and relationships between 
their component terms.  The positive ‘content’ of a particular proposition, be it 
‘transcendental’ or ‘materialist’, is of secondary importance and, in the case of Bely’s 
anthroposophic prose, liable to be contradicted and undermined by the formal, 
constructive principles of literary form. 
II 
The alternative of the device that Shklovsky offers to such ‘Kantian’ metaphysics is 
appropriately Kantian, and by criticising metaphysics he, along with Eikhenbaum 
and Tynianov, ironically ends up playing the role of the nephew who paradoxically 
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and indirectly inherits many of the qualities and ethical demands from his German 
uncle in Königsberg.  This device that contradicts other devices requires another 
component in order for it to be objectively valid: somatic sensation. The entire critical 
projects of Kant and Hegel begin with a moment of sensory immediacy and, in 
Kant’s case, proceeds to provide the conditions of possibility for this sensory 
immediacy and the empirical perception for which it provides sensory material.  For 
Shklovsky, the primary manner through which we engage with art is sensory 
immediacy, feeling that crooked road beneath our feet, and our somatic reaction to 
certain works of literary art is, for Shklovsky, evidence that the art work is a 
construction of devices, with different layers and elements that oppose and 
contradict one another.  Crucially, Shklovsky notes in a lengthy citation from Broder 
Christiansen’s Philosophy of Art that this somatic reaction to the defamiliarizing work 
of art is beyond empirical perception and cannot be proven scientifically (Shklovsky 
1929: 31-32).33  This construction is almost identical with the Kantian metaphysical 
paradigm which he regards himself as contradicting, particularly with regard to 
Kant’s differentiation between sensation and feeling, with the only significant 
difference being the dynamic object in which this contradiction is located.  In Kant’s 
case, it is thought that is the site of contradictory structures, paradox and inter-
relationships, and a practical activity of dynamic motion that is beyond the reach of 
the empirical perception.  Shklovsky, in contrast, insists that it is the work of art itself 
which is the site of dynamic contradiction, but both approaches require a given 
object and a sensuous subject if they are to function, and both, as a necessary 
criterion of their objectivity, locate the somatic reaction to art outside the reaches of 
                                                          
33 Richard Sheldon translates the citation thus: ‘Whenever we experience anything as deviation from 
the ordinary, from the normal, from a certain guiding canon, we feel within us an emotion of a special 
nature, which is not distinguished in its kind from the emotions aroused in us by sensuous forms, with 
the single difference being that its ‘referent’ may be said to be a sensation of a discrepancy 
[oshchushchenie (sic) neskhodstvo].  What I mean is that its referent stands for something 
inaccessible to empirical perception [chuvstvennoe vospriatie].  This is a field of inexhaustible 
richness because these differential perceptions are qualitatively distinguished from each other by their 
point of departure, by their forcefulness and by their line of divergence…’ (Shklovsky 1998: 20-1, 
translation amended).     
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scientific, empirical knowledge.  If Kant sees himself as identifying the conditions of 
possibility for synthetic a priori cognition, Shklovsky and his colleagues can 
therefore productively be regarded as determining literature’s conditions of 
possibility, or, in other words, describing how literature must be in order for it to 
provoke a somatic response in the reader, albeit a response that objectively lies 
beyond the limits of scientific knowledge.  
Shklovsky’s dismissal of the closure of Potebnia’s image and Bely’s ideology begs 
the question as to what are the properties of Shklovsky’s literary device that can be 
said to provide an alternative to such unitary schemas and account for the 
empirically undeterminable somatic response which designates an object as 
aesthetic.  In ‘Art as Device’ Shklovsky proffers a tentative definition of art as the 
opportunity ‘to experience the making of a thing’ [iskusstvo est΄ sposob perezhit΄ 
delan΄e veshchi] (Shklovsky 1929: 13).  One of the primary means of facilitating the 
sensation of creating things is, of course, the device of defamiliarization or 
‘enstrangement’ of the familiar.  This device, by far Shklovsky’s best known 
contribution to literary theory, is essentially a trajectory towards innovation, negation 
and difference. For the device of defamiliarization to be present, a particular object 
or cultural phenomenon is present in literary art in a manner which is new and 
departs from its previous conventionalised and common-place presence.  The 
results of such defamiliarizations are the accompanying sensation of creativity, and 
the heightened sensation (or vision) of whatever element happens to be 
defamiliarized (Shklovsky gives various examples from Tolstoy, which include 
corporal punishment and a horse’s thoughts on  private property).  The reader is 
thereby returned to what ‘makes the stone stoney’ through heightened somatic 
response, which contrasts with mere conventionalized recognition of the stone that, 
for Shklovsky, is tantamount to sleep-walking through life. This return to sensation is 
not, it is important to emphasize, Shklovsky inadvertently endorsing a 
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representational paradigm of aesthetic activity, where the viewer is returned to a 
sensation of the stone through its representation in art.  As Shklovsky insists, the 
referent is unimportant.  The created thing experienced by the reader is art itself, 
and its contradictory juxtapositions of devices (Shklovsky 1929: 13). 
There is certainly no shortage of critical discussion of Shklovsky’s famous concept,34 
but it is genuinely surprising how little effort has been directed towards exploring the 
implications of defamiliarization in terms of what it implies about literary art’s 
structural and constructive properties, and defamiliarization’s shared attributes with 
those other devices of puns, stepped-structures, digressions and non-recognitions, 
which Shklovsky insists are exemplary of literature’s tendency towards constructive 
quarrels and contradictions.   The fundamental paradox of defamiliarization’s 
heightened somatic perception of the conventionalized ‘thing’ is its insistence on 
negation or, in other words, it has to involve some additional element that is different 
or other to its conventionalized presence in literary art if it is to break with hackneyed 
and conventionalized instantiations.  The defamiliarized individual actions of 
corporal punishment and the horse’s thoughts on private property are, as necessary 
criteria of their innovativeness, moments of otherness and difference that 
correspond obliquely with conventionalized forms.  A similar structural relationship 
between elements is to be found in how Shklovsky conceptualizes literary narrative. 
Shklovsky prefers the description of events strung into a literary construction as a 
stepped form.  Consistent with the implicit treatment of negation in defamiliarization, 
Shklovsky says of stepped forms that they manifest how the literary thing divides 
‘into two or three segments that reflect or confront one-another’ (Shklovsky 1929: 
80). This moment of division immanent to the literary construction itself 
                                                          
34 Two recent issues of Poetics Today were devoted to defamiliarization. See Poetics Today 26:4 
(Winter 2005) and Poetics Today 27:1 (Spring 2006).  Annie van den Oever has edited an anthology 
of essays devoted to the topic (Oever 2010), and Igor΄ Smirnov has conducted an interesting lecture 
devoted to defamiliarization (Smirnov 2013).  Il΄ia Kalinin has written about the affinities between 
Shklovsky’s most famous concept and Kant (Kalinin 2009), however he notes the convergences 
between Kant’s concept of the sublime as elaborate in the Critique of the Power of Judgement.  
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demonstrates a moment of difference within the literary work, where one element is 
negated by that which follows it in the narrative thread, and, recalling the Formalists’ 
preference for construction over positive or nominal ‘content’, is entirely consistent 
with the movement towards negation implicit in defamiliarization.   
There may, albeit initially, appear to be some inconsistency between these two 
instances of negation in Shklovsky’s theory of literary construction.  
Defamiliarization, by definition, requires that a hackneyed element of literary art is 
rendered anew, and it is the moment of innovation that negates the common-place 
form.  Stepped narrative forms are, on the basis of the examples provided by 
Shklovsky, a common feature of an enormous breadth of literary art, and do not 
require a moment of innovation in order to provide an immanent moment of negation 
and difference.  Yet Shklovsky’s essays on plot and narrative formation in the 
Theory of Prose foreground oppositions and contradictions in stepped and parallel 
structures, noting that it is often juxtapositional [protivopostavlenie] or antithetical 
relationships between the various elements that motivate a given narrative 
(Shklovsky 1929: 82).    In addition, Shklovsky’s preference for such devices as 
puns and moments of non-recognition are also exemplary of negation and 
difference.   A pun, for Shklovsky, is one variety of non-recognition in literary art.  A 
particular referent (it is usually sexual in Shklovsky’s examples), is displaced 
through an alternative object which serves as its substitute.  Non-recognition can 
take a variety of forms beyond puns.  It can have a narrative function, causing a 
moment of retardation and necessitating a further scene. The eponymous hero of 
King Lear fails to recognize the character of Kent in order to retard and prolong the 
narrative.  The figure of Don Quixote offers countless examples of mis-recognition 
as, suffering the effects of madness due to reading too many books, he fails to 
recognize common-place objects and accords them a status which is other to them.  
All of these devices are exemplary of Shklovsky’s tendency to identify negation in 
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literary art, and such moments of negation serve to heighten somatic perception of 
literary art and prolong and make difficult the desire of storytelling ‘for the sake of 
story-telling itself’ […s motivirovkoi rasskazyvaniia radi rasskazyvaniia] (Shklovsky 
1929: 84).  As such, any initial tension between the innovatory moment of 
defamiliarization and the conventionalized moments of step-structures and non-
recognitions is dispelled once their shared properties of immanent negation are 
ascertained.  Such devices manifest ‘laws’ of plot construction that account for art’s 
non-unitary and contradictory qualities; or, in other words, they can be termed art’s 
conditions of possibility, which account for the reader’s somatic response. 
III 
In the essay ‘The Structure of Fiction’ [Stroenie rasskaza i romana], a brief 
discussion of Chekhov’s Notebooks encapsulates many of the elements of 
Shklovsky’s poetics under discussion, and foregrounds how moments of 
contradiction, difference and somatic response confer a material quality upon art.  
Shklovsky notes how a figure walks past a shop-sign and, due to his non-recognition 
of the ‘true’ meaning of words written on the sign, is perplexed as to why a shop 
should offer such a commodity.  When the shop-sign is taken down and placed by 
the shop at street level, the character appreciates that he has been mistaken (he 
believed the sign was offering a large choice of white fish [sig]), when in fact it offers 
a large choice of cigars [sigar]).  As Shklovsky notes: 
The poet removes all signs [vyveski] from their places, the artist always instigates 
the uprising of things.  Things rebel in poet’s hands, casting off their old names and 
adopting new names and new faces.  A poet employs images – tropes, 
comparisons… He wrests the concept from the semantic cluster in which it is 
embedded and reassigns it with the help of the word (trope) to another semantic 
cluster.  We, the readers, sense the presence of something new, the presence of an 
object in a new cluster.  The new word envelops its object, as new clothes envelop a 
man.  The sign has been taken down.  This is one of the ways in which an object 
can be transformed into something sensuous, into something that can become 
material for artistic creation.  Another way is represented by a progressive, stepped 
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form.  The object divides into two or three segments that reflect or confront each 
other…’ (Shklovsky 1929: 80; 1998: 62, translation amended).35  
Shklovsky’s use of the key term ‘material’ leads to a further paradox here.  
Shklovsky is unequivocal in his insistence that art is autonomous from life, and 
clearly disdains any unitary or ‘metaphysical’ relationship between art and the 
material world of life.  Yet, it would appear that any object in the field of life can 
serve as material for an artistic construction, as if the same paradigm of negation 
and difference that functions within the literary work of art can be applied to the 
relationship between an object and its artistic instantiation, with the latter providing 
the dynamic moment of otherness and negation that provokes a heightened 
sensation of the original material.  Purely on this basis, art is merely a relationship 
between different materials figured through their determinate negation, and any 
artistic device is merely a particular instance of this process of clash and 
contradiction in motion.   This relationship may be autonomous from life, but the 
actual materials that are deployed in opposition to one another by a given artist are 
the stuff of life itself.  
This paradoxical figuring of the (non-)relationship between art and life, where art is 
and is not ‘material’ to artistic constructions, is further compounded by the 
contradictory iterations of the ‘material’ status of that same artistic construction in 
Shklovsky’s literary theory.  In the above passage, Shklovsky notes how the poet-
artist has the capacity to shake up conventionalized associations with innovative 
and contradictory semantic associations.  Shklovsky ostensibly insists that a work of 
                                                          
35 It is, I think, important to note the difference between the Russian vyveska and znak, both of which 
are rendered in English as ‘sign’.  Vyveska can be roughly translated as a street or shop sign, 
whereas znak is the term used to denote the semiotic concept of the sign.   After Gerald Burn’s 
introduction to Shklovsky’s Theory of Prose, Douglas Robinson has argued that this passage 
manifests Shklovsky’s desire to make the sign concrete, but this is problematic (Robinson 2008: 127-
8).  Whilst I agree with regard to Shklovsky’s move to concretize verbal art, it is important to 
emphasize that Shklovsky’s drive to materialize is consistently paradoxical and dialectical in how it 
conceptualizes the constituent elements juxtaposed in an individual sign.  It is therefore unlikely that 
he can be said to share the dualistic Saussurean schema of the reified material signifier and signified.  
For a discussion of the first translation of Saussure’s Cours into Russian, see ‘Pervyi russkii perevod 
‘Kursa obshchei lingvistiki’ F. de Sossiura i deiatel΄nost΄ Moskovskogo lingvisticheskogo kruzhka’ 
(Toddes and Chudakova 1978: 229-49). 
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art is a relationship between materials, but his terms ‘device’, ‘structure’ and 
‘construction’ all confer a degree of materiality upon the work of literary art itself, 
denoting a semantic cluster – ‘ideas, comparisons’ – of materiality when, on the 
basis of Shklovsky’s terms in the above example, there is no factual material 
object.36 
This problematic obviously pertains to longstanding and unresolvable debates as to 
what is the Formalist idea of material in terms of literary art (Erlich 1955: 189) 
(Renfrew 2006: 21-41) (Medvedev 2000: 282-305; 1991: 104-128).  In the Theory of 
Prose, Shklovsky appears to offer at least three different definitions of the material in 
terms of literary art.  At times, it is the extra-literary stuff of life which can inspire an 
author to write a certain story, but, due to the properties and autonomous laws of 
literary art, has no role whatsoever in shaping a literary narrative.  This ‘material’ has 
certain similarities with the Kantian thing-in-itself, which must be given to 
consciousness through the forms of intuition, but remains ultimately unknowable to 
the categories and laws of the understanding.  Elsewhere, Shklovsky directly 
contradicts this reading of literary material and appears to insist that it is the 
contradictory structure of the literary object which is material, a position which 
Tynianov asserts in The Problem of Verse Language [Problema stikhotvornogo 
iazyka] (Tynianov 1963: 1981).  In ‘Art as Device’, Shklovsky hints that the work of 
literary art may only be the material sounds, words and devices which function in 
opposition to one another within the immanent whole of the work (Shklovsky 1929: 
10).  In the fragment ‘Sherwood’ from the Third Factory [Tret΄iaia fabrika], Shklovsky 
details what he learned through studying sculpture with Sherwood during a brief 
apprenticeship.  Shklovsky recounts how his master taught him that it is wrong to 
shape and sculpt a material into a representation of an emotion.  The material of 
                                                          
36 As will become apparent, the Formalist drive towards the material properties of literary art has far 
more positive qualities than it does for Hegel’s account of inert canvas and stone noted in the 
previous chapter. 
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stone is formed into a given shape and projects that emotion itself.  Verbal art, 
Shklovsky argues, is no different.  Any given emotional state does not lie beyond the 
work of art awaiting its representation: the material work of art itself is that emotion, 
and any truth cannot lie beyond its material boundaries (Shklovsky 2002: 350-1; 
2002: 27). Yet in an essay that praises Rozanov’s work for its startling innovations, 
Shklovsky insists that the work of art is not material, but a relationship between 
materials. If this relationship is to provoke a heightened somatic response in the 
reader and return sensation of a thing, then it must be one of contradiction, non-
correspondence and, by implication, negation.  Shklovsky praises how both ‘yes’ 
and ‘no’ exist simultaneously on the same page in Rozanov’s prose  (Shklovsky 
1929: 234), and, by implication, it is only art that is capable of immanently facilitating 
such a contradiction without the ideological closure of the ethnographic school, 
Bely’s anthroposophic dogma or Potebnia’s out-dated concept of thinking-in-images.  
The Rozanov essay demonstrates how the stone is made stoney through its being 
contradicted by something else, and it is only in this disharmonious relationship 
between materials within literary form that the somatic can arise.  
IV  
Previous generations of scholars would no doubt dismiss these contradictory 
iterations of materiality as yet another of Russian Formalism’s adolescent ‘mistakes’ 
or deliberately cultivated clumsiness.37  Given Shklovsky’s interest in the marvellous 
ambiguities of Rozanov’s prose, Shklovsky’s contradictory treatments of material 
can productively be regarded as his own moment of ‘yes’ and ‘no’ appearing on the 
same page simultaneously.  Literature’s conditions of possibility, it would seem, 
encompass a scenario where the device is at once material and immaterial inter-
                                                          
37 In the introductory remarks to his translation of Eikhenbaum’s ‘How Gogol΄’s Overcoat is Made’, 
Robert Maguire provides a particularly interesting appraisal of Formalism, stating that: ‘There are 
many difficulties involved in translating Eikhenbaum, indeed most of the Formalists.  Few of them 
were stylists; in fact they often seem to be deliberately cultivating clumsiness, perhaps in the interest 
of a less ‘aesthetic’ and more ‘scientific’ tone’ (Maguire 1974: 267). 
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relationship; the literary construction is a tactile structure and a relationship between 
elements that is, by virtue of its provoking a somatic response, completely 
inaccessible to empirical perception.   Once more it is productive (and indeed 
appropriately paradoxical) to note how the Russian nephew proves himself indirect 
heir to his avuncular progenitor in Königsberg.  It has already been noted that there 
is an uneasy tension in Kant regarding empirical knowledge.  Kant’s desire to 
provide the conditions of possibility for synthetic a priori truth is to no small extent an 
attempt to justify the natural sciences and the empirical paradigm of engaging with 
the phenomena of the natural world, as well as provide an account of the subject’s a 
priori moral freedom.  In the Critique of the Power of Judgement, Kant is more 
reticent regarding the empirical episteme, cautious over its destructive capacity to 
isolate, destroy or instrumentally manipulate the natural world to its own ends.  To 
counter this force, Kant proposes a productive theory of the self that is disinterested, 
through analogy with the feeling of pleasure produced upon the subject’s perceiving 
an artwork of beauty.    
Shklovsky is clearly under no illusions that an artwork has to be beautiful in order to 
provoke a somatic reaction, and, in the first three essays in the Theory of Prose, 
appears to regard the transgressive, taboo attributes of sexual topoi as analogous to 
defamiliarization (Shklovsky 1929: 7-23; 24-67 and 68-90).  Nevertheless, his 
insistence that art is an (im-)material terrain where ‘yes’ and ‘no’ exist 
simultaneously hints at a similar unease over empirical perception, which does, after 
all, lead to conventionalised perceptions of reified forms.  Accordingly, Shklovsky 
should in no way be regarded as providing reified definitions of the elements that 
constitute literary structures, such as plot, device, pun, parody, narrative, repetition 
and metaphor.  All these elements are, to borrow Tynianov’s phrase, examples of 
the dialectical play of devices (Tynianov 1977: 226), where art is the constructive 
relationship between elements that affirms sensory immediacy.  Shklovsky’s interest 
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in laws of plot formation runs contrary to the ‘morphology’ or proto-semiotics of 
Vladimir Propp’s Morphology of the Folktale or the kind of semiotic utterance which 
proclaims, with regard to the spatial media of cinema and theatre, that ‘good’ always 
comes in from the right and ‘evil’ from the left.  In contrast to these reified 
paradigms, Shklovsky’s consideration of the laws of plot unearths a Kantian 
structure of immanent contradictions, a stepped form that divides and contradicts 
itself at all levels, be it in terms of moving from sentence to sentence, narrative 
episode to narrative episode.  Shklovsky does formulate mathematical formulae to 
demonstrate narrative progression (Shklovsky 1929: 42, 62), but he does so with a 
view to demonstrating the discontinuity of narrative structures at the immanent level, 
where, to return to the essay on Rozanov, it is the arithmetical terms of the 
denominator which are of most interest in art, and not the isolated elements of the 
construction in and of themselves (Shklovsky 1929: 226-7).38 
In addition to Kant’s ambivalence towards empiricism, Shklovsky shares the 
tendency to regard method as constitutive of its object.  Kant’s trajectory towards a 
practical moral autonomy is replicated in the contradictory motions and structures of 
consciousness, with both the practical realm of experience and the motion of the 
mind co-constitutive and co-dependent upon each other.  Implicit in Shklovsky’s 
theorizing the ‘yes’ and ‘no’ existing simultaneously in Rozanov, and, for that matter, 
his own treatment of art as simultaneously material and immaterial construction, is 
the conclusion that in order to understand and practise art’s contradictory properties, 
it is necessary to objectively theorize art in a manner which is not entirely predicated 
upon the reified, empirical determinations made by Propp in his classic text devoted 
to the folktale and its morphology (Propp 2003).  As with Kant’s theory of the mind, 
Shklovsky’s objective theory of art insists that somatic reaction must remain beyond 
                                                          
38 It is apparent that, also like Kant, Shklovsky’s interest in constructive laws is undertaken with a view 
to facilitating a finite account of freedom, as once the author understands the paradoxical laws of 
literary creation she will be able to write.  This key affinity between the Formalists and Kant will be 
developed in both the third and seventh chapters. 
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the grasp of empirical knowledge.  Accordingly, if one is to theorize the work of art in 
its material complexity, then one must theorize (and thereby perceive) the literary 
object artistically, and therefore the sensation which lies beyond the reach of 
empirical knowledge becomes a significant element of the mutually constitutive 
praxes of writing art and writing theory.   
There has been no shortage of critical accounts of Shklovsky’s Formalism that 
explore the consistency between the properties Shklovsky identifies in literature and 
his own ‘method’ of literary critique (Paramonov 1996: 35-52) (Khanzen-Leve 2001).  
Yet Shklovsky’s insistence on non-recognition [ne-uznavanie] has been neglected in 
this regard, both in terms of the role it plays in his discussion of literary poetics and 
as a methodological principle with which to undertake a critique of literary form.  As 
mentioned above, Shklovsky identifies different instantiations of non-recognition in 
literary art, ranging from puns to characters not recognizing other characters or 
objects.  Appropriately, non-recognition can be said to function in different ways in 
Shklovsky’s theorization of literary art.  The figure of Bely, whose anthroposophic 
ideological closure is mocked so ruthlessly by Shklovsky, is himself something of a 
Quixote figure in The Theory of Prose, a figure who does not recognize the 
contradictory ‘reality’ of literary form and creates a ludicrous two-tiered structure of 
anthroposophic truth and the real world, a gesture that provides Shklovsky with a 
perfect interplay of devices, with the essay on ornamental prose amounting to 
material for a withering parody of Bely’s work.  Of greater significance, however, is 
Shklovsky’s non-recognition of art qua art, that is, not recognising art in a manner 
that would provide a non-contradictory, reified account of art and its structural 
properties.  The term ‘recognition’ has important associations beyond the realm of 
‘life’ to which Shklovsky argues it pertains (and art overcomes).  In Aristotle’s 
Poetics, a moment of recognition [uznavanie] is potentially the crowning moment of 
tragic art, when the tragic hero realizes the full import of his past actions.  
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Shklovsky’s Formalism may share Aristotle’s demand to speak of art on its own 
terms without recourse to other fields of knowledge, but Aristotle’s poetics demand a 
harmonious order which is all too obviously anathema to Shklovsky.39  Aristotle 
believes digression to be a mark of inferior art and, in the case of tragedy, has very 
strict requirements regarding what a tragedy requires in order for it to be recognized 
as such (Aristotle 2000: 1-11).40  Shklovsky clearly believes that it is impossible to 
create and theorize art along such terms, and valorizes all those elements that 
Aristotle rejects, welcoming the retarding force of digressions and the sensuous 
moment of non-recognition.   Shklovsky’s figures of art such as a knight’s move (the 
nod towards Quixote is clear) or a rocky road that doubles back on itself should be 
conceptualized as mis-recognitions of art that serve to impede and defamiliarize the 
reified, conventionalized clarity with which Aristotle accords it.41 
A further paradox of Shklovsky’s poetics of non-recognition is his rejection of 
another key tenet of Aristotelean poetics: representation.  Aristotle insists that 
tragedy has to involve the imitation of an action (Aristotle 2000: 10).  Shklovsky’s 
insistence that art is autonomous from life and his concomitant rejection of the 
determinist ethnographic school are consistent with his contradictory treatment of 
material, in that all deny that art can be recognized as mere representation. Art’s 
contradictory material properties serve to impede and make difficult perception, and 
deny such a hermeneutic enclosure that facilitates a simplistic and immediate ‘truth.’  
In terms of the ‘Sherwood’ conceptualization of material, the material artwork is its 
own emotional content through its own formal contradictions, and it is in no way a 
                                                          
39 For an alternative account which notes Formalism’s direct similarities with Aristotlean poetics, see 
(Epstein 2011: 159-170)  
40 ‘Every Tragedy must have six parts, which parts determine its quality—namely, Plot, Character, 
Diction, Thought, Spectacle, Song’  (Aristotle 2000: 11). 
41 There are obvious parallels between Shklovsky’s critical impetus towards non-recognition of its 
object and Kant’s programme of critique in the Critique of Pure Reason, where the in-itself (be it of the 
‘thing’ or of ‘consciousness’) must remain unknowable if we are to grasp the paradoxical, 
contradictory workings of consciousness and human autonomy. Kant’s project requires that the laws 
of reason, understanding, the imagination, sensible intuition and the thing-in-itself are all 
oppositionally located to one-another, and it is only in the immanent motion of these contradictory 
entities that autonomous human reason and synthetic a priori cognition are possible. 
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representation of an emotional state exterior to the work of art.  In the alternative 
paradigm of life providing material for the constructive relationship immanent to art, 
it is the contradictory and paradoxical laws which govern any somatic response to 
the artwork, and without any contradictory inter-relationship of materials, there can 
be no affective reaction. That is not to say, however, that Shklovsky’s poetics of 
non-recognition do not accord anthroposophic ideology, thinking in images or 
representation any role in art.  Shklovsky’s formulation that art is merely the 
contradictory relationship of disparate materials is ambiguous, and does not specify 
whether those materials are the concrete forms of verbal art or the material stuff of 
life itself.  Indeed the very qualities of the device, that dynamic element in a 
trajectory towards its own negation, do not prohibit either eventuality.  Therefore 
anthroposophic ideology, Potebnia’s image, or even the knowledge that an explicit 
representation is occurring in a roman-à-clef can all be devices, if deployed in 
artistic form with a view towards their negation.  Yet they cannot ever confer on art 
the closure of an absolute or incontestable truth. 
V 
The device’s capacity to re-orientate such elements within literary form is analogous 
to Hegel’s figure of mediated sublation in the discussion of objectivity in the previous 
chapter.  Boris Paramonov and Douglas Robinson have both argued that Shklovsky 
is a Hegelian theoretician of art, with Paramonov even going so far as stating that 
Shklovsky is the Hegel of Russian Formalism  (Paramonov 1996: 35-52) (Robinson 
2009: 135-65).42  Yet the dialectical tensions between innovation and deformation, 
                                                          
42 Paramonov’s account of Shklovsky’s Hegelianism is problematic in that he glosses over the glaring 
contradictions in Hegel’s Lectures on Aesthetics, where Hegel at times appears to endorse the 
opposition between form and content in aesthetics, and at other times unconvincingly argue for their 
sublation in a manner which lacks the persuasive elaboration of the absolute idea in The Science of 
Logic.  Paramonov problematically argues that Shklovsky is the Hegelian example of literature’s 
coming to self-consciousness, when, on the basis of the present discussion, Shklovsky and the other 
Formalists argue precisely against the substitution of the self-conscious self for the work of art.  The 
Formalists’ treatment of material asserts the radical concrete otherness of verbal art, or, in other 
words, that art is very much a thing and not a self-conscious self.  As will become apparent in due 
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construction and deconstruction, advancing a narrative and its retardation belie the 
difficulty of equating Shklovsky’s poetics of non-recognition with the variety of the 
Hegelian dialectic already discussed.  In terms of Hegel’s discussion of objectivity, 
the dialectic proceeds from sensory immediacy to the negative moment of 
opposition and then the moment of sublation before a cyclical return to sensory 
immediacy.  All these elements are certainly present in Shklovsky’s dialectical 
formulation of not recognizing literary art, but careful consideration reveals the 
elements are orchestrated towards different ends and with differing evaluations as to 
the value of each stage of the process.  In Hegel, the sensory immediacy that is so 
vital for Shklovsky is but an initial stage that precedes the more worthy activity of 
reason as it goes about its self-regarding gymnastics of sublation.  For Shklovsky 
heightened sensory immediacy arises at the point of dialectical contradiction and 
negation and serves to remove the subject from a state of sleep walking through life, 
where she merely recognizes material phenomena without appreciating the full 
vitality possible through their heightened somatic intuition.  Shklovsky and Hegel 
both share the preference for mediation, where the moment of negation and 
difference is incorporated into an immanent whole, but for Shklovsky this moment is 
the height of sensory immediacy, whereas Hegel locates it between the conceptual 
activity of the mind and the newly determined properties of the thing before a return 
to somatic intuition (sense-certainty) of the material world.  Thus in Hegel’s 
framework the accent is not placed on the subject’s mis-recognition of the world as a 
constant:  Hegel’s Absolute Idea entails the historically contingent, mediated 
synthesis between thing and object, and is clearly alien to Shklovsky’s inclination not 
to recognize the object in its abstract purity in order to ascertain a heightened 
sensory awareness of its properties. 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
course, it is potentially Tynianov who is closest to Hegel’s objective dialectics.  Shklovsky, as will be 
argued in the discussion of The Third Factory, is an altogether more arch and ironic dialectician than 
either Tynianov or Hegel. Indeed, Shklovsky could even be said to offer a dialectics of non-
recognition. 
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Despite these differences between Shklovsky and Hegel, it is nonetheless important 
to note that Hegel’s preference for a dialectics of mediation between two opposing 
terms is structurally analogous to Shklovsky’s devices of defamiliarization, 
retardation, non-recognition and puns.  These features of Shklovsky’s poetics 
should under no circumstances be construed as a refusal to engage with the reified, 
thingly aesthetic object or equally reified abstract formulations as to its properties.  
Of necessity such elements are part of Shklovsky’s project: defamiliarization, 
retardation and puns all require knowledge of whichever object is displaced through 
negation.  If such elements were absent in Shklovsky’s thought, there would be no 
resulting dialectical tension between the referent and its negation, just as a stepped 
plot construction requires additional material beyond an individual element if it is to 
advance the narrative further.  Were it not for the existence of conventionalized 
forms, the whole desire for innovation and transgression through contradiction would 
be impossible.43  Shklovsky’s restlessness sees him demand that any resulting 
synthesis brought about, in the case of defamiliarization, by the reader’s heightened 
sensory perception of a particular object will soon become conventionalized and 
routine, and require further innovation or defamiliarization if it is to remain a vital 
element of artistic practice.  Shklovsky’s poetics of non-recognition implicitly requires 
an object in its recognizable, conventionalized form, and it is only the dialectical 
tension between the two which provides the sensation of creativity.  
Despite Shklovsky’s preference for a dialectics of mediation it is, I think, somewhat 
misleading to insist that Shklovsky is a card-carrying Hegelian.  In order to support 
his assertion that Shklovsky is the Hegel of Russian Formalism, Paramonov offers 
an analogy.  If for Hegel Absolute Spirit is consciousness of itself as a philosopher, 
then in Shklovsky’s thought we approach literature’s self-consciousness 
(Paramonov 1996: 51).  Hegel’s Absolute Spirit, like his Absolute Idea in the greater 
                                                          
43 The above citation from Christiansen’s Philosophy of Art notes the importance of the 
conventionalized form.   
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Logic, entails a mediated synthesis between mental abstraction and concrete object, 
or, in more Hegelian terms, the historical self-mediating process of Spirit and sense-
certainty (Hegel 1977: 492-3).  It would be easy to blithely assert that Shklovsky’s 
contradictory structures manifest the Hegelian argument in the ‘Doctrine of Being’ 
from the greater Science of Logic, where all phenomena contain immediacy and 
mediation (Hegel 2010: 45-82).  The heightened sensation of life that accompanies 
defamiliarization is, undeniably, the result of the mediating tension between old and 
new.  But Shklovsky’s heightened awareness is, if nothing else, sensuous.  In 
contrast, Hegel disapproves of an overbearing emphasis on sensuality.  In the 
preface to the Phenomenology, he applauds the ferment of enthusiasm that drives 
the desire to know and tears people away from ‘ordinary, private affairs’, but this 
ferment is not sensuous.  Philosophy can restore the feeling of what Hegel terms 
‘essential being’, but this feeling is differentiated from men’s ‘preoccupation with the 
sensuous’ (Hegel 1977: 5).   Shklovsky’s dialectic of non-recognition and recognition 
exults in the mediated tension between these two elements but, unlike Hegel, the 
‘goal’ of this process is a heightened somatic pleasure.  Hegel’s historical Absolute 
Knowing maintains the same paradoxical structure, but with very different 
constituent elements.  
Kant, like Hegel, does not endorse sensuous excess.  Shklovsky’s thought is 
nevertheless comparable to that of Kant, in that his conflicting iterations of material 
implicitly advocate at least one element of literature that is, of necessity, other to 
itself, and, just as in Kant, the closing moment of self-consciousness that provides 
the knowledge of an object in-itself is impossible.  If art is to remain art then it has to 
be aloof and remain unknowable.  Accordingly, it is impossible to formulate a poetics 
of literary creation in intentional terms or, in other words, any writer must accept the 
necessary condition not of self-consciousness, but of stupidity, of a Quixotian 
brainlessness.  The contradictory, othering properties of literary form and its 
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contradiction are a condition of an author being free to create that art so valorized by 
Shklovsky, and this is the wisdom he proffers in Theory of Prose and his other 
works.  Kant’s denial of knowledge of self-consciousness and the thing-in-itself 
constitute an analogous insistence on human finitude, where knowledge is 
drastically limited as a necessary price for autonomous freedom. 
Yet Kant was prepared to make art a surrogate for human subjectivity in order to 
guarantee moral freedom.  Shklovsky, as will become apparent in due course, is not 
prepared to undertake such a ‘reciprocally expeditious’ gesture and, with his 
unknowable (im-)material literary art, formulates an alternative, resolutely objective 
relationship between art, the human subject and the problematic encounter with 
‘life’.  Formalism is, particularly in its Bakhtinian reception, often regarded as 
distancing itself from ethical and philosophical matters as a price for art’s autonomy 
and the thingly properties of material art.  Rather than insist on a restoration of the 
rights of mankind, Formalism, so Bakhtin appears to argue, tramples on those rights 
through its insistence that art is a positivistic thing. Yet, in the following discussion 
on Eikhenbaum’s Gogol΄ essay, the distinction is not as clear as it may seem.  
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3: A Grotesque Science 
I 
Critical literature on Russian Formalism has occasionally provided some odd 
analogies in its discussions of the movement’s key dramatis personae.    As 
mentioned in the previous chapter, Boris Paramonov has referred to Shklovsky as 
the Hegel of Russian Formalism.  Shklovsky is the subject of an even more far-
fetched comparison in the introductory essay to a collection of his autobiographical 
prose, where Aleksandr Galushkin likens him to none other than Indiana Jones 
(Galushkin, in Shklovsky 2002: 6).  It is easy to imagine that Shklovsky would 
approve of the richness of the extreme semantic gap between the opposing terms 
here, but it would likely be unwise to read too much into these moments of non-
recognition beyond the fact that Shklovsky enjoys a reputation for being 
unconventional, challenging and as going about a disciplinary activity associated 
with systematic and stuffy conservatism with cavalier recklessness.  Boris 
Eikhenbaum has, to my knowledge, not been the subject of such extraordinary 
analogies.  In a chapter entitled ‘Guarding the Work Centred Poetics’, Carol Any 
provides the sober comparison of Eikhenbaum with a guard dog (Any 1994: 46-7).  
Any sees Eikhenbaum as guarding the core object of Russian Formalism: the 
autonomy of the literary work from life, a task that, Any argues, involved protecting 
Formalism from attacks coming from without, and the wayward activities of its own 
members.  With regard to his defence against the latter, Any notes how 
Eikhenbaum’s review of the first Poetika collection reveals his wariness of 
Yakubinsky’s work as ‘it implied a psychological source of poetic creation, relating 
poetry to the subconscious impressions that produce dreams’; and Eikhenbaum was 
equally sceptical of Shklovsky’s concept of ostranenie, which according to Any’s 
reductive reading (which she shares with Pavel Medvedev), is merely another 
instantiation of the Aristotelean mimetic paradigm (Any 1994: 47-8, 57-8).  
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Eikhenbaum therefore only uses defamiliarization in terms of the relationship 
between literary devices, and not between an object and its material referent in life.  
This use of defamiliarization is exemplary of the guard dog’s most significant 
contribution to Russian Formalism: conceptualizing the work of art as a system that 
has no contingency upon the world of life.44   
There is clearly something defensive in Any’s guard dog analogy, both in terms of 
how it formulates Formalism’s relationship with its disciplinary rivals, and with regard 
to Eikhenbaum’s contribution.  Any resents the fact that Eikhenbaum’s contribution 
to Russian Formalism has been neglected at the expense of the innovations of 
Shklovsky, Tynianov and Jakobson.   The dutiful guard dog, according to Any, made 
an equally important contribution with his concept of literature as a system and his 
‘applied criticism anticipated, corrected, and validated Formalist theory; and it was at 
least as important in the first two functions as in the last’ (Any 1994: 46).  Such 
critical interventions, which seek to particularize Russian Formalism’s achievements 
(or, for that matter, its ‘mistakes’) to individual authors is, in terms of the present 
study, highly problematic.  Shklovsky’s parodic treatment of Andrei Bely’s venture 
into anthroposophy is typical of the Formalist strategy of regarding authorial 
intention as a ‘catalyst’, where the author is contingent upon the laws and materials 
with which she goes about writing.  To speak of Shklovsky, Eikhenbaum and 
Tynianov in terms of their individual authorial innovations with substantiating 
evidence provided from their personal correspondence is certainly not without 
interest,45 but it runs the risk of confining Formalist theory to just one other 
manifestation of poetics, literary theory or early Soviet intellectual culture, all of 
                                                          
44 Any also insists that it was Eikhenbaum who first advanced the concept of literary art as a system in 
her article ‘Testing the Limits of the Work Centred Poetics’ (Any 1990: 409-26).  Her disappointment 
that Eikhenbaum has been neglected in previous studies of Formalism is primarily directed at Fredric 
Jameson’s The Prison House of Language and George Steiner’s Formalism: a Metapoetics. 
45 For a sustained, and highly interesting, effort at a biographical account of Russian Formalism, see 
‘Neudavshiisia dialog (Iz istorii vzaimootnoshenii formal'noi shkoly i vlasti) (Galushkin 1992: 210) and 
‘“I tak, stavshi na kostiakh, budem trubit΄ sbor”: K istorii ne sostoiavshegosia vozrozhdeniia Opoiaza v 
1928-1930 gg.’ (Galushkin 2000: 136-58).   
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which is accounted for in a positivist, biographical discursive formation that denies 
Formalism (or any other theoretical discourse) the potential to constitute 
simultaneously its object and the praxis of its critique.    The paradoxes, laws and 
materials determined by Formalists, and which no less constitute their own critical 
praxis, cannot satisfactorily be reduced to individual members’ contributions.  Their 
belief that a literary work is a construction whose elements conflict and struggle with 
one another is replicated in a desire to argue and contradict each other, often to the 
point of construing elements that now seem complementary as radical difference.  
Accordingly, the Formalists serve as suitable catalysts for the critique of ‘positive 
influence’ made in the first chapter, and this study therefore sees little merit in 
particularizing the contributions of Eikhenbaum, Shklovsky or Tynianov at the 
expense of each other. They emerge as authors only in each other’s presence; the 
totality of their thought only when perceived collectively. 
Eikhenbaum, the supposed ‘guard dog’ of the work-centred poetics himself was at 
times capable of figuring an ambiguous relationship between literary text and the 
‘elsewhere’ of life that lies beyond its boundaries, and even not above recourse to 
such biographical sources as personal correspondence.  The ‘guard dog’ may lack 
the paradoxical and unconventional mode of exposition found in Shklovsky’s work, 
but his use of the conventional materials of literary scholarship could be no less 
creative and indeed paradoxical, serving to limit and problematize authorial intention 
rather than affirm it.  As shall be argued here, his use of these and other materials 
suggest an author far less conventional than the analogy of a guard dog who 
‘corrects and validates’ implies, and Eikhenbaum’s capacity for irony and his 
startling treatment of the contradictory, paradoxical literary system and its conditions 
of possibility are no less radical than the thought of Shklovsky or Tynianov.  
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II 
Eikhenbaum’s radical and paradoxical figuring of the literary system and the 
problems of plot, conflicting compositional layers, realism and authorship are 
apparent in his first contribution to Formalist poetics, the essay ‘How Gogol΄’s 
Overcoat is Made’ [Kak sdelana ‘Shinel΄’ Gogolia].   The title manages to go a step 
further than Shklovsky’s similarly titled essay on Cervantes’s Don Quixote, and 
provides a punning moment of non-recognition afforded by the title of Gogol’s 
famous short story and the Formalist interest in material literary construction.  
Gogol΄’s text The Overcoat [Shinel΄] is juxtaposed with the material item of an 
overcoat.  The verb to make [sdelat΄] provides a semantic shift away from the 
conventionalized recognition of The Overcoat as the canonical text of morally and 
socially committed realism valorized since Vissarion Belinsky.  Instead of 
recognizing the reality of the world depicted in this classic realist text, Eikhenbaum 
performs the Formalist gesture of materializing the literary work, insisting not upon 
the accuracy of the text’s morally committed mimesis, but the reality of its material 
elements, implying that it is a material construction that can be assembled in the 
same manner as a tailor making a garment (note the convergence with Shklovsky’s 
non-recognition ‘thread’ [nitka]).46  The reality of the text is its material elements and 
their orchestration into a systemic literary construction; the ‘reality’ of the text’s 
realism is exposed as an illusion.     
This tension between a realistic description of material manufacture and a 
supposedly illusory mimetic realism is brilliantly dissected by Eikhenbaum in the 
essay.     The central focus of his systemic critique of Gogol΄’s The Overcoat is not, 
pace Bakhtin, the oral form of narration, but compositional construction; and 
                                                          
46 In ‘The Structure of Fiction’ [Stroenie rasskaza i romana], Shklovsky’s brief remarks on Le Sage’s 
Gil Blas are consistent with Eikhenbaum’s critique of Gogol΄.  Shklovsky insists that the character Gil 
Blas is not a human being and in no way reveals the author’s goal of depicting the man in the street 
[srednyi chelovek].  Gil Blas is, for Shklovsky, categorically not a human being, but a thread with 
which the novel is sewn together [eta nitka, shivaiushchaia episody romana] (Shklovsky 1929: 85).   
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Eikhenbaum’s analysis proceeds by identifying and classifying those devices which 
coalesce into the layers of this total systemic construction and, in turn, how this 
particular story conforms with and departs from literature’s more general categories.   
Eikhenbaum insists that The Overcoat should be differentiated from the category of 
the novel because it is a particularly interesting example of the skaz form.  
Eikhenbaum argues that comic skaz is a distinct category of literary praxis in its own 
right, of which he states that there are two types. Storytelling or narrating 
[povestvuiushchii] skaz contains a measured speech intonation and jokes and puns 
on the nominal, ‘logical’ meaning of words.  In opposition to this story-telling variety, 
Eikhenbaum identifies a more performative variety which involves the reiteration of a 
narrative after its occurrence.  Eikhenbaum terms this variant vosproizvodiashchii 
skaz, and it includes such devices as mimicking speech patterns, the conscious 
articulation of sound puns, and experimental play with syntactical structures that 
exist purely for their own sake and not in order to convey a narrative of events.  With 
the second variant, it is as if an actor is concealed in words [kak by skryvaetsia 
akter], performing the text.  As a result, the composition of performative skaz 
appears to be determined by play-acting and lively improvisation with sound forms 
and gestures (Eikhenbaum 1927: 149-50).  The Overcoat provides an abundance of 
interesting material for the objective analysis of the literary system advocated by 
Eikhenbaum and his fellow Formalists, as it not only offers both these varieties of 
comic skaz simultaneously, but its material construction also manifests a second 
layer that conflicts with and contradicts these typical skaz features (Eikhenbaum 
1927: 157-8).  This additional layer is the renowned ‘human’ or sentimental narrative 
of a put upon clerk struggling with government bureaucracy, that is, the qualities of 
the text seized upon by those critics who established its canonical status as a work 
of morally engaged realism depicting society’s ills and injustices.  
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It is worth recalling here Shklovsky’s remarks that the elements of a literary work are 
more likely to contradict and quarrel with one another, rather than peacefully 
cohabit; and it is important to emphasize how Shklovsky makes this observation in 
the context of Andrei Bely’s failed orchestration of a ‘two-tiered’ literary construction 
in Kotik Letaev.  Shklovsky was dismissive of Bely’s anthroposophic motivation, 
arguing that it was undone by the contradictory properties of literary art, but he 
nonetheless emphasised the importance of such two-tiered structures and clearly 
thought them a worthwhile object for Formalist literary science.  In Gogol΄’s The 
Overcoat, Eikhenbaum identifies an equally contradictory structure, albeit with an 
altogether more positive evaluation than Shklovsky’s caustic critique of Bely.  Kotik 
Letaev and the other epopee texts make the error of a ‘metaphysical’ closure, 
positing a unitary relationship between the planes of reality and a symbolic realm of 
anthroposophic truth, an error structurally analogous to the Belinkskian ‘error’ of 
socially committed realism, which requires the illusory closure of mimetic 
correspondence between text and the world beyond, and, no less importantly, a 
morally committed author intentionally authoring her literary creation.  According to 
Eikhenbaum, The Overcoat does not provide grounds for such a unitary closure, 
and the simultaneous existence of the two contradictory varieties of skaz alongside 
realistic pathos present an opportunity to argue that literature is not a unitary 
system, but a system of contradictions, the extent of which is readily apparent in 
Eikhenbaum’s discussion of plot.  
The twofold taxonomy of skaz and its simultaneous manifestation with a realistic 
narrative results in an ambiguous classification of plot [siuzhet] similar to that found 
in Shklovsky’s essays in The Theory of Prose.    Eikhenbaum’s juxtaposition of 
opposing compositional layers restages Shklovsky’s interest in plot as a both a 
threading together of events into a sequence that manifests a coherent motivation, 
and a stepped structure that divides and contradicts itself, serving to prolong the 
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pleasure of storytelling for its own sake and retard the eventual narrative resolution 
with the negating introduction of new materials (Shklovsky 1929: 24-67 & 68-90).  A 
threaded plot with a coherent motivation is found in The Overcoat’s depiction of a 
suffering clerk; yet vosproizvodiashchii skaz, with its emphasis on repetition, 
experimentation and improvisation for their own sake, typically lacks such a 
‘threaded’ plot.47    Like Shklovsky, Eikhenbaum is faced with the tension between 
denoting plot as a sequence of events threated into a narrative sequence, and the 
lingering need to account for how works such as Sterne’s Tristram Shandy, 
Rozanov’s Solitaria and The Overcoat can be conceptualized as systemic literary 
constructions.  In such texts, materials and devices are clearly strung together, yet 
they lack the ostensible motivation of a clearly threaded plot.  If The Overcoat is an 
example of a realist narrative and performative skaz, how, like the account of motion 
in Kantian critique, can it have a plot and not have a plot at the same time? 
It is perhaps this rich ambiguity over the status of plot which sees Eikhenbaum make 
a transition from the particular example of The Overcoat to the more general literary 
categories of melodrama and the grotesque.  Whilst The Overcoat does contain 
some melodramatic elements, it is, Eikhenbaum argues, an example of the 
grotesque.  Eikhenbaum’s use of the term grotesque is absolutely crucial to the 
problematic, defamiliarizing opposition of mimetic realism and the objective reality of 
literature’s material construction in the essay’s title.  Eikhenbaum shares 
Shklovsky’s enthusiasm for particular elements, and argues that for the grotesque to 
function it must isolate an individual element from reality in order to play with reality, 
breaking up its parts and freely displacing them.  This act of play must not be made, 
                                                          
47 Eikhenbaum states that ‘Many of Gogol΄’s stories, or individual sections of them, offer interesting 
material for an analysis of this kind of skaz.  Composition, in Gogol΄, is not determined by plot; his 
plots are always scanty.  Rather, there is no plot at all [skoree – net nikakogo siuzheta], but only some 
comic situation… serving, as it were, merely as an impetus or pretext for the elaboration of comic 
devices’ (Eikhenbaum 1927: 150; 1974: 270 translation amended).  Yet later in the essay 
Eikhenbaum notes how, in the particular case of The Overcoat, the simultaneous manifestation of the 
tale involving the poor government clerk and the comic elements and devices of skaz make ‘the 
original compositional layer much more complex’ (Eikhenbaum 1927:159-60; 1974: 284, translation 
amended). 
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so Eikhenbaum argues, with any didactic or satirical intent; for if it is to be 
grotesque, then it must exhibit a spontaneous destruction of normal, logical 
correlations and associations in the creation of a new literary construction.    The 
manifest similarities with Shklovsky’s valourization of defamiliarizing art and 
negation are clear when Eikhenbaum argues that grotesque art joins together what 
cannot be joined [soediniat΄ nesoedinimoe]: playful, mocking skaz and sentimental 
pathos; narrative realism and, at the end of The Overcoat, the fantastic; punning, 
sonorous sound gestures and the logical meaning of positive terms which 
accumulate into the ‘realistic’ narrative. As Eikhenbaum notes, ‘[t]his contradiction or 
disparity acts upon the words themselves in such a way that they become strange, 
enigmatic, unfamiliar-sounding, striking to the ear, as if they had been dismembered 
or invented by Gogol΄ for the first time’ (Eikhenbaum 1927: 159-63; 1974: 282-9).   
It is apparent that Eikhenbaum’s use of the term grotesque is, in terms of its implicit 
structural relationships, consistent with the Shklovskian concept of defamiliarization 
and Tynianov’s definition of parody as the dialectical relationship of devices noted in 
the previous chapter.48 All three terms insist that the material literary construction is 
beset by contradictory and opposing relationships between particular elements, and 
pertain to questions of construction and system as a site of dynamic inter-
relationship and dialectical contradiction, not reified or positive definitions that seek 
to classify and determine the properties of literary poetics in a manner akin to 
Aristotle’s account of tragedy.  This state of affairs is, as has been argued above, 
grounds for arguing the counter-intuitive similarity between Kant’s conditions of 
possibility of synthetic a priori cognition, and the Formalists’ conceptualization of the 
literary work’s constructive properties and relationships.  In terms of how Kant 
presents the conditions of possibility of sensuous intuition, synthetic a priori 
cognition, moral freedom and inaccessibility of the thing-in-itself and consciousness-
                                                          
48 For a very brief discussion of the convergences between Eikhenbaum’s concept of the grotesque 
and the Formalist ‘method’ of defamiliarization, see (Khanzen-Leve 2001: 197-8). 
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in-itself, Žižek argues that Kant’s contribution manages to radicalize and 
problematize binary oppositions simultaneously (Žižek 2012: 8), and as a result 
posits a metaphysical discourse where antinomic structures and propositions are the 
de facto human condition.  It has become something of cliché to note how Kant 
insists on the reality of illusions in his ontological framework, but it has gone almost 
unnoticed that Eikhenbaum’s objective discussion of Gogol΄’s material construction 
insists that both sentimental realism and the conflicting properties of comic skaz are 
both illusions that arise through the juxtaposition of individual material elements.49  
Accordingly, Eikhenbaum’s material aesthetics, like Shklovsky’s essay on Rozanov, 
allows for the antinomic freedom of ‘yes’ and ‘no’ to appear on the same page, and 
for those elements which cannot be related to one another to be located in 
ambiguous tension. 
III 
There is admittedly something perverse, grotesque even, in arguing that 
Eikhenbaum’s critique of The Overcoat is analogous to Kant’s conditions of 
possibility.50  Kant’s engagement with the aesthetic in the Critique of the Power of 
Judgement concerns such serene questions as the beautiful and the sublime, and 
does not stoop to address the sinister devices and peculiarities that Eikhenbaum 
identifies in Gogol΄.  Kant tries to guarantee the human subject’s moral freedom 
through a purported harmony between the productive sensation of pleasure felt by 
all perceiving the beautiful or the sublime work of art.  As noted in the first chapter, 
Andrew Bowie and Dieter Henrich have emphasized the fundamental importance of 
Kant’s suggestion of the mutual reciprocity between the moral human subject and 
the work of art, hinting at a possible reconciliation of the alienation of the human 
subject from the thing-in-itself.  Through Fichte’s treatment of the imagination and 
                                                          
49 Eikhenbaum makes the observation that compositional elements combine to create the illusion of 
skaz in the first sentence of the essay (Eikhenbaum 1927: 149; 1974: 269). 
50 For an alternative account which states Kant’s emphatic opposition to the grotesque, see ‘Van 
Gogh’s Ear’: Toward a Theory of Disgust’ (Chaouli 2003: 47-62). 
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German Romanticism, art effectively becomes the autonomous site of a priori moral 
content that guarantees and dramatizes the moral human subject.51  Accordingly, 
materialist Formalism cannot be said to share this post-Kantian belief in the a priori 
morality of the work of art and, in the figure of the genius, the artist herself.  It has 
long been noted how the Belinskian reading of The Overcoat is inflected by 
precisely those same post-Kantian discourses that argue art is the a priori surrogate 
of moral human autonomy, and, to return to Kant’s phrase, Belinsky’s project of 
socially committed realism clearly mirrors the Kantian project for the restoration of 
the rights of mankind, with both dutiful art and no less dutiful artist exemplary of the 
human subject’s a priori moral freedom.52 
Eikhenbaum’s discussion of authorship in the Gogol΄ essay reveals the extent to 
which Russian Formalism departs from these post-Kantian paradigms of the morally 
committed artist.  According to the Bakhtin / Medvedev interpretation53 of 
Eikhenbaum’s essay and the broader aims and objectives of Russian Formalism, a 
morally committed authorial subjectivity is either limited in its capacity for free choice 
by the ‘objective’ laws of literary construction identified by the Formalists, or, in 
extreme interpretations, is denied altogether in such formulations as Osip Brik’s 
well-known remark that, given the incontrovertible nature of the objective laws of 
literary construction, Evegenii Onegin would have been written even if Pushkin had 
never been born (Brik 1923: 213-5).   A careful reading of Eikhenbaum’s essay on 
The Overcoat would suggest that the treatment of authorship is more nuanced than 
Bakhtin’s and Medvedev’s reductive account of Formalism allows, and is indeed 
consistent with an autonomous free subjectivity, that is, a subjectivity that asserts 
                                                          
51 Whilst he is wary of attributing the entire Romantic movement to Fichte’s philosophy, Henrich 
consistently argues that Fichte’s account of the imagination in The Science of Knowledge is highly 
significant in terms the development of aesthetics and the unitary promise of human reconciliation 
with the natural world provided by aesthetic autonomy (Henrich 2003: 222-30).  For Andrew Bowie’s 
account of the evolution of aesthetics after Kant’s Critique of the Power of Judgement, see (Bowie 
2003: 49-68).     
52 On Belinsky’s and his successors’ reception of post-Kantian aesthetic discourses, see (Terras 
1974).  
53 Bakhtin’s and Medvedev’s objections to Russian Formalism are discussed at length in chapter 8. 
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itself in the free play of literary praxis and its interaction with literature’s material 
properties and paradoxical relationships of contradiction and negation.  Kant’s 
Critique of Pure Reason, as noted in the first chapter, does not grant the 
‘reciprocally expeditious’ analogy between artwork and its prompting of the dis-
interested production of pleasure in the human subject, and there is no gesture 
towards bridging the subject’s alienation from both thing- and consciousness-in-
themselves.   The subject remains alienated from the natural world in a manner 
replicated in consciousness’s antinomic structures which are set in motion through 
empirical intuition.  The first Critique maintains a contradictory, paradoxical 
relationship between both the immanent workings of consciousness and the 
subject’s relationship with the material natural world in order to guarantee freedom.  
At this stage of Kant’s project, alienation can therefore be said to be present at 
many different levels of his system and its dynamic, multi-dimensional structure.  
Kant’s account of the genius artist in the third Critique is clearly incompatible with 
the ontological platform of the earlier work’s ‘conditions of possibility’, because it 
insists on a unitary relationship between the genius-talent, a harmoniously ordered 
natural world and the universally valid and disinterested sensation of pleasure felt by 
all upon perceiving the genius’s beautiful artwork (Kant 2000: 186-97).  Russian 
Formalism’s material aesthetics and its concomitant, objectively formulated account 
of authorship can be understood as analogous to Kant’s account of subjectivity in 
the first Critique, in that in order to guarantee authorial freedom, the author must 
contend with the alienating objective properties of literary art that inhere in the praxis 
of writing.   
Accordingly, Eikhenbaum’s subsequent remarks can be understood as convergent 
with Kant’s insistence upon the human subject’s finitude, both in terms of coming to 
know itself and the material world around it: 
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Proceeding from the basic proposition that in a work of art not a single sentence 
can, in and of itself, be a mere ‘reflection’ of the author’s personal feelings, but 
rather is always a construct and a performance, we cannot and have no right to see 
anything other than an explicit artistic device…  The customary procedure of 
identifying some given statement with the contents of the writer’s ‘psychology’ is 
false scholarship.  In this sense, the mind of the artist as a man who experiences 
various moods always remains and must remain outside the bounds of what he 
creates.  The work of art is always something that is made, fashioned, contrived; it is 
not only artful but artificial, in the best sense of the word.  Therefore, there neither is 
nor can there be any place in it for the reflection of the empirical reality of the inner 
self (Eikhenbaum 1927: 161; 1974: 287). 
Eikhenbaum’s insistence that there is only a material set of devices in a literary text 
and not even a trace of an author’s personal feelings or his inner self could no doubt 
be understood as complementing Brik’s contentious assertion regarding Evgenii 
Onegin.  Yet insisting on the objective qualities of literary material should in no way 
be understood as the Formalists denying that the inner self or even authorial 
commitment do not exist.  Indeed, Eikhenbaum, Shklovsky and Tynianov all insist 
on the author’s necessary alienation from the objectively determined properties of 
literary material.  Michael Holquist and Ilya Kliger have argued that Shklovsky’s 
concept of ostranenie is an attempt to perpetuate a Kantian variety of alienation 
from the thing-in-itself.  The loss of vitality brought about by unquestioning 
recognition of a thing ‘as it is’ is shattered by the defamiliarizing moment of 
alienation, where, as argued previously, the heightened sensation of the thing is 
facilitated through its negative juxtaposition with that which it is not.54  The 
Formalists’ accounts of authorship also insist on an author’s alienation from the 
material literary work itself, where working with materials and laws that are radically 
other to the authorial self is a requirement for the author to be free in her 
                                                          
54 Whilst it is possible to agree with Holquist and Kliger on this point, their subsequent argument is 
problematic.  They argue that Shklovsky effectively sees heightened sensation as an opportunity to 
overcome alienation, and thereby provide a return to the thing-in-itself.  Holquist and Kliger suggest 
that this move is analogous to Kleist’s remark that only by eating more fruit from the tree of knowledge 
will a return to innocence be possible  (Holquist & Kliger 2005: 629).  Pace Holquist and Kliger, 
Shklovsky is not seeking a return to essences, but rather denying the possibility of ever arriving at 
absolute truth, be it through ideology or representation.  In the terms of the previous chapter, 
Shklovsky’s concept of ostranenie requires an ontological crack that is accompanied by antinomies 
that can never be bridged.    
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engagement with art’s many paradoxical contradictions.  Likewise, the same 
paradigm applies in reverse for the literary critic who objectively attempts to 
ascertain and codify the contradictory and paradoxical conditions of literature’s 
possibility, and refuses to be drawn into the ‘metaphysical’ trap of closure provided 
by the unitary, intentional relationship between author and text that amounts to 
access to the roots of knowledge, the very possibility of which Kant refuted as it is 
incompatible with finite human autonomy, synthetic a priori cognition and empirical 
perception of the natural world.  
As a result, Eikhenbaum’s startling treatment of the grotesque in the Gogol΄ essay is 
consistent with Kant’s conditions of possibility and the finite human subject that they 
engender, both in terms of the conflicting relationship between the text’s morally 
committed realism and comic skaz, and the human author and her material literary 
creation.   The grotesque, for Eikhenbaum, exhibits a tension between reality and 
that which is isolated from the real in a problematic relationship of negation and 
performative spontaneity that can mock, limit and undermine the real.  The 
grotesque, therefore, both radicalizes and problematizes the relationship between 
the real, the material work of art and the illusions to which it gives rise.  Given 
Eikhenbaum’s definitions of the grotesque, Carol Any’s ‘guard dog’ is not opposed to 
the work-centred poetics’ isolation from the ‘elsewhere’ of life beyond the text, but 
Any is none the less correct when she notes that, if the grotesque is to have its full 
affective force, The Overcoat’s morally engaged social realism must have some 
emotive substance, for if it did not then the mocking and parodic laughter of 
performative comic skaz could not give rise to the grotesque (Any 1994: 53-4).  It is 
precisely because moral commitment to human suffering, logic and realism are 
being derisively mocked that Gogol΄’s tale has its grotesque power.  Simon Critchley 
has argued that parodic art, which serves to mock the human, is the aesthetic 
discourse which accords the most with Kantian finitude, in that it serves to limit and 
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mock unitary or ‘authentic’ accounts of the human (Critchley 2012: 77-82).  
Eikhenbaum’s grotesque may lack any hint of the sublime and the beautiful, but is 
nevertheless Kantian in this regard, in that it affirms finite, illusory and moral 
engagement through its parodic, mocking negation. 
IV 
This same ‘grotesque’ tension between the real and mocking laughter that limits 
unitary human agency is replicated in Eikhenbaum’s conceptualization of authorship 
and its role in the objective literary system.    It is clear that this contradiction 
between the ‘real’ author and his material literary creation implicitly replicates the 
grotesque relationship between realist pathos and the mocking laughter of 
performative skaz.    This ambiguous treatment of authorship is present from the 
very first sentence of Eikhenbaum’s essay, when he proclaims that an author’s 
personal tone [lichnyi ton] plays a significant role in a literary compositional structure 
(Eikhenbaum 1927: 149; 1974: 269).  Elsewhere in the essay, Eikhenbaum even 
goes as far as to say that all the characters in Gogol΄’s The Government Inspector 
[Revizor] are ‘only petrified poses.  The mirthful and ever-playful spirit of the artist 
himself reigns over them, as stage-director and real hero [nastoiashchii 
geroi]’(Eikhenbaum 1927: 153;1974: 275).  As has already been mentioned, 
Eikhenbaum’s remarks which are consistent with Shklovsky’s ostranenie concept 
specifically link the defamiliarizing properties of words to Gogol΄, noting how it is as 
if Gogol΄ had invented a new word. Yet in contrast Eikhenbaum argues that is totally 
wrong to see the narrator [rasskazchik] as a discernible presence in the story, as the 
narrator is hidden away behind the anecdotes and puns which exemplify comic skaz 
and its many digressions.  The conclusion, at once logical and paradoxical, to be 
drawn from such contradictory statements is made clear when Eikhenbaum notes 
how the personal authorial tone that plays such a vital constructive role is, in the 
case of The Overcoat, a grotesque leer or grimace [grotesknaia uzhimka ili grimasa] 
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(Eikhenbaum 1927: 160; 1974: 284).  With this move Eikhenbaum implies that 
authorship, in the variety of manifestations discussed here, is in fact a compositional 
device akin to plot that serves to thread a literary work together, and is just as 
illusory as morally committed realistic pathos and comic skaz.  A narrator’s personal 
tone at once affirms an author as a device and the alienation of the historical author 
from the material literary work.  If Gogol΄’s presence in The Government Inspector is 
akin to a real hero, it is a hero whose material reality is its being a device that serves 
to string a narrative together into a contradictory systemic construction, and is 
engaged in a trajectory towards its negation; and not a living, breathing or 
‘embodied’ presence.  ‘Gogol΄’ is accordingly just one thread that serves to weave 
The Overcoat into a systemic construction, and is alienated from the living, 
biographical personality to whom the story is attributed, and who therefore remains 
unknowable within the material limits of the literary work.  The author is 
correspondingly alienated from a text which serves to mock and deride genuine 
authorial commitment, just as, from Shklovsky’s perspective, Kotik Letaev serves to 
mock and deride Andrei Bely’s commitment to anthroposophic ideology. 
Eikhenbaum’s use of the traditional materials of biographical literary criticism is 
entirely consistent with his treatment of the grotesque and the author’s alienation 
from her literary labour.  Eikhenbaum notes how Gogol΄ complained to Pushkin that 
his own works lack plot, and asks Pushkin to do be so kind as to send him a plot of 
some kind [sdelaite milost΄, daite kakoi-nibud΄ siuzhet], which Gogol΄ claims he 
would then transform into something akin to his own humorous compositions 
(Eikhenbaum 1927: 150; 1974: 270).   This example demonstrates Gogol΄’s 
alienation from his own work, and his inability to control the act of writing in a 
deliberate, volitional manner.   Eikhenbaum also notes how the story evolved across 
various draft versions, insisting that only when an author re-reads what she’s written 
can she objectively appreciate what changes the story needs in order to enhance its 
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objective qualities.  And when Eikhenbaum argues for the importance of 
performative skaz in the text’s composition, it is to the writings of those historical 
individuals who witnessed Gogol΄ perform his works that Eikhenbaum turns, but he 
does so in order to foreground the importance of sound gestures as a compositional 
motivation, and emphatically not to attribute these qualities to the text’s author 
(Eikhenbaum 1927: 151; 1974: 271).  In refuting such a strategy, Eikhenbaum 
provides a suitably grotesque image that affirms the author’s alienation from the 
material literary work: even marionettes can perform these words of narration, as 
they stand ‘outside of time, outside the moment, immobile and eternal’ (Eikhenbaum 
1927: 158; 1974: 283). 
As a result, it is no longer tenable to dismiss the Formalists’ objective laws of literary 
praxis as repressing, or even denying the possibility of an autonomous human 
subject.  Entirely consistent with Shklovsky’s thought, the objectified structures of 
literature are precisely what reveal an autonomous authorial subjectivity; and, for 
Kant, the objectified categories of human apperception are the very conditions of 
possibility for an autonomous, finite human subject.  Just as Kant desired the 
establishment of a coherent, objective science of metaphysics along these lines, so 
Russian Formalism can be understood as accounting for the possibility of a free, 
autonomous authorial praxis of literary construction.  The fact that the author that 
emerges is the product of an unresolved tension between differing realities is the 
necessary condition for that author to be free, and for him or her to be intuited as 
such.  Much of Eikhenbaum’s scholarly output was devoted to studies of individual 
authors, such as Tolstoy, Akhmatova, and Leskov as well as a discussion of the 
mutually-constitutive categories of ‘literature’ and ‘writer’, and Eikhenbaum’s own 
variety of an objective science of literature never makes the demand that the 
category of author be abandoned as a productive ground for literary scholarship’s 
sound, objective principles. The Kantian account of consciousness required that 
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consciousness is constituted by that which it is not – it has to be conscious of 
something in order to engage in the practical activity of thought.  The Formalist 
position is comparable, for in order for there to be an author, the author, as a 
subject, is constituted by that part of herself which is other to herself: her objective 
literary creations.  For Kant, the identity of practical consciousness emerges 
historically, after a sequence of acts that come to constitute identity after the fact; 
and, for the Formalists, an author emerges historically, be it in terms of the 
accumulation of devices which constitute an oeuvre, and in relation to other factors 
such as genre and other authors. 55  
V 
For many readers of texts such as Eikhenbaum’s, as well as those of Shklovsky and 
Tynianov, the suggestion that an author can, even in part, be the result of the 
accumulation of literary devices in his or her oeuvre provokes ethical objections, as 
the capacity of an autonomous subjectivity to not only create the work of literary art, 
but also be held accountable – or ‘answerable’ – for it is threatened or undermined.  
With regard to Eikhenbaum’s essay on Gogol΄’s The Overcoat, the most well-known 
objection is that of Bakhtin, who strongly criticized Eikhenbaum for his categorization 
of skaz.   For Bakhtin, Eikhenbaum’s emphasis on the verbal performativity of 
Gogol΄’s texts and their self-motivated, contradictory play with sound and logical 
meaning, is perceived simply as ‘an orientation toward the oral form of narration, an 
orientation toward oral speech and its corresponding language characteristics (oral 
                                                          
55 Accordingly, there is an important distinction to be made between Brik’s remark about Evgenii 
Onegin and Eikhenbaum’s suggestion that the narration in The Overcoat is objective material that can 
be spoken by puppets.  Brik’s argument that Evgenii Onegin would have been written had Pushkin not 
been born is supported with the accompanying declaration that America existed before Columbus 
discovered it.  On this basis, Brik appears to be maintaining an extreme variety of proto-semiotics or 
even Chomskian universal grammar, whereby the reified laws of storytelling always already exist in all 
cultures.  The ‘creative’ role of any author in the process of storytelling is therefore completely 
insignificant.  In contrast, both Shklovsky and Eikhenbaum do insist on the role of the author in the 
praxis of storytelling, but, as with the Kantian finite subject, the author is alienated from her objective 
literary creation.  The grotesque and defamiliarization require a human element to break reified 
compositional laws, juxtaposing what cannot be juxtaposed, and allowing ‘yes’ and ‘no’ to exist on the 
same page. The resulting alienation wrought by paradoxical literary material means that these 
paradoxes cannot be attributed entirely to the will of the creative author. 
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intonation, the syntactic construction of oral speech, the corresponding lexicon, etc.)’ 
(Bakhtin 1984: 191).   Eikhenbaum, so Bakhtin argues, fails to realize that skaz is 
fundamentally an orientation towards the speech of an another, and only as a 
consequence of this orientation does skaz foreground oral speech and its verbal 
characteristics.  Bakhtin’s insistence on skaz being an orientation towards alterity is 
consistent with his broader interest in discourse, understood as language in its 
social totality, and the corresponding term double-voiced discourse which arises 
from genuinely dialogic relationships between the embodied beings of author and 
hero. 
These criticisms of Eikhenbaum’s conceptualization of skaz are entirely consistent 
with Bakhtin’s (and Medvedev’s) objections to many of the central tenets of Russian 
Formalism, objections which largely pertain to its conceptualization of just what the 
nascent discipline of scientific literary studies should be.  Bakhtin’s and Medvedev’s 
objections to Russian Formalism and its methodology, and whether Bakhtin’s 
‘metalinguistic’ privileging of the categories of ‘dialogic relationships’ and ‘embodied 
beings’ amounts to a credible alternative to Formalist poetics, will be addressed at 
greater length in due course.  For the present, it is sufficient to address one aspect 
of Bakhtin’s position which is typical of a great many rejections of the literary critique 
offered by the Formalists.  Bakhtin states that it is his ‘metalinguistic’ methodology 
that facilitates an understanding of skaz as a historico-literary problem.  In order 
words, if we are to understand skaz it must be conceptualized as a historically 
situated phenomenon, and, more precisely, one that it is strictly located in the matrix 
of dialogic utterances particular to the historical context in which they are uttered: 
…stylistics must be based not only, and even not as much, on linguistics as on 
metalinguistics, which studies the word not in a system of language and not in a 
‘text’ excised from dialogic interaction, but precisely within the sphere of dialogic 
interaction itself, that is, in that sphere where discourse lives an authentic life.  For 
the word is not a material thing but rather the eternally mobile, eternally fickle 
medium of dialogic interaction.  It never gravitates toward a single consciousness or 
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a single voice.  The life of the word is contained in its transfer from one social 
collective to another, from one generation to another generation.  In this process the 
word does not forget its own path and cannot completely free itself from the power 
of these concrete contexts into which it has entered.  
When a member of a speaking collective comes upon a word, it is not as a neutral 
word of language, not as a word free from the aspirations and evaluations of others, 
uninhabited by others’ voices.  No, he receives the word from another’s voice and 
filled with that other voice.  The word enters this context from another context, 
permeated with the interpretations of others.  His own thought finds the word already 
inhabited.  Therefore the orientation of a word among words, the varying perception 
of another’s word and the various means for reacting to it, are perhaps the most 
fundamental problems for the metalinguistic study of any kind of discourse, including 
the artistic.  Every social trend in every epoch has its own special sense of 
discourse, including the artistic.  Every social trend in every epoch has its own 
special sense of discourse and its own range of discursive possibilities.  By no 
means all historical situations permit the ultimate semantic authority of the creator to 
be expressed without mediation in direct, unrefracted, unconditional authorial 
discourse.  When there is no access to one’s own personal ‘ultimate’ word, then 
every thought, feeling, experience must be refracted through the medium of 
someone else’s discourse, someone else’s style, someone else’s manner, with 
which it cannot immediately be merged without reservation, without distance, 
without refraction (Bakhtin 1984: 202).  
This insistence on the ‘life’ of the word, the very medium of dialogic inter-relation 
which fluidly moves from one social collective to another throughout history, bearing 
with it the concrete historical contexts of its utterance, is Bakhtin’s own contribution 
to the Belinskian ‘realist’ school of Russian literary criticism, where there is a strong 
ethical demand that literature address the contextual social reality of its composition 
from a moral standpoint.56  Bakhtin’s repeated emphasis on a mediated, refracted 
discourse that lacks any authoritative control or absolute closure is entirely 
predicated on beings that are embodied, actual and historically situated, which, in 
other words, assumes that the voices of authors and their living embodied heroes 
really do say what they are saying, and in doing so are strictly situated in the 
historical epoch of the text’s composition.  It is only when two given living voices are 
                                                          
56 In emphasizing both Bakhtin’s ethical engagement with and demands of the embodied social 
context, the ‘Bakhtin’ that figures in this analysis is broadly consistent with that advanced in Ken 
Hirschkop’s Mikhail Bakhtin: an Aesthetic for Democracy (Hirschkop 1999), Craig Brandist’s The 
Bakhtin Circle: Philosophy, Culture and Politics (Brandist: 2002) and, as already noted, Alastair 
Renfrew’s Towards a New Material Aesthetics: Bakhtin, Genre and the Fates of Literary Theory 
(Renfrew 2006). 
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engaged in dialogue with one another that the processes of reflection and mediation 
are set in motion.   The distinctly Belinskian undertone in Bakhtin’s thought rings 
through loudest when the following comment is contextualized against the ethical 
content of Bakhtin’s early thought that resurfaces periodically in his later work.  In 
clarifying his remarks about just who this ‘other’ is to which skaz narratives are 
directed, Bakhtin says of the narrator that: ‘[w]hat is introduced here, in fact, is a 
storyteller, and a storyteller, after all, is not a literary person; he belongs in most 
cases to the lower social strata, to the common people (precisely this is important to 
the author)—and he brings with him oral speech’ (Bakhtin 1984: 202).  The 
sentiment here, articulated as a general comment about skaz with the specific 
purpose of highlighting Eikhenbaum’s failure to fully appreciate its orientation 
towards alterity, is clearly that of the educated literary classes benevolently 
addressing the situation of the lower classes, a Belinskian notion which is 
particularly in keeping with Bakhtin’s strong ethical demands of authors and their 
heroes (Brandist 2002: 40-50).  The ‘intonation’ of Bakhtin’s remarks is clear: in his 
interest in objectively determined literary structures, Eikhenbaum does not recognize 
the foundational ethical orientation of literature initiated by Belinsky, that is, he does 
not perceive the living dialogic relationship between Gogol΄, Akakii Akakievich and 
the narrator of The Overcoat; nor does he appreciate the living ethical bonds that 
underlie their interaction and, crucially, how the disciplinary praxis of literary studies 
should classify and evaluate such phenomena.  In contrast to Bakhtin’s 
‘metalinguistics’, Eikhenbaum’s objective science can only ever provide an account 
of an inert, lifeless object, as if providing a purely positivist account of the material 
stuff of canvas and stone that Hegel argued art has become.  
Bakhtin’s subtle hint that Eikhenbaum is rejecting the Belinskian paradigm of 
realism, where a benevolent author creates a literary work that represents some 
variety of social injustice, is certainly justified.  In his distinction between the two 
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compositional layers of skaz and realist pathos, Eikhenbaum identifies the latter as 
the layer of the novel’s composition which preoccupies Belinsky, that is, a ‘pathetic 
declamation’ or ‘sentimental’, ‘melodramatic’ narrative which chronicles the trials 
and tribulations of a poor government clerk, and which occasionally interrupts the 
dominant second layer of verbal play with sound and puns.  To underline his point 
regarding the dominance of the second compositional layer over the former, 
Eikhenbaum notes that the description of Akakii Akakevich which includes the 
resonant declaration of the brotherhood of Russian man ‘Leave me alone! Why are 
you bothering me?’ [Ostav΄te menia!  Zachem vy menia obizhaete?’], does not 
appear in Gogol΄’s early drafts of the tale, and is therefore most likely an after-
thought, and is probably present because it enhances the second layer of the tale’s 
composition, underlining the sense of verbal play and mimicry (Eikhenbaum 1927: 
156; 1974: 282).  One of the grand declarations of humanist discourse in 19th 
century Russian literature is rendered as a mere after-thought, and, in accordance 
with Eikhenbaum’s treatment of the category of the grotesque, is ironic, and 
reinforces the dynamic tension between laughter and suffering that pervades all 
levels of the novel’s compositional structure.57  
Having effectively plunged his analytical scalpel into the heart of Russian humanism, 
Eikhenbaum is unable to resist a turn of the knife.  In addition to denying that the 
motivation for this depiction of Akakii Akakievich is a profoundly moral concern with 
social ills, Eikhenbaum implies that such moral concern became just one more 
device [pobochnyi priem] available to the Russian author, and that the many ‘moral’ 
works of nineteenth-century Russian literature and its critics are autonomous 
objective structures that in and of themselves are not subject to the variety of moral 
imperative toward society demanded by Belinsky; and by Bakhtin in his 
understanding of the ‘living’ dialogic relationship between embodied author and 
                                                          
57 Indeed, it is possible to conceptualize Eikhenbaum’s essay (and, for that matter) Shklovsky’s 
parody of Bely’s anthroposophic pose, as similar ‘grotesque’ mocking laughter. 
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hero.  That Eikhenbaum and Shklovsky are driven by a contrasting ethical demand 
for an objective science of literature does not, however, require that their thought be 
regarded in any way as less ‘moral’ than the thought of Belinsky or Bakhtin, or, for 
that matter, that their relationship to reality is any less ethical.  What unites the 
positions of Bakhtin, Eikhenbaum and Shklovsky in their conceptualizations of 
literary science is the ethical demands towards objectivity which, following Hegel’s 
dialectical exposition of the term discussed in the first chapter, is an ethical demand 
to account for the real.  For Bakhtin it is the concrete, historically situated embodied 
beings of author and hero; for Shklovsky it is the concrete material structure of 
literary art, which of necessity must be so in order for us to sense it as such; in 
Eikhenbaum’s essay on Gogol΄ it is the illusory performance of verbal material that 
fully engages its audience, and which presupposes the objective structures of 
literary compositions which, if they are to fully engage their audience, must be riven 
with contradictions and discontinuities. The conceptualization of science in both 
positions is certainly different, with Bakhtin believing that any objective scientific 
classification of a literary object, whilst nonetheless important, never articulates that 
object in its living concrete totality unless it is attributed to a human voice.  The 
‘objectivizing’, grotesque science of literary study in Eikhenbaum and Shklovsky is, 
like the Kantian programme for metaphysics, a system that resists the reification 
Bakhtin identifies with scientific study.  The contradictions and discontinuities so 
valorized in the literary object by Eikhenbaum and Shklovsky are, for Bakhtin, only 
ever possible if contradictions can be attributed to two embodied voices engaged in 
dialogue.   
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4: The Literary Fact 
I 
Yury Tynianov’s literary theory provides an intriguing stepped progression from that 
of Shklovsky and Eikhenbaum.  In his essay on Gogol΄’s The Overcoat, Eikhenbaum 
concluded that accounts that seek to locate the meaning of the text in Gogol΄’s soul 
are totally invalid, and that the author-device of Gogol΄’s short story is something 
akin to an actor or a marionette, an illusion arising in the text’s relentless succession 
of puns and mimicry.  Gogol΄ was also the object of Tynianov’s interest, but it is 
Pushkin who preoccupied him most extensively, be it in terms of Tynianov’s literary 
theory or his own forays into novel writing.  A potential venture into acting would see 
Tynianov provide an intriguing twist to Eikhenbaum’s likening of authorship and its 
narration to an actor’s performance, when Tynianov himself unsuccessfully screen-
tested for the role of Pushkin in the film Poet i tsar ′ (Gardin: 1927).  There is an 
appropriate contiguity between the Formalists’ insistence upon authorship as an 
accumulative construction of devices alienated from the ‘real’ historical individual, 
and the Formalist critic effectively acting out that alienation in an artistic construction 
temporally distant from the biographical events of Pushkin’s life, which, in light of the 
discussion in the previous two chapters, could be said to constitute the film’s 
material.   
Eikhenbaum’s broadly constructive treatment of authorship was accompanied by a 
refutation of The Overcoat’s status as a founding text in the Russian canon of 
socially committed realism, and the critical tradition of establishing illusory, closed 
correspondences between text, author, reality, and a moral-philosophical discourse 
upon the innate rights of man and the demand for their restoration. Tynianov’s 
theoretical writings on Pushkin maintain this Formalist demand that unitary 
relationships of correspondence between text and matters beyond its material 
boundaries are false, and attack what is arguably the most generalized example of 
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this tendency in Russian critical discourse, where, following Apollon Grigor΄ev’s then 
conventionalized reception of Pushkin, the great poet is held to be ‘our everything’ 
[Pushkin – eto nashe vse].   In the essay ‘The Imaginary Pushkin’ [Mnimyi Pushkin], 
Tynianov dismisses the mythologization of Pushkin that has followed Grigor΄ev’s 
famous remarks, arguing that this mythic Pushkin has been deployed for ideological 
and political ends entirely alien to Pushkin’s work (Smith 2008: 87).  The best 
alternative to these imaginary Pushkins is a (no less imaginary) Pushkin that 
emerges through the Formalist ethics of objective, scientific principles.  The study of 
Pushkin’s oeuvre must be undertaken, so Tynianov argues, under the general rubric 
of literary science, and should not labour under the misguided principle that Pushkin 
and his work are unique and therefore not contingent upon general literary 
conventions (Tynianov 1977: 98) (Smith 2008: 88).  Accordingly, Tynianov can be 
seen as reiterating the tension that informed Eikhenbaum’s essay on The Overcoat, 
where the material reality of literary constructions is valorized over illusory ‘realities’ 
to which author and text, life and ideology are falsely believed to correspond.     
It can only speculated as to how Tynianov’s literary theory might have informed his 
performance of Pushkin on screen, and whether his thoughts on the ‘literary 
personality’ [literaturnaia lichnost΄], made in the ‘Literary Fact’ essay (and developed 
in the later ‘Literary Evolution’), would have affected his practical portrayal of the 
poet.  Tynianov’s concept of the literary personality is consistent with his attack in 
‘The Imaginary Pushkin’ on ideological and political uses of Pushkin that do not 
conform to the objective principles of literary science.58  Tynianov insists that 
Pushkin the historical figure is totally distinct from the Pushkin seized upon by, 
among others, the Russian Symbolist generation.  The literary personality of a given 
author is therefore dynamic, and changes from epoch to epoch.  It is, so Tynianov 
argues, as if the epoch impersonally selects its relevant materials, and those 
                                                          
58 For further discussion of Tynianov’s concept of the literary personality, see (Boym 1991: 22-3) and 
(Khanzen-Leve 2001: 401-3). 
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aspects of the historical individual and his literary work which correspond to the 
epoch’s demands are used, while others are abandoned.  Such use of materials 
conveys, Tynianov insists, nothing about the historical figure and everything about 
the epoch in which the literary personality undergoes change.  The literary 
personality shifts endlessly both with and within the advancing literary epoch, and 
cannot be defined and confined in closed terms, but is instead a broken line that is 
bent and directed by the literary epoch (Tynianov 1977: 259; 2000: 35).  
After the essay’s publication in 1924, both Eikhenbaum and Shklovsky would single 
out Tynianov’s ‘Literary Fact’ as a highly significant development for the ‘Formalist’ 
school of objective literary science.  To return once again to Shklovsky’s concept of 
the stepped structure that divides and contradicts itself, the introduction of epoch 
and literary personality into its field of vision can be said to constitute the negative 
moment when new material is brought into both a literary construction and the 
objective discipline of literary theory.    With the concepts of the literary personality, 
constructive function and, as will become apparent presently, a ground-breaking 
treatment of genre, Tynianov incorporates the problems of history and art’s epochal 
relationship with life into the Formalist demand for an objective study of literary art.   
In terms of the present discussion of authorship, Tynianov’s position in ‘The Literary 
Fact’ and the subsequent ‘On Literary Evolution’ is entirely consistent with 
Eikhenbaum’s analysis of Gogol΄, in that Tynianov totally rejects any intentional 
account of literature, where the author wilfully manipulates and controls her 
materials in accordance with her creative vision. Eikhenbaum’s Gogol΄ despaired at 
the lack of plot in his works.  Similarly, Tynianov’s Pushkin shows frustration at how 
a chapter of Evegenii Onegin lacked the satirical elements which the great poet 
intended (Tynianov 1977: 278; 2002: 72-3).  However, Tynianov nimbly interweaves 
this demand for a finite conceptualization of authorship with questions of history and 
art’s relationship with life.  Such interweaving is accomplished by taking the same 
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contradictory (and paradoxical) constructive relationship between the material 
elements of literary form which informs Shklovsky and Eikhenbaum’s theories of 
narrative, plot formation and the grotesque, and replicates this relationship in art’s 
contradictory and indeed paradoxical imbrication with the epochal life-world beyond 
the material borders of the text. 
II 
At the heart of Tynianov’s strategy to account objectively for art in its historical and 
social contexts is his deft ability to affect the dialectical semantic shifts and re-
orientations of meaning that Shklovsky regards as crucial to defamiliarization and 
Eikhenbaum crucial to the grotesque.  Tynianov does this most brilliantly in the 
‘Literary Fact’s’ discussion of literary materials and their dialectical relationship with 
what he terms the ‘constructive function’, which denotes the interrelationship of 
elements immanent to literary form.59  In addition, he also maintains a more overtly 
Hegelian dialectic of objectivity in his problematization of intentional accounts of 
authorship in ‘On Literary Evolution’.  Tynianov begins his remarks by noting the 
popular, conventionalized understanding of authorial orientation: ‘We use the term 
“orientation”.  It denotes approximately the “creative intention of the author” [U nas 
est΄ slovo «ustanovka».  Ona oznachaet primerno «tvorcheskoe namerenie 
avtora»].  Such ‘orientations’ or ‘intentions’ are, Tynianov insists, contingent upon 
the objective, constructive relationship between the elements of literary materials 
that are other to the creative artist: ‘The “author’s intention” is nothing more than a 
catalyst which initiates the constructive function.  “Creative freedom” [Tvorcheskaia 
svoboda] thus becomes an optimistic slogan which does not correspond to reality, 
but yields instead to “creative necessity” [tvorcheskaia neobkhodimost΄]’ (Tynianov 
                                                          
59 Kunjundžić has argued that Tynianov’s constructive function is exemplary of Derridean 
deconstruction, and should accordingly be designated a deconstructive principle (Kunjundžić 1997: 
100).  Kunjundžić is, unlike Renfrew, using the term deconstruction in the Derridean sense of the 
term.  For an alternative definition of the constructive function which focusses on the result of the 
combination of different elements in verse and not their dynamic, dialectical tension, see (Khanzen-
Leve 2001: 298-300, 366).   
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1977: 278; 2002: 74 translation amended).   On this basis, Tynianov is able to re-
define objectively the conventionalized term ‘orientation’ with which he began this 
discussion, just as Hegel incorporates the initial moment of sensory immediacy into 
his account of objectivity as the concrete activity of consciousness itself.  The reality 
of orientation is that it is deprived of any intentional meaning, that is, any 
‘teleological, goal orientated nuance’, and the author’s illusory engagement with the 
work emerges instead as a manifestation of the work’s orientation towards concrete 
byt.  Tynianov specifies this orientation as the text’s verbal function [rechevaia 
funktsiia], and this ‘orientation’ towards byt is accordingly located in a functional 
relationship which recalls the constructive relationship immanent to literary art and 
its materials made in the ‘The Literary Fact’.  Crucially, Tynianov regards the literary 
personality as exemplary of literary art’s verbal function, and, like Grigor΄ev’s all-
encompassing remark about Pushkin, exemplary of how literary art enters byt in a 
manner that is totally removed from any historical individual.   Thus, when 
conceptualized dialectically, authorial orientation in the concrete social world is not 
the conventional understanding of a biographical being’s intentional act of creation.  
It is really the manifestation of the impersonal social forces that, in combination with 
the work of literary art, give rise to the author’s literary personality.    
Tynianov is adamant that art’s many levels of functionality should not be construed 
in determinist, causal terms.60  As Tynianov notes: ‘[t]he direct study of the author’s 
psychology and the establishment of a causal bridge from the author’s environment, 
byt, and class to his works is particularly hopeless’ (Tynianov 1977: 280; 2002: 75 
translation amended).  The Formalist alternative to such closure, including its ethical 
demand for an objective, open method of scientifically accounting for literature, thus 
accords the literary a privileged status.  In order to study literary art’s relationship 
                                                          
60 The editors of the collection Poetika, istoria ileratury, kino note that the term ‘function’ does not 
have a specific meaning in Tynianov’s theory.  It is rather indicative of Tynianov’s orientation to 
conceptualize literature in non-teleological terms (Tynianov 1977: 521 & 528). 
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with its surrounding byt, it is imperative that objective critique must begin with the 
work of literature itself.  In ‘On Literary Evolution’, Tynianov concludes the essay by 
emphatically stating that such critique should start at the immanent level and 
account for the constructive function whereby individual elements and devices are 
located in inter-relationship.  Only then can the critic proceed to address more global 
questions of literature’s relationship with byt and its complex inter-relationship with 
literature’s evolution: ‘The study of evolution must move from the literary order [riad] 
to the nearest correlated orders, not the distant, even though major systems.  In this 
way the prime significance of major social factors is not at all discarded.  Rather, it 
must be elucidated to its full extent through the problem of the evolution of literature’ 
(Tynianov 1977: 281; 2002: 77).   
In many ways, it is an entirely appropriate irony that Tynianov’s argument here 
offers both a productive and still under recognized theoretical paradigm for the (now) 
purportedly extinct discipline of literary theory in general; and the particular problem 
of accounting for the evolution of the Formal method against such major social 
factors as the shifting ideological parameters of cultural byt in early Soviet 
intellectual culture and beyond.  Tynianov’s stepped progression towards 
addressing the problems of life and history has been contextualized against the 
increasingly hostile attacks against Formalism from its ‘Marxist’ enemies (Renfrew: 
2006, 26), and the accompanying graduated restriction and censorship of artworks 
and scholarship that were deemed incompatible with the then establishing norms of 
intellectual and cultural behaviour.61  Indeed, the Formalists themselves can no 
doubt be productively conceptualized as literary personalities actively engaged in 
early Soviet cultural byt and, more tellingly, the epochal demands of scholarship in 
                                                          
61 For an intriguing record of the Formalists’ turbulent debate with ‘Marxist’ opponents in March 1927, 
see ‘Materialy disputa “Marksizm i formal΄nyi metod’ (Ustinov 2001: 247-78).  According to Ustinov, 
the year 1927 marks the turning point from a degree of intellectual freedom to ever increasing 
pressure for ideological conformity with statist demands.  For an insightful discussion of these 
materials, see (Tihanov 2002: 69-77).  
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subsequent accounts of Formalism, accounts that, following Tynianov’s argument, 
select the materials that are ideologically and politically necessary for their 
purposes, but the selection of which ‘says’ far more about the given epoch in 
question than the objective historical referent.  Thus Formalism has been variously 
understood as presaging the intellectual movements of structuralism and linguistics, 
deconstruction, Bakhtinian heteroglossia and dialogue, intellectual resistance to the 
Soviet Union, Russian orthodox religious faith, or even, in the context of this present 
study, a paradoxical echo and reconfiguration of post-Kantian thought.62   Rightly or 
wrongly, this study’s interest in post-Kantian modernity, where the ethical demand 
for objectivity requires a paradoxical, antinomic and finite relationship to given 
materials, replicates Tynianov’s insistence that any objective critical trajectory 
towards the external or elements of ‘otherness’ can only ever be accomplished 
through an objective consideration of immanent properties.  Accordingly, the 
principle focus will, for the present, remain Tynianov’s treatment of the constructive 
function and how it corresponds to the theories of Eikhenbaum and Shklovsky 
discussed in the previous chapters, and also constitutes an evolution of OPOIAZ 
thought. Only then will the discussion proceed to address the broader questions of 
art in its historical aspect and in its relationship with that which it is not, and how 
Tynianov’s calibration of immanent relationships is replicated in these broader 
problems.  
III 
The term constructive function, as already noted, denotes a relationship between 
elements, and determining the role of these elements in Tynianov’s theory 
necessitates a return to the problem of material.    As already noted, in The Problem 
                                                          
62 For Bakhtin’s relationship with Formalism, see (Clark and Holquist 1984: 186-196), (Holquist 1985: 
82-95), (Tihanov 2000: 130-6, 151-2), (Renfrew 2006: 21-67), (Brandist 2002: 68-74, 88-9) and 
(Shaitanov 1997: 233-53); for Formalism’s shared attributes with linguistics see (Matejka 2002); Linda 
S. Kauffmann has made ambitious claims that Formalism and, particularly Shklovsky’s theory and 
fiction, anticipate Bakhtinian heteroglossia, structuralism and Derridean deconstruction (Kauffmann 
1992: 1-44);  Sarah Pratt argues that Shklovsky’s early essay ‘The Resurrection of the Word’ amounts 
to Shklovsky’s profession of faith (Pratt 1996: 181). 
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of Verse Language Tynianov maintains a conceptualization of material akin to 
Eikhenbaum’s use of the term in the Gogol΄ essay and Shklovsky’s in ‘Art as 
Device’, where the ethical drive to objectively account for literary art and its unique 
properties is consistent with the drive to materialize the object of analysis, rendering 
it a determinate thing.  By the time he comes to write ‘The Literary Fact’ Tynianov’s 
position has shifted somewhat.  The essay’s title economically conveys how the 
ethical drive to materialize the object of objective analysis is still very much in 
evidence, but Tynianov’s treatment of the constructive principle provides a 
contrasting iteration of material more akin to Shklovsky’s position in the Rozanov 
essay in The Theory of Prose, where literary art is specifically a contradictory and 
paradoxical relationship of negation between verbal materials, which can be 
anything – literary or extra-literary – as long as they are held in dialectical tension 
with the constructive function.    Tynianov, as with Eikhenbaum’s concept of the 
dominanta, insists that the contradictory relationship between constructive function 
and material is one of dialectical struggle.63  Material is, Tynianov argues, always in 
a subordinate role to the dominant power of constructive function, and any literary 
construction is therefore a complex site of dynamic tension.  By way of example, 
Tynianov offers the contrasting examples of poetry and prose.  In the former, the 
constructive factor can be rhythm, and its material the semantic clusters which 
coalesce into a plot.  In the latter, plot serves as the constructive function, and the 
rhythmic elements of the word its material  (Tynianov 1977: 261; 2000: 37).  The 
constructive function can thus be conceptualized as providing a solution to the 
problem resulting from Eikhenbaum’s and Shklovsky’s treatments of plot as a 
sequence of elements with a coherent motivation.  According to this schema, it is 
impossible to account for such works as The Overcoat and Rozanov’s Solitaria 
where a ‘threaded’ plot is notable by its absence, or can even be said to be both 
                                                          
63 David Duff foregrounds the role of tension and struggle in Tynianov’s theory, particularly with regard 
to his conceptualization of genre. See ‘Maximal Tensions and Minimal Conditions: Tynianov as a 
Genre Theorist’ (Duff 2003: 553-563). 
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present and absent simultaneously.  According to Tynianov’s more general 
formulation of a relationship between elements, plot is not necessarily the sine qua 
non of literary prose, as Shklovsky complains in The Third Factory (Shklovsky 2002: 
367-77; 2002: 62-3).  With regard to Eikhenbaum’s essay on Gogol΄, the grotesque 
can be said to perform the role of constructive function, and plot and its absence 
part of the materials which are in conflict with its constructive motion.  In the ‘Literary 
Fact’ Tynianov is adamant that absences can indeed serve as material in literary art, 
noting how gaps and pauses in poetry are necessary elements that conflict with a 
poem’s broader constructive function (Tynianov 1977: 262; 2000: 38). 
Consistent with the relationships which inform Shklovsky’s concept of ostranenie, 
stepped progressions and Eikhenbaum’s grotesque, the relationship between 
material and constructive principle is an immanent, mutually constitutive 
contradiction that cannot be reduced to a unitary point of closure.  Appropriately, 
Tynianov uses the Potebnian schema of thinking in images in order to differentiate 
his constructive programme from such closed constructs (Tynianov 1977: 261; 
2000: 37).  Any attempt to place elements beyond the parameters of the literary text 
is typical of the Potebnian belief that an artistic image strives towards an idea 
beyond its boundaries.  There may be an infinite variety of images striving towards 
the realm of truth beyond the confines of the text, but the closed structural 
relationship in which they are engaged with ‘truth’ is identical. By locating a text’s 
material beyond the constructive function, the resulting structure would be exactly 
the same as this closed Potebnian paradigm.  Accordingly, a text’s material, 
whatever it can be said to be, cannot be located outside of the constructive function 
with which it is engaged in dialectical tension.   And, as a result, Tynianov insists 
that literary art’s material is already formed in some way [«material» vovse ne 
protivopolozhen «forme», on tozhe «formalen»], and not some variety of primordial 
referent which, in a direct causal framework, undergoes representation in art 
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(Tynianov 1977: 261; 2000: 31).  Yet again Tynianov’s argument is evocative of 
Hegel’s dialectic.  As noted in the first chapter, the oppositions in Hegel’s dialectic of 
objectivity are not simply moments of radical difference and otherness that emerge 
through negation, but are conditioned by each other.  The materials and constructive 
function therefore condition, ‘form’ and constitute each other, albeit with the added 
element of the constructive function performing the role of master, and material the 
slave. 
In addition to these convergences with Hegel, Tynianov’s treatment of material and 
the constructive factor offers striking parallels with Kant and his account of 
consciousness’s conditions of possibility.  In accordance with Tynianov’s injunction 
against a causal account of literary art, it is apparent that literary art’s materials are 
only ever apparent after the fact.  Kant’s account of consciousness, as already 
noted, is historical, both in terms of the metaphysical discipline which it critiques in 
order to advance conventionalized knowledge and of the spontaneous activity of 
consciousness and its advances of knowledge.  It is impossible to causally 
determine the individual elements of knowledge before the fact, and it is only 
possible through the retrospective practice of critique.  Analogously, the author, 
denied any iteration of an intentional account of literary praxis, can, as Eikhenbaum 
notes with regard to Gogol΄, only ever be confronted with the material reality of 
literary creation and its impersonal constructive relationship of elements after the act 
of writing the text.  Equally, the critic can only ever ascertain a text’s materials and 
their conflicting relationship in the text’s constructive principle afterwards, and 
cannot viably construct a causal relationship of meaning in literary art.  As a result, 
Vladimir Novikov’s claim that Tynianov’s concept of material encompasses ‘all the 
pre-creative reality of the work of art’ [vsia dotvoritel΄naia real΄nost΄ 
khodozhestvennogo proizvedeniia] (Novikov in Tynianov 2002: 475) needs to be 
treated with caution.  Tynianov’s insistence that there are no materials outside of the 
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constructive factor requires that there be no pre-creative reality as far as the literary 
work of art is concerned.  In a crude temporal schema, any one material element of 
the literary construction may indeed be located prior to the act of artistic creation 
but, in order to serve as formed material within the immanent constructive function, 
that material element cannot be held to precede the reality of text.  Pre-creative 
material that exists prior to the composition of the text is impossible, as it is only the 
temporally fixed text which occupies a moment of creative reality.  Accordingly, 
Tynianov’s constructive function is a practical synthesis analogous to the Kantian 
consciousness that is dynamic, and always comes afterwards.  There is further 
parallel between Tynianov and Kant in how they deploy antinomic relationships of 
difference between disparate elements.  As already noted, Kant insists that 
consciousness is always consciousness of a material something which is other to 
the mind.  Consciousness is therefore a practical activity between autonomous 
elements.  The literary object is, for Tynianov, disparate elements held together by 
dynamic constructive function.  Literature is, like Kantian consciousness, not a 
unitary field, but an antinomic terrain, where its conditions of possibility are 
literature’s inner divisions and its being other to itself, at once diverse material and 
immaterial constructive relationship, but both objectively constituted by the other in 
evolving, restless tension.   This tension is none the less immanent and cannot be 
closed in any variety of ‘metaphysical’, ‘ideological’ unity or causal determinism.  It is 
worth recalling Tynianov’s discussion of epochal demands and the literary 
personality, where, in both instances, Tynianov insists that it is the epochal context 
in which materials are orchestrated into a given verbal orientation that takes 
precedence over the historical period in which the referent of these formulations is 
situated. 
There is a further, yet more counter-intuitive convergence between Kant’s historical 
account of consciousness and Tynianov’s historical account of literature.  Henrich 
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and Žižek have both noted how, in Kant’s philosophical framework, identity only 
arises through consciousness’s successive acts of synthesis, and there is no 
symbolic or mystical access to identity in essentialized terms.  Tynianov, albeit 
implicitly, hints that the various functions of literature, and, by extension, the 
objective critique of literary art, can play an important role in constituting a national 
identity.64  As already noted, he is profoundly sceptical of criticism that mythologizes 
Pushkin for ideological and political ends that run contrary to art’s contradictory 
properties.  This reticence towards the ideological and political does not stop 
Tynianov observing, in ‘The Literary Fact’, that, at the time of writing, the post-
Revolutionary Russian adventure novel has not yet manifested a constructive 
principle adequate to the demands of the post-Revolutionary epoch (Tynianov 1977: 
263-4; 2000: 39).  With this move, Tynianov provides a more positive treatment of 
literary art’s verbal function beyond his negative evaluation of the literary personality 
and the mythologization of Pushkin, and implies that the historical shifts from epoch 
to epoch have, in the then post-Revolutionary context, a potentially positive 
relationship with literary art, whereby the latter’s immanent properties of conflict and 
paradox can offer a potentially dynamic and complex inter-relationship with historical 
epoch and post-revolutionary byt. 
IV 
It is particularly interesting that Tynianov raises the problematic status of the 
Russian novel in the post-Revolutionary context, as it specifically links the problem 
of genre and its formulation in literary criticism with questions of Russian national 
                                                          
64 Tihanov has a number of perceptive comments regarding this point.  He argues that the Russian Formalists 
displayed a neo-Romantic pride in belonging to vanguard attempts at forming the post-Revolutionary state 
and its new cultural identity.  For Tihanov, the Formalists’ interest in the language of a key political figure 
(Lenin) is clear evidence of this, as is their association with Maiakovsky and the journals LEF and Novyi lef, and 
the radical RAPPist Na literaturnom postu.  The Formalists’ engagement with constructivism, the Literature of 
Fact and other manifestations of Leftist art are, so Tihanov argues, far more than displays of loyalty and 
attempts to advance their cause (Tihanov 2004: 66-7).  Whilst I agree with Tihanov’s argument it is, as already 
stated, important not to forget the rejection of individual intention and their treatment of material objectivity 
in their theory, and we therefore need to maintain a degree of caution when attempting to map their 
engagement with cultural construction in purely intentional (and individualized) terms.     
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identity.  Genre, for Tynianov, is a vital intermediate stage in the conflicting 
relationships between a historically dynamic, immanent critique of literary 
construction and its broader inter-relationship with the surrounding byt.  In 
demonstrating the infinitely broad relationship between a constructive function and 
its diverse materials, Tynianov’s discussion of genre is similarly oppositional and 
explicitly differentiates between the broad, opposing literary categories of poetry and 
prose.  In ‘The Literary Fact’ [Literaturnyi fakt], Tynianov classifies genre as a big 
form [bolʹshaia forma], and insists that such forms are not reified categories that can 
be accounted for in statistical terms.  Tynianov even offers confirmation that the 
Formalist objective study of literature is a science of non-recognition, stating that we 
do not recognize genre in positive terms [zhanr ne uznavaem], and this non-
recognition is the result of genre’s immanent and active struggle of negation, where 
in any given genre there is always a dialectical struggle with that which it is not. 
Tynianov gives the example of the evolution in the long-poem genre felt by readers 
of Pushkin’s Gypsys [Tsygany], where readers were confounded by Pushkin’s 
departure from previous generic conventions.  Nevertheless, this sensation of 
evolution was not enough to conclude that the long-poem had somehow ceased to 
exist.  Accordingly, it is never possible to recognize genre, because any given big 
form contains sufficient elements for it to be a genre and not a genre at the same 
time, or, in the case of Pushkin’s Gypsys, there was something sufficient for this 
non-poem to be a poem [nechto dostatochnoe dlia togo, chtoby i eta «ne-poema» 
byla poemoi].  Genre can only exist as such through its being riven with tension 
between the gravitational pull of ‘big’ elements against the negative force of 
additional, ‘small’ forms (Tynianov 1977: 256-7; 2000: 36-7). 
The similarities of Tynianov’s figuring of genre and Shklovsky’s equally constructive 
concepts of ostranenie and stepped forms are therefore not difficult to discern.  
Shklovsky noted how plot requires the addition of new elements to prolong and 
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retard a narrative structure, or provide an equally retarding moment of non-
recognition.  Defamiliarization demands the problematizing of conventionalized 
forms with a radical juxtaposition with the innovative and unexpected.  Tynianov 
even expands upon his demand of not recognizing genre by arguing that the primary 
awareness of genre is somatic, and that genre and the constructive principle are 
intuited by sensation [oshushchenie] (Tynianov 1977: 257; 2000: 37).  There are 
further similarities with Eikhenbaum’s treatment of the grotesque discussed in the 
preceding chapter, albeit Tynianov inverts the emphasis Eikhenbaum gives to the 
categories of grotesque or melodrama at the expense of the novel or short story 
form to which The Overcoat belongs.    To adapt Eikhenbaum’s argument to 
Tynianov’s constructive principle, it is the tension between the secondary elements 
of the grotesque with the large generic form of the short story that can be said to 
constitute part of these systemic tensions, or, to use Tynianov’s own term, constitute 
the text’s literary function.  The literary function is structurally analogous to the 
constructive function (which pertains to orchestration of elements and devices) and 
the verbal function (which pertains to literature’s relationship with byt), in that it 
stages a conflict between the material elements of different generic systems.  The 
necessarily historical aspect of genres is manifested in Tynianov’s brief illustration of 
how the dynamic function at work in the ‘big’ and ‘small’ forms of the novel genre 
change over time: ‘The novel, which seems to be an integral genre that has 
developed in and of itself over the centuries, turns out to be not an integral whole 
but a variable’. At the time of writing, Tynianov states that the novel is determined by 
plot development and a purely quantitative judgement concerning the total number 
of pages which denotes the differentiation of a novel from a novella, short story or 
fragment.65  In previous epochs, the novel was designated by differing elements at 
                                                          
65 Shklovsky makes a similar observation concerning the anecdote in the preface to The Third Factory 
(Shklovsky 2002: 337-8; 2002: 3-4). 
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work in historical constructive factors, such as pathetic romance or the epistolary 
form (Tynianov 1977: 274-3; 2001: 70).   
It is precisely the variable quality of generic forms that, for Tynianov, decisively 
demonstrates the limitations of an analysis of merely the constructive aspect of 
literary art in what would later termed its synchronic aspect.  In ‘On Literary 
Evolution’, Tynianov berates followers of immanent textual analysis of devices, 
arguing that they confuse the immanently historical character of the literary 
phenomenon with historicism.  They refuse to address the problem of history and 
pursue what might be termed a universal grammar approach to literary art that does 
not engage with literature’s complex historical evolution and its inter-relationship 
with the extra-literary series (Tynianov 1977: 273-74; 2002: 68-9). Immanent 
analysis does provide an understanding of literary art, but the critic, armed with an 
awareness of the paradoxical and contradictory qualities of literary art, must go 
beyond the immanent, and turn to the problematic areas of epochal life in all its 
historical complexity in order to account for literary evolution.  But, in going beyond 
literary art’s immanent properties, the contradictory relationship between 
constructive function and material is replicated in the literary functions of genre, and 
the verbal function of art with byt.  Tynianov acknowledges the ongoing relevance of 
immanent textual criticism, but, with Tynianov’s series of functions (constructive, 
literary and verbal), the Formalist method evolves into a variety of objective critique 
that realises it must account for literature’s difficult relationship with elements that lie 
beyond its boundaries, and that the changing nature of those boundaries 
necessitates that the literary must be addressed on an objective, historical basis.  
Immanent textual criticism will, Tynianov believes, never be able to account for the 
incorporation of materials into the literary set that were previously extra-literary.  By 
way of example, Tynianov demonstrates how the epistolary form was gradually 
incorporated into the novel form.  Previously, letter-writing pertained purely to byt, 
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but, due to the changing qualities and demands of the epoch in the time of 
Karamzin, the letter, with all the varieties of materials it offers, was elevated to the 
very centre of literature, displacing elements which had previously played a central 
role (Tynianov 1977: 265-7; 2000: 41-3). 
V 
At this stage, taking into account Tynianov’s evolution of the ethical demand to 
account objectively for literature’s conditions of possibility in all their immanent, 
historical and contingent complexity, it is possible to address the broader epochal 
problems particular to the mid to late 1920s in the Soviet Union or, in Tynianov’s 
own terms, address his evolution of Formalism’s ethical demands in terms of their 
verbal function.   Whilst it is certainly the most prosaic of platitudes, it is nonetheless 
important to emphasize that Tynianov’s contribution to the formal method and its 
demand for an objective science is itself an evolution of Russian Formalism and its 
method, and not a radical rupture that amounts to abandoning the work centred 
poetics.  As has been argued here, the structural and constructive relationships 
active in Shklovsky’s account of defamiliarization, plot formation and Eikhenbaum’s 
critique of Gogol΄ are very much alive in Tynianov’s work.  Some have argued that 
Tynianov’s critique of genre amounts to Formalism’s ‘final break with the era of the 
device’ (Renfrew 2006: 31).66 Such a conclusion is not without justification given 
Tynianov’s criticisms of purely immanent textual criticism in ‘The Literary Fact’ and 
                                                          
66 In suggesting that there is a clear continuity in how the Formalists’ conceptualize art from the early 
Poetics collections to their writings up to the end of the 1920s, and in my use of theoretical concepts 
to account objectively for the history of the movement which formulated them, my argument owes a 
debt of inspiration to Aage A. Hansen-Löve’s Russkii formalizm: Metodologicheskaia rekonstruktsiia 
razvitiia na osnove printsipa ostraneniia (Khanzen-Leve 2001).  However, I do not accept his at times 
rigidly schematic exposition of Formalism’s fundamental concepts (Khanzen-Leve 2001: 200-207), 
and his accompanying division of the history of Russian Formalism into three distinct stages.  Of 
these three distinct stages, Hansen-Löve argues that the first ‘paradigmatic’ stage focused on 
material, parody, device and orientation; and the second ‘syntagmatic’ is differentiated by an interest 
in narrative and plot.  The third ‘pragmatic’ stage encompasses the turn to literary art’s relationship 
with life.  To my mind, the publication of ‘The Literary Fact’ in 1924 and the publication of 
Eikhenbaum’s Gogol΄ essay (first included in the third Poetics collection in 1919 and republished in 
the second edition of Eikhenbaum’s Teoriia Kritika Polemika in 1927), render this schematic account 
of Russian Formalism problematic, as it fails to account for Formalism’s dialectical evolution in the 
Soviet 1920s.     
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‘On Literary Evolution.’  However, the suggestion that Formalism has two distinct 
eras of ‘device’ and ‘genre’ risks understanding the Formalist school in positive 
terms at the expense of their interest in constructive relationships and paradoxical 
relationships of negation, non-recognition and knight’s moves.  The point may seem 
pedantic, but it is nonetheless significant when assessing the verbal function of 
Tynianov’s work towards the end of the Soviet 1920s.  The turn to questions of art’s 
relationship with life and its historically grounded evolution are clearly indicative of a 
shifting ideological climate that increasingly demands these problems be addressed 
in ‘objective’ or ‘scientific’ accounts of literary art; just as Tynianov’s refutation of 
determinist accounts of an author’s social class suggests that the idea has some 
currency in the historical context of Tynianov’s refutation.  Yet the persistence of a 
degree of Formalist pedigree in Tynianov’s treatment of these problematics requires 
that an element of discursive openness and tolerance in that epochal context be 
acknowledged, and even that these discursive formations of ideology, class and 
history cannot be satisfactorily articulated in closed, intentional or determinist 
accounts of early Soviet ideology and a coercive pressure to conform.    
It is a measure of the inability to provide such closed correlations between a 
coercive ideological environment and Formalist critique that it is never clear whether 
Tynianov can be said to accord with such pressures, or indeed be regarded as 
providing a particularly subtle parody of the broader ideological climate.67  This 
tension is most apparent in ‘On Literary Evolution’, where Tynianov echoes Lenin 
and Plekhanov when he states that the authorial intention school of literary criticism 
amounts to a history of war in terms of the actions of individual generals.  Such an 
approach obviously addresses the socio-economic structural problems which lead to 
the advent of war in the first place.  Tynianov even goes so far as stating that the 
discipline of literary scholarship is, given its emphasis on unscientific authorial 
                                                          
67 As will be argued in the seventh chapter, Shklovsky exploits this ambiguity to dramatic effect in The 
Third Factory. 
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modes of criticism, analogous to a colonial territory, with the implication being that 
objective Formalist specifications offer the potential revolutionary overthrow of the 
discipline’s oppressors, and the discipline will rise to the challenge of constructing a 
new discipline in the new Soviet state (Tynianov 1977: 270; 2002: 66).  Such 
analogous moments of non-recognition of their referent are rich in their ambiguity.  
Perhaps it is Tynianov making a conciliatory gesture in the face of the Cultural 
Revolution’s coercive pressure to conform, or perhaps such overwrought examples 
parody the extent to which revolutionary discourses were being forcibly injected into 
all aspects of the epochal byt in which Tynianov was writing.68  
It is far less ambiguous, with regard to ‘The Literary Fact’, that Tynianov’s 
‘orientation’ is towards promoting the advent of the Russian adventure novel which 
he suggests is absent in the post-Revolutionary context.  As noted in the first 
chapter, Kant’s insistence that the project of critique be orientated towards its praxis 
in public debate is fraught with difficulties.  Tynianov’s insistence that literary art’s 
verbal function encompass art’s dialectical engagement with the public world of life 
is equally problematic, albeit in a manner that now appears more aware of those 
difficulties and ambiguities than Kant.  Kant’s critique objectively accounts for 
consciousness’s conditions of possibility, the natural sciences and a priori moral 
freedom with a view to their practical activity in social life.  Formalism’s objective 
critique of art accounts for its conditions of possibility (immanent, historical and 
contingent with extra-literary orders) with a view to a critique of finite, non-
recognition and, crucially, the practical activity of writing literature itself and, to return 
to Kant’s words in ‘What is Enlightenment?’, taking responsibility for the arts and 
sciences.  The Formalists’ non-intentional accounts of authorship and, particularly, 
Tynianov’s suggestion that the literary personality is exemplary of literature’s verbal 
function complicates this latter element, by insisting that a text’s (or author’s) 
                                                          
68 Tynianov’s orientation towards parody, even when engaged in nominally ‘scholarly’ genres, is 
exemplified by his planned, yet unrealized, history of poetry (Tynianov 1977: 537). 
123 
 
relationship with the concrete world of life is mediated by objective, impersonal 
forces that are beyond intentional formulation.  Thus, Tynianov’s ‘orientation’ to 
promote and facilitate the act of writing in the Soviet 1920s is an impersonal, illusory 
formation that arises through his theory’s dialectical inter-relationship with the 
broader epochal context.  
VI 
Yet epoch and constructive principle are, in Tynianov’s discussion of genre, 
inextricably linked.  A new epochal constructive principle, so Tynianov argues, 
requires new materials, and it is apparent that by foregrounding the possibility that 
newspapers and journals are potential material for the as yet undefined post-
Revolutionary Russian adventure novel, Tynianov may well be advancing the 
‘Literary Fact’ essay and its theoretical proclamations as potential material (it is 
worth noting that the essay appeared in the journal LEF) for an inchoate 
constructive function.  The glaring contradiction between Tynianov’s own demand 
that material cannot exist outside of the constructive function in the same essay is 
all too apparent here, and demonstrates the difficulty with which the Formalist 
school can be engaged with what, retrospectively, is widely termed the Russian 
Avant-garde.  This discontinuous and plural cultural phenomenon offers a great 
variety of artistic praxes and thematic preoccupations, of which the post-Russian 
Symbolist propensity towards life-creation [zhiznetvorchestvo] has been much 
discussed.69  With the exception of Tynianov’s remarks on the post-Revolutionary 
novel, it is well-nigh impossible to equate the Formalists with this tendency in post-
                                                          
69 For a discussion of ‘life-creation’ in Russian culture prior to its voguish application to the ‘avant-
garde’, see The Semiotics of Russian Cultural History: Essays by Iurii M. Lotman, Lidiia Ia. Ginsburg, 
Boris A. Uspenskii (Lotman in Nakhimovsky & Nakhimovsky 1985: 67-8, 75 & 94) and (Boym 1991: 5-
6).  The first chapter of Boris Groys’s The Total Art of Stalinism: Avant-garde, Aesthetic Dictatorship 
and Beyond (Groys 2011: 1-32) argues, problematically it must be said, for the preponderance of a 
Nietzschean will to power in the avant-garde intention towards life-creation.  Irina Gutkin has analysed 
the perpetuation of Russian Symbolist discourses of life-creation in the avant-garde and beyond in 
‘The Legacy of the Symbolist Aesthetic Utopia: From Futurism to Socialist Realism’ in (Paperno and 
Delaney-Grossman 1994: 167-97).  The introduction to Laboratory of Dreams provides an insightful 
discussion of the term with regard to the avant-garde (Bowlt & Matich 1996: 4, 8-9).    
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Revolutionary culture, specifically because of their propensity to problematize the 
relationship between art and life, and their insistence that the relationship between 
art and artist can never adequately be formulated in intentional terms.  In a highly 
problematic essay which has been the subject of much critical attention, Ekaterina 
Degot΄ provides a deeply flawed account of Soviet citizens’ relationships with 
objects, and elaborates on Aleksandr Rodchenko’s desire to create object-comrades 
that differ from their capitalist commodity counterparts (Degot΄ 2000: 201-210).70  
Anke Hennig has spoken about an analogous effort by Lilia Brik to create a kino-
object that does not conform to the oppressive gaze of the masculine kino-eye.71  
The Formalists are adamant that such intentional accounts of artistic creation are 
                                                          
70 Of the many problematic arguments advanced in the essay, it is particularly concerning that Degot΄ 
does not differentiate between Marx’s concept of commodity fetishism and Freud’s subsequent 
treatment of fetishism.  Degot΄ confuses the former with the latter extensively in this article.  Marx’s 
brilliant argument critiques the ‘witchcraft’ through which the abstract value of the exchanged 
commodity comes to have profound structural implications in the concrete social environment of 
social exchange (Marx 2000: 452-487).  As Michael Heinrich persuasively argues, it is entirely 
incorrect to equate Freud’s thesis of fetishistic attachment to objects with Marx’s altogether more 
ethically committed critique of exchange in Capital  (Heinrich 2008: 70-9, 179-98).  Seemingly 
unaware of this distinction, Degot΄’s account of the Soviet citizen’s relationship to commodities seems 
ultimately orientated towards a paradoxical account of Soviet capitalism.  It is interesting to note that 
Marx’s critique of political economy shares many structural relationships with Tynianov’s own critique.  
However, as will become apparent in due course, Eikhenbaum correctly problematizes any direct 
relationship of correlation between literary meaning and the financial world of alienation, exchange 
and commodification.  
 A key concern of ‘Literary Fact’ and ‘Imaginary Pushkin’ is anachronism.  Tynianov seemingly 
concedes that anachronism is unavoidable in any act of reading or cultural criticism, as an epoch will 
always select the materials which suit its contemporary needs.  By extension, the very term ‘Avant-
garde’ and, for that matter ‘modernism’, can therefore be designated examples of an anachronistic 
constructive function from subsequent epochs, particularly when applied to cultural phenomena which 
do not explicitly identify themselves as either ‘avant-garde’ or ‘modernist’.  Regarding the latter term, it 
is very interesting that Jean-Michel Rabaté should begin his study 1913 Cradle of Modernism with the 
question: ‘Could the Year 1913 have brought bad luck?’ (Rabaté 2007: 1). To my mind, this 
unintentionally associates modernism with superstition, and begs the question: is it not exemplary of 
superstition to assume that ‘modernism’ can encompass the attributes of so much cultural 
phenomena over such an extended period of time? It was Marx who invoked the superstitious 
practice of witchcraft in his explanation of value and commodity fetishism, and it is certainly tempting 
to pursue the analogy, and argue that ‘Avant-garde’ and ‘Modernism’ are themselves agents of 
commodification of cultural phenomena, in that they establish a common value-denominator of 
equivalence between such a wide variety of phenomena in all cultural walks of life.  On this basis, it is 
Deget who participates in the commodification of the Avant-garde and its objects, and, potentially, is 
even complicit in the capitalist relationships to objects which she purports to critique.     
71 I am referring here to an interesting paper, ‘From Commodities to Comrades: On Gender Relations 
in the Russian Avant-garde’, given at Durham University as part of its Literary Theory History research 
group in the School of Modern Languages and Cultures.   
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impossible, and demand that the dynamic literary object is other to the artist and her 
attempts to fashion it according to her will.72 
Despite the contradiction in his remarks on the Russian adventure novel, Tynianov 
is adamant that it is impossible to engineer a constructive principle before the fact.  
As already mentioned, there is, in effect, no pre-creative reality for a work of art.  It is 
only a completed work of art which manifests its material through its contradictory 
struggle with the constructive principle, and writer and critic can only ever ascertain 
this relationship after the act of writing.   Whilst it is clear that Tynianov is specifically 
engaged with the problem of genre, and how an apparent absence in Russian 
literature might be addressed, his remarks on a specifically Russian problem hint at 
an alternative way of formulating a national identity in non-essentialized and even 
non-mythological terms.  According to Tynianov, the problem for the Russian 
adventure novel lies in the ambiguous dialectical contradiction between two 
constructive principles: the plotted novel, and the plot-less novel (Tynianov 1977: 
263; 2000: 38-9).   Whilst this state of affairs affords Eikhenbaum his brilliant 
analysis of Gogol΄’s The Overcoat, it is more problematic with regard to the Russian 
adventure novel.  Eikhenbaum was also profoundly sceptical regarding the Russian 
adventure novel in the contemporary essay ‘In Search of Genre’ [V poiskakh zhanra]  
(Eikhenbaum 1927: 291-95).  Eikhenbaum is highly critical of attempts to 
intentionally create a Russian adventure novel, noting its failed attempts to 
incorporate voyages to Mars, the construction of enormous laboratories, and great 
voyages across time and space.  Eikhenbaum hints that these attempts to forcibly 
engineer a Russian adventure novel are the result of statist demands for a new 
literary culture, noting that the fate of Russian literature concerns not only literary 
                                                          
72 In the chapter ‘The Avant-garde and the Retrospectivists’, Katerina Clark has argued that the 
Formalists are exemplary of the avant-garde because they attempted ‘to create a new system of 
norms by redistributing the authority of chance and necessity’. The problematic term here is create, as 
the Formalists consistently demand that the objective laws of literary material have always been as 
such, and there is no ‘chance’ in their implementation or discernment (Clark1994: 259-277).  
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circles and editors, but also the organs of state power (Eikhenbaum 1927: 291).  
Attempts to force a Russian adventure novel arise from an influx of foreign works in 
translation, but such foreign material does not necessarily correspond with the 
epochal demands of post-Revolutionary Russia.  Tynianov’s critique of the Russian 
adventure novel is entirely consistent with Eikhenbaum, and argues that the 
dialectical interaction of plot and plotless style is set in motion in certain conditions.  
Whilst these conditions may exist in other national literary cultures, in Russia the 
material for this constructive tension is, at the time of writing, not yet existent. As 
such the Russian adventure novel can be said, with regard to its verbal function, to 
convey a sense of crisis in post-Revolutionary literary culture, where any attempt to 
intentionally found a given literary movement or genre will remain only an attempt. 
With these criticisms in mind, any ‘attempt’ to align the Russian Formalists with 
intentional efforts to establish new national or political identities needs to be treated 
with a degree of caution.  Tynianov and Eikhenbaum do indeed express a concern 
with the fate of a particular variety of the novel genre, and hint at its potential for 
promoting a variety of national identity.  But that identity can only arise through a 
correspondence between the materials active in the various levels of functions 
(constructive, literary and verbal) outlined by Tynianov.  It would be a mistake to 
read Tynianov’s insistence on the contradictory, dialectical relationship between 
specifically Russian material and literary construction as opposed to any kind 
material ‘other’ to the Russian cultural experience.  Tynianov in no way precludes 
that possibility, he merely resists intentional attempts to establish a literary genre in 
Russian culture when there is no material basis (be it literary or in byt) for its forced 
introduction.  The negative moments, where new material is present in a genre’s 
dialectical evolution, stepped formations or defamiliarization are all very much 
dependent on that element being negated.  Russian identity, by implication, will be a 
variable, and thrive only with the advent of new materials and constructive 
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principles, but their introduction will only ever be possible if they are appropriate or 
consistent with what is or what has already been a generic Russian identity, that is, 
what is an already extant literary fact.  Accordingly, the Russian Formalists may 
indeed be linked to the process whereby a new state and political identity arose, but 
they cannot be conceptualized as engaging in this process in purely intentional 
terms, and, recalling Tynianov’s criticism of ideological and political deployments of 
Pushkin as ‘our everything’ and, potentially, his parodying the overt politicization of 
apolitical activity, their objective critical praxis was consistently accomplished with a 
degree of irony that militates against absolute or essentialized uses of national 
identity.     
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5: A Difficult (K-)not 
I 
In the previous chapter, Tynianov’s ‘The Literary Fact’ emerged as an attempt to 
conceptualize the relationship between literary genres and literature’s broader 
relationship with life dialectically, and thereby replicate the paradoxical, mutually 
constitutive relationships of negation between devices, material and constructive 
function within the broader objective contexts of genre and social life.   Tynianov, it 
is important to note, does not formulate these dialectical relationships in intentional 
terms, and noted how efforts to forcibly programme an adventure novel into the 
post-Revolutionary context was doomed to failure.  Eikhenbaum, as demonstrated in 
his essay on Gogol΄’s The Overcoat, is profoundly sceptical of intentional accounts 
of authorial praxis, and maintains this scepticism towards intentional cultural 
construction in ‘The Literary Byt’, an essay that deals with the relationship between 
art and life along similar lines to Tynianov in the earlier essay.  Of the two texts, 
Eikhenbaum’s is by far the better known in the English-language speaking West.  In 
the essay’s anthologized reception, it has been regarded as an evolution of the 
Formal method, through attempting to address matters beyond the limited 
boundaries within which Formalism had militantly confined itself, all the while 
simultaneously defending the core principles of the new literary science and its 
objective determinations of its text-object (Shepherd 1992: 22).  The essay’s renown 
rests, to no small extent, on Eikhenbaum’s formulation of three questions that 
pertain to a shift in the dilemmas facing Soviet writers.  The initial technical 
questions of ‘how to write in general’ and ‘what to write next’ had, at the time of 
writing, given way to the more existential problem of ‘how to be a writer’ 
(Eikhenbaum 1987: 428-9; 2002: 57-8). 
Shepherd argues that Eikhenbaum’s diagnosis is of much greater significance than 
its ostensible evolution of Russian Formalism suggests: ‘This formulation provides a 
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succinct characterization not only of a proposed new dimension for Formalist literary 
analysis, but also, perhaps primarily, of the current in the literary practice of the later 
1920s and early 1930s’  (Shepherd 1992: 22).  This particular epochal current, 
whereby the status of the literary profession (or ‘the business’ of literature itself) has 
assumed primary importance, is significant for Shepherd because it proved highly 
propitious for self-conscious fiction or ‘metafiction’.  Following Patricia Waugh, 
Shepherd denotes metafiction as ‘a term given to fictional writing which self-
consciously and systematically draws attention to its status as an artefact in order to 
pose questions about the relationship between fiction and reality’ (Waugh 1984: 2).  
In some respects, Waugh’s definition is wonderfully appropriate to the argument 
being advanced here.  With regard to the Formalists, the suggestion that a work of 
literary art is an artefact is analogous to the Formalist insistence that a literary work 
of art is either material or a relationship between materials.  Waugh’s suggestion 
that metafictional works ‘pose questions’ about the relationship between art and life 
is no less appropriate to the Formalists, as, in both Eikhenbaum’s essay and 
Tynianov’s ‘Literary Fact’, the relationship between art and life is resolutely not 
articulated in the terminology of causal determinism, and has the ambiguity and 
openness of a question, rather than an emphatic determinate response.  With 
regard to the broader context of late twenties literary culture in the Soviet Union, 
such questioning of the relationship between art and life is given an added twist.  
Drawing on two contemporary essays by Aleksei Selivanovskii, Shepherd provides a 
long list of metafictional works that thematize the problem of how to be a writer in 
the late twenties and early thirties, of which many of the texts are examples of 
roman-à-clef.  Indeed, some of this doctoral labour’s dramatis personae underwent 
fictional projection in a few of the novels listed by Shepherd:  Shklovsky (and 
possibly Tynianov) in Veniamin Kaverin’s The Troublemaker [Skandalist, ili vechera 
na Vasil΄evskom ostrove]; Bakhtin in Konstantin Vaginov’s The Goat Song 
[Kozlinnaia pesn΄]; and Medvedev in both The Goat Song and The Works and Days 
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of Svistonov [Trudy i dni Svistonova].  As if to cement the validity of Eikhenbaum’s 
epochal pronouncement on the centrality of ‘how to be a writer’ as the then thematic 
preoccupation du jour, the metafictional irony is completed by both Vaginov and 
Kaverin undertaking fictional projections of themselves in their respective novels.73 
That literary theorists themselves should become an objective literary fact raises a 
variety of interesting debates as to the objective role of Formalist theory and its own 
concept of the epochal constructive function.  Shepherd appears to imply that the 
immanentism of Formalism was somehow blind to the reality of events going on 
around it, and only when it came under increasing attack from 1925 onwards did it 
out of necessity turn to more pressing social concerns.  As a result, Eikhenbaum’s 
encapsulation of the epochal dilemma is, for Shepherd, a broadly descriptive 
statement of what was already apparent in the then contemporary literary culture, 
and not an evolution of the Formalists’ poetics of non-recognition and dialectical 
literary constructions.  Yet the fact, indeed, the literary fact that these theorists all 
served as material for fictional projection in these novels potentially implies a 
constitutive role for objective literary theory, that at once provides a theoretical 
framework for conceptualizing literary praxis and was, potentially, the material and 
epochal constructive function that dialectically organized its materials.74   In addition, 
Eikhenbaum’s account of current literary themes and problematics is undertaken on 
the basis of the essay’s emphatically positive response to Tynianov’s essay and its 
concept of the constructive function, published some five years prior to 
                                                          
73 Shepherd refers to Selivanovskii’s ‘Mezhdu prosvetitel΄stvom i marksizmom’ from Oktiabr, 8 (1929) 
and ‘Ostrovitiane iskusstva’ from V Literaturnykh boiakh: sbornik statei (1930).  For a discussion of 
the prototypes of Kaverin’s Skandalist see ‘Prototipy odnogo romana’ (Chudakova & Toddes 1981). 
Bakhtin himself discusses the prototypes of Kozlinaia pesn΄  (Bakhtin and Duviakin 1994: 182-4) and, 
in his discussion of Vaginov’s metafictional novels, Shepherd provides an extensive list of those 
scholars who have engaged in what he derisively terms ‘prototype spotting’ (Shepherd 1992: 91). 
74 This statement should not be interpreted as writers representing the ideas of literary theory in their 
respective fictions.  There have been some misguided attempts to take the biographical link between 
Bakhtin and Vaginov as conclusive proof that Bakhtin’s theory is replicated in Vaginov’s novels 
(Anemone 1998: 57-70).   Given the current interest in non-linearity and indirect influence, it is fitting 
that it is Vaginov’s novels that exhibit a sustained thematization of Formalist poetics, and Kaverin’s, 
former student of Tynianov’s, whose works seem much closer to Bakhtin’s concept of real embodied 
authors. 
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Eikhenbaum’s ‘epochal’ pronouncement (Eikhenbaum 1987: 342; 2002: 61).  
Indeed, rather than proceeding from an observation of contemporary literary 
dilemmas, Eikhenbaum’s essay effectively begins from where Tynianov’s remarks 
about the Russian adventure novel left off.  Tynianov’s anti-intentional account of 
literary art argued that the Russian adventure novel could not be forced into being, 
as there was then no adequate material in the post-Revolutionary context to sustain 
a suitably dynamic relationship of negation with an epochal constructive function.   
Tynianov refused to proffer any intentional solution to this problem, only hinting that, 
as art searches for new materials, its deforming and defamiliarizing encounter with 
life could do worse than consult Formalist theory in literary journals.  Eikhenbaum’s 
next step from this unresolved ending is to acknowledge the difficulties the writer 
faces and, through an objective analysis of literature and its inter-relationship with its 
epochal context, help the writer go about writing.  The literary functions of this 
epochal context have, according to Eikhenbaum, become entangled in a difficult 
knot [slozhnyi uzel] (Eikhenbaum 1987: 436; 2002: 64-5).  However, in the hands of 
a writer-critic armed with the insights of Formalism’s poetics of non-recognition, this 
knot ultimately proves to be Gordian, and Shepherd’s description of the essay’s 
epochal formulations ultimately prove to be wide of the mark, be it in terms of the 
essay’s attempt to provide ‘a new dimension’ to the Formal method, or in terms of 
Eikhenbaum’s diagnosis of the ‘metafictional’ malaise in late-twenties literary 
culture.  As with both his and Tynianov’s earlier rejection of the post-Revolutionary 
adventure novel, Eikhenbaum is by no means enthusiastic as to the trajectory of 
literary culture towards the end of the 1920s, and, paradoxically, the ostensible 
‘Formalism’ apparent in literary culture is not something of which Eikhenbaum 
implicitly approves. 
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II 
According to Eikhenbaum, the writer’s difficulty in untying the difficult knot of 
‘function’ is compounded by the very status of the profession, which, in an attempt to 
align himself with Tynianov’s essay, he suggests is part of the literary byt that writers 
thematize in their work.  As already noted, Tynianov formulates the term byt in 
broadly positive terms, praising it as fertile space, teeming with rudimentary 
sciences.  Eikhenbaum is much less positive, and formulates byt in manner 
comparable to the numerous contemporary treatments of the term as all that is 
mundane,  relentlessly over-bearing and banal; an ultimately determinist discourse 
of miserablist materialism that will inevitably overcome any attempt at progressive or 
positive movement.75  Eikhenbaum does not go as far as to lament the wreck of the 
love-boat on the rocks of byt, but he does formulate byt as a broadly negative 
contingency that limits authorial activity (Eikhenbaum: 1987, 430; 2002, 58-9).  In 
the ‘byt’ of Eikhenbaum’s essay, writers lack professional independence and cannot 
simply create whatever literature they wish.  They must undertake what amounts to 
hack work in order to support themselves, and are therefore included within the 
broader economic market of production and exchange and demands that authors 
and their writing conform to external ideological demands.  In this socio-economic 
context, it really is the job of the writer to discern just what the function of literature 
can be, and to figure out just how to ‘be’ a writer.   
Eikhenbaum’s turn to the problems of profession and economic market goes some 
way to explaining Shklovsky’s blinkered dismissal of the essay as ‘the most vulgar 
Marxism’ [vul΄garneishii marksizm] (Shklovsky quoted in Galushkin 2000: 140), and 
might equally be understood as an epochal moment of rupture with the tenets of 
‘early’ Formalist theory, where the ‘device’ period of immanent textual analysis is 
abandoned once and for all, and the problem of the extra-literary finally becomes 
                                                          
75 For an excellent survey of such ‘byt’, see Common Places: Mythologies of Everyday Life (Boym 
1994: 29-120). 
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equally significant, that is to say, an epochal socio-economic problem.   Yet as even 
Shepherd notes, the essay manifests an orientation towards defending Formalism’s 
core principles of the work-centred poetics.  Contrary to many scholarly accounts of 
Russian Formalism, it appears that mapping the co-ordinates of Russian Formalism 
along a crudely linear line of breaks and abandoned ideas is, on the basis of 
Eikhenbaum’s essay, problematic.  In ‘Literary Byt’, Formalism’s conservative ‘guard 
dog’ of the work-centred poetics is very much in evidence, and the demand for an 
autonomous discipline of literary science is as penetrating and persistent as it was in 
publications from the decade prior to Eikhenbaum’s article.  Eikhenbaum insists that 
a coherent, autonomous theoretical schema is vital to the achievement of this aim, 
and an objective science of literary art must account for historical problems.  The 
incorporation of the problems of literary history is only ever possible by a unitary 
theoretical system under which the various data of the literary past can be 
assimilated and organized into literary history (Eikhenbaum 1987: 428-31; 2002: 56-
9).  It is only upon this historical basis that the guard-dog theoretician can also serve 
as a guide-dog for the would-be author, providing an objective explication of the 
historically constituted problems of how to write and what to write next.  However, 
when encountering the contemporary problem of how to be a writer in the socio-
economic contexts of production, exchange, commodification and supply and (at 
times ideological) demand, the guard-dog once again bares his teeth and insists 
upon a return to the work-centred poetics.  
For Eikhenbaum, an objective literary science cannot facilitate the undertaking of 
literary praxis upon such socio-economic ‘bases’.  Eikhenbaum’s essay implies that 
the core principles of Formalist poetics can help the fledgling writer feel out the 
potentialities of her profession in the late 1920s, but he is typically strict when it 
comes to formulating the methodological principles under which the struggles of the 
present can be configured.  Tynianov was interested in how a given phenomenon 
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can be extra-literary in a particular historical period, but then be incorporated into the 
literary series in another.  It is as if Eikhenbaum develops this objective criterion to 
the point where he insists against an historical anachronism, and warns against 
applying the evaluative criteria of one epoch’s literary facts to interrogate those of a 
preceding era.76  Perhaps controversially given the timing of the article’s publication 
in 1929, Eikhenbaum specifically identifies this error in schools of literary analysis 
that seek to identify the ‘class’ and ‘ideology’ of a given author as dominant sources 
of meaning in a literary work (Eikhenbaum 1987: 432-5; 2002: 60-4).    They are 
rejected precisely because they constitute an elsewhere beyond the literary object, 
which must always be analysed at the level of the immanent before any relationship 
with external elements can be configured.  Any such interest in ‘class’ and ‘ideology’ 
are, for Eikhenbaum, analogous to metaphysics and do not acknowledge the 
immanent material reality of the literary thing.    Like Tynianov and Shklovsky, 
Eikhenbaum rejects any treatment of the relationship between the literary and the 
extra-literary as causal, and is consistently evocative of Kant’s conditions of 
possibility in how he formulates the constructive relationship active at immanent and 
external levels:  ‘The relationships between the facts of the literary order and facts 
extrinsic to it cannot simply be causal relationships but can only be relations of 
correspondence, interaction, dependency, or conditionality’.  Accordingly, there is no 
‘why’, no ‘root of knowledge’ for Eikhenbaum’s objective literary science, only ‘what 
does it mean?’  As such it is totally inadmissible to formulate a causal chain between 
a given author’s social class and her novels.  Deftly anticipating a potentially hostile 
response from what then passed for Marxists, Eikhenbaum produces a quotation 
                                                          
76 Eikhenbaum’s warning against ‘class’ criticism is indicative of the paradoxical manner in which 
anachronism figures in both Hegel’s thought (see Chapter 1) and Russian Formalism.  Eikhenbaum 
does formulate an anachronistic theory as to literature’s conditions of possibility, whereby the 
properties of literary art can be evaluated both terms of their historically situated particularity and their 
general capacity to change and evolve over time.  The latter general tendency must be calibrated in 
order to account for the particular. The causal determinism which Eikhenbaum identifies in 
contemporary ‘Marxist’ criticism is inadmissible on both counts.  Indeed, from the Hegelian 
perspective, this ‘Marxist’ approach is an anachronism. 
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from Engels pleading for a genuinely dialectical conceptualization of socio-economic 
phenomena, where Engels expresses frustration with the determinist materialist 
paradigm frequently used by Marx’s inferior successors (Eikhenbaum 1987: 432-3; 
2002: 61).77 
Eikhenbaum’s essay does not argue that the concepts of social class and the 
literary are mutually exclusive, but rather that ‘class’ can only ever be addressed in 
literary analysis once it has become an objective literary fact.  For Eikhenbaum, at 
any given historical moment social and political demands do not necessarily 
correspond with literary demands in causal terms, and, correspondingly, the class 
struggle and the literary struggle do not necessarily coincide (Eikhenbaum 1987: 
436; 2002: 64).  On this basis, he makes the strikingly bold assertion that class, in 
the sense that it is understood in socio-economic sciences, has never been a literary 
fact in Russian literature.  According to Tynianov’s dialectical formulation of the 
constructive principle, and the concomitant dynamic definition of the literary fact, 
socio-economic class cannot be said to have performed any kind of constructive 
function during both the mid and late nineteenth century.  To put it in more 
Shklovskian terms, class has served as neither motivation, nor material for Russian 
literature.  The mid nineteenth century struggles between Nekrasov and Fet, Tolstoy 
and Dostoevsky were not class struggles in the socio-economic understanding of 
‘class’ or ‘ideology’. They were struggles over ‘class-nature’ [klassovost΄] between 
the new profession of writers dependent on their readers for income and writers of 
independent means.  The former wrote in the evolving generic forms that came into 
being around this time, and which in turn must be regarded as dialectically inter-
dependent and co-constitutive of these struggles.  These are, for Eikhenbaum, the 
perennial co-constitutive problems of literature and literary byt, where the struggle 
                                                          
77 As Samuel D. Eisen notes, Eikhenbaum was particularly effective at demonstrating the failure of 
‘Marxist’ literary critics to adhere to anything which resembled a Marxist methodology in their work 
(Eisen 1996: 68). 
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between the new profession of writers and those writers pertaining to the hereditary 
nobility are constituted by the devices and genre-constructions active in their work, 
or, in the specific examples he mentions, the genres used by those writers who 
needed the support of their readers, and those used by the landed nobility 
(Eikhenbaum 1987: 431-5; 2002: 62-4).  Eikhenbaum’s argument is clearly 
reminiscent of Tynianov’s concept of literary art’s verbal function, where literature 
dialectically relates with the social environment.  Eikhenbaum’s discussion of class-
nature is analogous to Tynianov’s treatment of the literary personality that is 
emphatically not the ‘real’, historically situated socio-economic authorial being, but 
rather the changing discursive manifestation of that material in different literary 
epochs.  For the literary scientist to maintain a focus on ‘class’ in the history of 
Russian literature is, therefore, an invalid anachronism that organizes the data of 
Russian literary history under the prevailing methodological formulations of the 
present.  Socio-economic class, Eikhenbaum argues, can only ever be significant in 
terms of its literary function in the (then contemporary) present.  Eikhenbaum 
seemingly baits his Marxist-Leninist readers, arguing that any deterministic 
understanding of class s in a given author’s work is invalid, noting how Tolstoy’s 
work from this period thematizes concerns which are antithetical to the class 
interests of the hereditary nobility into which he was born.   
Tynianov’s critique of ideological uses of Pushkin’s literary personality pertains both 
to historical examples of such ‘uses’ since Apollon Grigor΄ev’s sweeping 
generalization, and to the present of the essay’s composition.  Tynianov concludes 
that only adhering to the principles of an objective literary science will prevent the 
grossest distortions of Pushkin’s life and oeuvre being perpetuated.  There is a 
paradox here, in that Tynianov effectively implies that a writer does not exist as a 
verbal function a priori, and it is only through authoring a text that an iteration of the 
author objectively manifests itself as part of the text’s dialectical, mutually 
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constitutive relationship with changing epochs.  On the basis of Eikhenbaum’s 
essay, it can be suggested that Eikhenbaum also denies that an author can exist as 
a verbal function before the literary fact, and the current discursive pressure over 
‘how to be a writer’ is potentially just such a tendency towards literature’s verbal 
function before the constructive literary fact.  From Eikhenbaum’s essay it is clear 
that a materialist interest in authors’ social class and the problem of how to be a 
writer are related.  Yet Eikhenbaum staunchly resists this tendency to ‘class’-ify the 
author before the fact, arguing that there has never been a preceding literary fact by 
which writers can orientate themselves as a ‘class’.  Indeed, Eikhenbaum argues 
that writers have always been and continue to be a classless profession, even in the 
literary byt of the new Soviet state (Eikhenbaum 1987: 435; 2002: 63).  The only 
socio-economic relationship of exchange into which the writer enters is with the 
purchasers of his or her books, a commodification which pertains purely to fetishistic 
financial value, and which cannot have any effect on the text’s constructive function 
or even ‘meaning’ beyond the generic matters already identified, despite the then 
current demand that an author exist as a socio-economic literary personality prior to 
the act of writing (Eikhenbaum 1987: 430; 2002; 58).  
III 
Eikhenbaum therefore sees the solution to untying the difficult knot of discerning the 
literary function in the present is to cease thinking of the author as a socio-economic 
phenomenon, that is, to end the current pre-occupation with how to be a writer and 
return to the objective historical basis of authors who write books, after which the 
verbal function of authorial class can arise.  And, by implication, the objective literary 
scientist can advise writers on how to write those books, and even what books might 
be written next.  To emphasize the importance of writers as a class risks a situation 
where literary byt begins to take precedence over literature itself, when the two can 
only ever be inter-related and co-constitutive of one another and, moreover, the text 
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and its immanent constitutive principles remain the point of departure for both writer-
author and writer-critic.   Once again, it is important to emphasize that Shklovsky, 
Tynianov and Eikhenbaum consistently reject authorial intention as a reliable basis 
for objective literary analysis and for the writer to understand how to go about the 
task of writing itself.  Their Pushkin, Gogol΄ and Bely are all to a greater or lesser 
extent undone by the objective properties of literary form.  Eikhenbaum burdens the 
writer with discerning the literary function of the then present age, but this is, in all 
likelihood, an ironic burden that hints at the author’s potential emancipation from 
matters that are entirely alien to literature, be it in its present or historical aspect.  
The preceding problems of how to write and what to write next are also, potentially, 
ironic formulations that, in keeping with Formalism’s poetics of non-recognition, are 
negative orientations.  The finite authorial self objectively determined by the 
Formalists never knows how to write and has no idea what she will write next, as the 
objective properties of literary form will as likely as not undermine authorial intention.  
Discerning the qualities of literary art, its historical situation and its implications with 
the impersonal constructive function are all only possible once a text has been 
written.  That Eikhenbaum describes the writer as a classless profession implies that 
the writer emerges, on a certain level, as a negative objectification of the writer, not 
as unified embodied being in the Bakhtinian sense, but as a dynamic, contradictory 
accumulation of devices in the literary thing and the verbal function beyond. The 
Gordian knot of how to be a writer and discern epochal literary functionality is 
ultimately undone through the alternative problem of the ‘not’, as the brainless writer 
does not ‘know’ how to be a writer, and does not ever know how to write or even 
what to write next.  All these problems are constituted by her negation in the literary 
text, and the concomitant negation of ever knowing how to write.  
Given Eikhenbaum’s negative conceptualization of authors and literature, it is 
unsurprising that he dismisses many activities prevalent in literary byt.  Whereas 
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Tynianov praised the potential encounter with byt’s rudimentary sciences, 
Eikhenbaum feels the situation has gone too far and the social aspects of artistic 
creation have taken precedence over the objective praxis of writing itself.  Again 
foregrounding the role of the critic in facilitating this process, Eikhenbaum demands 
that his contemporary literary specialists stop ‘fabricating artificial alignments of 
writers, running ‘ideologies’ to the ground, and foisting on literature publicistic 
imperatives’ (Eikhenbaum 1987: 436; 2002: 65).    Whilst the then contemporary 
literary byt may involve undertaking ‘hack work’ [khaltura] in order to make a living, 
Eikhenbaum infers that such ‘work’ is not necessarily the business of literature 
proper, and encourages authors to negotiate a degree of professional independence 
that will grant them the opportunity to engage in a literary praxis more in accordance 
with its objective historical basis (Eikhenbaum 1987: 435; 2002: 64).  Eikhenbaum’s 
closing remarks that it is time to stop talking about class, ideology and collective 
activities and instead start talking about literature is, therefore, not ‘the most vulgar 
Marxism’ as Shklovsky dismissed it; on the contrary, they are, if anything, the ‘pure’ 
dialectical Formalism of Shklovsky and Tynianov; a Formalism with a view towards 
an ethics of the historically contingent literary object, and, concomitantly, a 
genuinely dialectical relationship between literary object and epoch.78   
Eikhenbaum’s dismissal of the existential topos of how to be a writer implies his 
dissatisfaction with the various contemporary romans-à-clef which treat this epochal 
malaise. Eikhenbaum suggests that objective theory will help the writer ignore 
precisely those thematic preoccupations that were being pursued by contemporary 
writers.  As Eikhenbaum notes at the end of his article, the burden of discerning an 
epoch’s constructive function falls not to the writer, but the critic, who is tasked with 
objectively analysing the literary work.   The Formalists’ rejection of both the post-
                                                          
78 Eikhenbaum’s suggestion that such an approach will help the writer feel out the possibilities of the 
literary profession (Eikhenbaum 1987: 435; 2002: 64) echoes Tynianov’s comments on the 
impersonal constructive principle in the ‘Literary Fact’, where the constructive principle of a new 
artistic current is felt dialectically  (Tynianov 1977: 265). 
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Revolutionary adventure novel and the avant-garde roman-à-clef manifests an 
ethical commitment to a positive post-Revolutionary culture, where the triumph of 
the Revolution is accompanied by the literary art that it deserves.79  There is, 
however, an unacknowledged consequence to Eikhenbaum’s and Tynianov’s 
criticisms here.  If the epochal constructive principle arises impersonally and 
unintentionally through dialectical determinacy with contemporary literary art, there 
is the risk that an epoch will always get the art it deserves.  By criticizing literary art’s 
inadequacy to its post-Revolutionary material, the Formalists risk implicitly criticizing 
that post-Revolutionary epoch precisely through its dialectical determinacy with 
inferior art.  As will become apparent in the subsequent two chapters, Shklovsky’s 
criticism and his autobiographical novels address this problematic head on, and 
confront a difficult knot of an altogether more complex variety than the Gordian 
platitude of how to be a writer, and explore the dynamic that has run through much 
of the discussion thus far: what is to be done when a poetics of non-recognition itself 
becomes the constructive function that organizes its material, and what are the 
accompanying implications for non-recognitions of the post-Revolutionary epoch?80   
Shklovsky’s dismissal of Vaginov’s and Kaverin’s memoir novels appears, in light of 
this problematic, appropriately double-edged.  Writing under the rubric of the 
Literatura fakta, Shklovsky proclaims these novels are failures, because they make 
                                                          
79 With regard to this point, Galin Tihanov has suggested: ‘It is essential to realize that both Russian 
Formalism… [was] inherently linked to the process of constructing a new state with a new political 
identity; and there was a neo-Romantic pride in belonging to the vanguard of these transformations’ 
(Tihanov 2004b: 66). Whilst we should be wary of ascribing the Formalists a unified political credo or 
indeed ‘ideological’ position, Tihanov’s remarks clearly problematize the reception of Formalism which 
perceives it as a variety of proto-structuralist immanent analysis.  Yet Tihanov himself also notes that 
‘[b]y concentrating on the literary “device,” especially in the early phase of their work, the Formalists 
were leaving literature to its own devices, uncontrolled by, and irreducible to, ethics, religion, or 
politics’ (Tihanov 2004b: 62).  Both contrasting aspects of Formalist critique are present in the 1924 
edition of Lef devoted to Lenin’s language, and which contains essays by Shklovsky, Tynianov and 
Eikhenbaum.  Tynianov’s concept of the verbal function is once again useful in grappling with this 
contradiction, where the verbal function of Formalist criticism sees precisely its imbrication with the 
political, ethical and issues of cultural construction, whereas, at the more immanent level, Formalism 
is nominally distant from such matters.      
80 This problem has been formulated, albeit with a different agenda to the argument advanced here, 
by Alyson Tapp, who has argued that Eikhenbaum’s hybridization of theoretical works with more 
autobiographical works is precisely a response to the epochal ‘crisis’ in the literary professions that 
leads Eikhenbaum to formulate his sceptical treatment of ‘how to be a writer’ (Tapp 2009: 33). 
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the grave error of sketching chicken legs onto a horse.  It is possible, Shklovsky 
notes, to sketch chicken legs onto a dragon, but only because a dragon does not 
exist (Shklovsky 1972: 124).  Whilst it is no doubt possible to understand these 
remarks as a bald declaration of factography, where the writer’s task is merely to 
write reality as it is in all its reified facticity,81 Shklovsky, in all likelihood, is being 
ironic here.  Vaginov and, particularly, Kaverin have sketched chicken legs onto a 
dragon, because the literary personalities which serve as the materials of their 
novels do indeed not exist.  The Shklovsky who was ‘sketched’ by Kaverin in 
Skandalist does not exist, and does not correspond to the more complex (if equally 
non-existent) reality of Shklovsky’s Formalist critique, which would, in his 
autobiographical prose, breath fire upon its epoch and its inferior art.82  
 
                                                          
81 For the declaration of the factographists’ intent, see ‘Lef: ob etoi knige i o nas. (Predislovie)’ and 
Nikolai Chuzak’s ‘Pisatel΄skaia pamiatka’ in (Chuzak 1972: 5-8 & 9-28).   
82 It is interesting to note here that in the issue of LEF devoted to Lenin’s language, Shklovsky 
foregrounds Lenin’s capacity for irony as an effective rhetorical device to deal with his opponents.  
Shklovsky argues that Lenin had a tendency for semantic play with words whose sense has changed 
or evolved from a once conventionalized meaning, perhaps hinting that Lenin himself shared the 
Formalist interest in innovation and defamiliarization (Shklovsky 1924: 55).  
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6: Life as Device 
I 
Shklovsky’s Zoo… or Letters not About Love is an epistolary novel that recounts the 
artistic byt of Russian exiles living in post-Revolutionary Berlin.  Life in this Berlin byt 
is frustrating.  The letters are those of an unidentified narrator (supposedly 
Shklovsky himself) and his would-be lover Alya (supposedly the novelist Elsa 
Triolet), who does not respond positively to his amorous intentions.  Made deeply 
unhappy by constant declarations of love, Alya prohibits the narrator from 
mentioning the word ‘love’ in his letters.   In response to this prohibition, the narrator 
describes the difficult lives of various members of the artistic Russian diaspora who 
reside in Berlin.  In order to earn a living, figures such as the Cubist-Suprematist 
Ivan Puni have had to compromise their aesthetic ideals and produce popular trash.  
These epistolary accounts of artistic byt are threaded together with digressions 
detailing the paradoxical principles of Formalist theory to the would-be lover, as if 
the narrator is attempting to teach her how to write.  This exchange of letters sits 
uneasily at the periphery between art and life, simultaneously the non-literary 
personal correspondence between two ‘real’ individuals and the material with which 
the narrator intends to write a new form that goes beyond the novel’s conventional 
framework.  The novel’s renowned nineteenth letter is purportedly by Alya, and 
recounts her fond memories of her nurse Stesha, whose unwavering integrity 
contrasts with the rhetorical games and self-aggrandizing poetics of the narrator.  
The narrator acknowledges the letter’s power and proclaims it the best letter in the 
novel, only to put a cross through it and instruct the reader not to read it.  At the end 
of the novel, the narrator’s final letter is addressed to All-Russian Central Executive 
Committee.  He protests that he cannot live in Berlin and asks permission to return.  
Alya, the narrator declares, does not exist and was merely a metaphor for his desire 
to return to Russia.  A lesson in the problems of negation, art’s shifting boundaries 
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with life and failed authorial intentions, this ‘novel’ is appropriately difficult to 
describe.  Of the very few scholars to discuss the novel at length, Linda S. 
Kauffmann describes Zoo as the strangest epistolary novel ever written (Kaufmann 
1992: 3), and Sergei Zenkin sees it as unique among its contemporary literature, 
and as a work that lacks precedent in Russian culture (Zenkin 2003: 170-1). 
The opening two questions of Tynianov’s ‘The Literary Fact’ are highly pertinent to 
Zenkin’s remarks: What is literature?  What is genre? (Tynianov 1977: 255; 2000: 
29).  In arguing that the novel is unique among its contemporary literature, Zenkin 
clearly does not recognize the many consistencies between the novel and the 
Formalist theory of Shklovsky, Eikhenbaum and Tynianov.  Zenkin makes an 
absolute distinction between literature and theory, whereby literature is emphatically 
not theory.  The ‘novel’ and ‘theory’ are accordingly in no way different genres of the 
broader term literature.   Yet in ‘The Literary Fact’, Tynianov emphatically argues 
against such a static, reified understanding of the literary series, and instead insists 
that the latter is constituted by the dialectical, contradictory and even defamiliarizing 
relationship of intersecting genres in their historical evolution.  Genre’s evolution is 
signified by negation or, more specifically, the incorporation of material which is 
other to a given genre, and there is always an element of what a genre is not within 
that given genre.   Tynianov implies that the budding writer would do well to 
assimilate the Formalist conceptualization of genre in order to avoid making the 
mistakes which characterise the contemporary Russian adventure novel.   It is 
ambiguous whether Tynianov is, like Eikhenbaum in the ‘Literary Byt’ essay, merely 
offering the Formal programme of critique as a primer in how not to write for the 
budding writer, or, as noted in chapter 4, Tynianov is in fact writing a theoretical 
treatise that manifests precisely those same paradoxes, contradictions and 
dialectical oppositions that he identifies in Pushkin’s poetry, and is effectively 
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demanding that the genre of theory needs to be incorporated into other genres, as it 
has been in the past. 
In an essay critiquing the ‘quiet war’ between the various literary factions in post-
Revolutionary culture, there is no ambiguity as to theory’s capacity to enrich the 
novel genre.  From the past, Tynianov points to Heinrich Heine’s Reisebilder, Paris 
Letters and The History of Philosophy and Literature in Germany; and, from 
contemporary Soviet literature, Tynianov looks to Zoo as a particularly interesting 
example. Tynianov argues that Heine and Shklovsky mix the genres of newspaper 
correspondence, personal portraits and penetrating polemics and theoretical 
insights.83  Accordingly, Tynianov argues that theory is not merely an abstraction, 
but a genre that conflicts with other genres within the literary series.  In Zoo, 
Tynianov perceives a striking mix of the pathos of a sentimental novel, feuilletons 
and, crucially, objective literary theory.  For Tynianov the novel is a thing located at 
a border line [«Zoo» Shklovskogo – veshch΄ tozhe «na granitse»] (Tynianov 1977: 
166).  The review addresses its contemporary readers, arguing that they are not 
used to reading a novel that is also a work of theory, just as they are not used to 
reading objective theory in both love letters and letters not about love, for ‘[o]ur 
culture is based on the prim and proper differentiation between science and art’ 
[[n]asha kul΄tura postroena na chopornom differentsirovanii nauki i iskusstva].  In 
contrast, Tynianov implies that post-Revolutionary culture should strive for literary 
forms that, like Zoo, exist on contested boundaries.   Tynianov insists that literature 
travels along many paths simultaneously, and simultaneously ties together many 
knots.  Literature is, for Tynianov, not a train that travels to a destination where 
‘meaning’ is easily discerned, and the critic is emphatically not the station controller 
at this imaginary point of ‘meaning’.  The ‘early’ Formalist poetics of non-recognition 
                                                          
83 For an example of Tynianov’s own polemical writing, see his ‘Sokrashchenie shtatov’ (Tynianov 
1924: 21-2),  signed with pseudonym Iu. Van-Vezen.  For further examples of Tynianov’s treatment of 
Heine, see Blok i Geine, Ob Aleksandre Bloke. Sbornik statei (Tynianov 1921); ‘Tiutchev i Geine’ 
(Tynianov 1922: 13-16); and the extended ‘Tiutchev i Geine’ (Tynianov 1977: 350-94).   
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is clearly alive and well in Tynianov’s preference for the jarring, simultaneous 
analogies of paths and knots over linear trains and station controllers; and, 
appropriately, Zoo’s precarious status at the peripheries of intersecting genres is 
largely attributed to its unconventional use of disparate materials (Tynianov 1977: 
150-166). 
If ‘theory’ is accordingly conceptualized as one genre within the broader category of 
‘literature’, then claims for Zoo’s uniqueness amongst its contemporary literature 
collapse, for the novel is saturated with precisely the same Formalist critique of 
literature’s conditions of possibility that has been outlined thus far, where it is the 
paradoxical relationships between elements that is held to be no less constitutive of 
literature than the nominal or determinate properties of those elements.  Indeed, for 
those schematic accounts of Russian Formalism which seek to categorize and 
divide the movement into distinct periods, it would no doubt have been better if 
Shklovsky had written Zoo after ‘Literary Fact’ and ‘Literary Byt’ essays.  ‘Literary 
Fact’s’ impressive conceptualization of the contradictory evolution of the relationship 
between art and life provides the example of the personal letter as an extra-literary 
form that became a literary fact.  In ‘Literary Byt’, Eikhenbaum cautions against an 
overbearing emphasis on artistic collectives, but insists that the social predicament 
of the writer (albeit not her social class) is closely imbricated with the evolution of 
generic forms, and, in certain instances, can result in writers stooping to khaltura in 
order to support them-selves.  In ‘Literary Byt’, Eikhenbaum implies that objective 
Formalist science can help the writer understand literary history and get down to the 
business of writing, and, in ‘Literary Fact’, Tynianov encourages his readers to 
render the tumultuous world around them in an experimental, formalist poetics, and 
write a novel of this material.  A Zoo written after these two essays would serve as a 
nice dialectical synthesis between their respective thematic concerns, where theory 
bequeathed the authorial practice of personal correspondence, thematic treatments 
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of the relationship between life and art, and the related problem of how to be a 
writer.  A Zoo written before these essays could be said to anticipate these later 
developments of Russian Formalism, yet such a reading threatens crude 
periodizations of Formalist activity and reductive accounts of Formalism’s 
‘pragmatic’ capitulations to the social demands of the Cultural Revolution, that is, the 
ever strengthening ‘no’ in Soviet culture post 1927. 
Viktor Erlich’s solution to this problem is to argue that Zoo’s thematic preoccupations 
simply mark Shklovsky’s departure from Russian Formalism and its strict focus on 
the immanent laws of verbal art (Erlich 1955: 135-6).  Zenkin goes a step further, 
and argues that Shklovsky’s autobiographical prose from the 1920s amounts to his 
effective abandonment of literary theory.  Following the ancient Greek definition of 
the term, Zenkin argues that the immanent, work-centred theory of OPOIAZ’s 
Poetika collections is abstract contemplation [sozertsanie], and as such requires 
distance from its object.84  In his autobiographical prose, Shklovsky the theoretician 
is denied such distance and thrust into the hostile and pessimistic environment of 
byt.  Zenkin even makes the bold claim that it was none other than Shklovsky 
himself who introduced the term byt into post-Revolutionary culture, and thereby set 
the tone for all subsequent iterations of byt as a ‘deadly force’ that frustrates and 
limits all human activity, depriving the noble theoretician of the peaceful distance 
she requires in order to contemplate her literary object (Zenkin 2003: 173).   Yet in 
the preceding paradoxes, has not the objective critique of Shklovsky, Eikhenbaum 
and Tynianov shown itself to be diametrically opposed to such a reified schema?  
The ‘early’ concepts of defamiliarization, device, material and the grotesque are 
constituted by a dialectical relationship of negation with life. The conventional, 
everyday understanding of art was that it was a representation of the content found 
                                                          
84 Zenkin’s suggestion that Zoo… departs from Formalist theory is unusual. The novel was recognized as 
drawing heavily on Formalist doctrine at the time of its publication.  See (Ginzburg 2002: 65) and (Levchenko 
2013a: 181).  Levchenko’s article is of particular interest here as it explores how Shklovsky uses the type of the 
perepischik to perpetuate and contradict Formalist method simultaneously in the Soviet 1920s and beyond.  
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in the material world of life.  The Formalists proposed that art was autonomous from 
life, and its devices were determined by the contradictory and paradoxical laws of 
aesthetic creation.  The suggestion that art is itself a material artefact of devices in 
Theory of Prose and ‘How Gogol΄’s Overcoat was Made’ are the temporary 
synthesis in this Hegelian dialectic of objectivity, for the ‘life’ or ‘reality’ of art is its 
status as a material thing.  The paradoxical relationships of non-recognition and 
stepped structures that pervade literary art are therefore rendered objective, 
immediate and even ‘real’.  The ‘later’ Formalist concepts of genre and the three-fold 
functionality active within and without of the literary series further augment what 
amount to literature’s dialectical conditions of possibility, where ‘yes’ and ‘no’ can 
exist on the same page, and a genre is not recognized in reified terms precisely in 
order to grasp that element of what it is not that makes it what it is. Accordingly, this 
critique of non-recognition is entirely immanent to the turbulent world of life in all its 
inter-determinate complexity, and the Formalists’ struggle to take responsibility for 
the arts in the new Soviet state is precisely the praxis of that critique in the early 
Soviet cultural field of life.   
II 
Zoo is a highly significant intervention in Formalist critical praxis.  Its significance 
can be felt most acutely around the topos of authorial intention, and the novel’s 
paradoxical thematization of intentionality is apparent from its beginning.  Zoo 
commences with a preface that could, if read in anthologized isolation, be conceived 
as a concise summation of Formalism’s immanent poetics.  The preface outlines 
how a Formalist conceptualization of literary material aided and inspired the writing 
of the novel, describing how, in a manner comparable to Eikhenbaum’s account of 
Gogol΄’s creative frustrations, authorial intention was thwarted by its contingencies 
upon literary material. Shklovsky states his original intention was to compose a 
series of essays on Russian Berlin.  The essays needed to be connected into a 
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coherent whole, which in turn generated the problem of theme.  The image of the 
zoo, whereby all the exotic phenomena of Russian artists are held in captivity and 
alienated from their natural habitat, failed to connect the pieces together sufficiently: 
hence the idea of writing an epistolary novel.  The phenomena populating Russian 
Berlin can, following one of Shklovsky’s own definitions of the term, be said to 
constitute the novel’s material, in that certain events in life inspire the autonomous 
construction of a literary work.  Consistent with Tynianov’s argument in the ‘Literary 
Fact’, it is only the composition of the novel which grants them the status of material 
immanent to the novel itself.  This material, Shklovsky explains, requires motivation.  
In the case of the epistolary novel, the motivation is provided by the question as to 
why two characters should write to one another:  one Russian ex-patriot in Berlin 
has no motivation to write to another Russian ex-patriot describing the life of 
Russian Berlin.  In order to motivate the descriptions, Shklovsky deems it correct 
that the character receiving them be from a culture alien to that of the character 
describing Russian Berlin.  Shklovsky’s knowledge of the epistolary genre then 
leads him to state that characters write to one another in epistolary novels because 
they are in love, only their love is impeded because they are parted from each other.  
Consistent with his writing on narrative and the erotic, Shklovsky enlarges this 
obstacle to desire by making the male character’s love unrequited.  As the novel’s 
Berlin material had nothing to do with love, Shklovsky decides to introduce a 
negation: the prohibition on speaking of love, at which point the subtitle ‘Or Letters 
Not About Love’ emerges.  In a remark that neatly encapsulates the tensions 
between the Formalist ethics of literary praxis and its critique of the impersonal 
literary object, Shklovsky declares that it was at this point that the book began to 
write itself [Tut knizhka nachala pisat΄ sebia sama].  This synthesis of objective 
critique and compositional fluency is made possible through an act of submission: 
Shklovsky submits himself to fate and the material [Pokornyi vole sud’by i 
materiala…], and, to incorporate Tynianov’s concept discussed earlier, the 
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impersonal and objective constructive function of the love-lyrical theme is 
dialectically engaged with all Shklovsky’s material.  All the descriptions of life in 
Russian Berlin and the arguments in favour of Formalist literary science emerge as 
moments of non-recognition or, in other words, metaphors for love (Shklovsky 2002: 
271; 2001: 3-4). 
For those familiar with Shklovsky’s literary theory, Zoo’s preface appears remarkably 
direct.  It could even be said that it is exemplary of what an author’s prefatory 
remarks are expected to perform.   Compositional decisions are justified and 
accounted for, the natural ease of writing the novel recounted for the reader.  There 
is, in this paradigmatic statement of ‘work-centred’ Formalist poetics, none of the 
irony, contradiction and parody which typify Shklovsky’s writing.  Despite 
Shklovsky’s protestations to the contrary, the preface reads like a justification of 
Formalist poetics, accounting for the novel’s form after the fact of writing and 
demonstrates how an author’s task was aided by the literary theory that, in his brief 
review of the novel, Tynianov demands be incorporated into the literary series.  This 
in turn necessitates a return to the problem of advocating a poetics of non-
recognition and not knowing how to write that are present in Tynianov’s and 
Eikhenbaum’s essays.  Is not Shklovsky’s submission to the impersonal forces of 
material and constructive function an intentional act?  Indeed, Shklovsky appears to 
let his guard down in the preface as, in his brief remarks on the novel’s plot, he 
concedes that he might have embedded a plot in the novel, and provided 
descriptions of the hero’s fate. He claims to dislike conventionalized narratives, 
likening his attitude towards plot as that of a dentist towards teeth, and therefore 
intentionally did not include a plot in the novel (Shklovsky 2002: 271; 2001: 4).   
As noted earlier, Tynianov’s dialectical treatment of authorial orientation argues that 
it exemplifies two phenomena.  First, the author’s intention is merely a catalyst that 
sets the constructive function in motion and, second, ‘intention’ is typical of a text’s 
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verbal function and manifests the phenomenon of the literary personality and its 
dialectical relationship with byt. Or, in other words, authorial intention is an 
intersecting ‘knot’ which ties together the human author, the generic constructive 
function of disparate materials, and the impersonal cultural construction of the 
literary personality and its verbal function.  In ‘The Literary Fact’ and ‘On Literary 
Evolution’, Tynianov is at best ambiguous as to how authorial intention relates to 
verbal function. He implies that it is the dynamic constructive function set in motion 
by intention that performs the dominant role in literary art; and it is the misguided 
‘metaphysical’ understanding of literary art which results in the verbal function and 
‘intention’ becoming interchangeable terms, as it ceases to have anything to do with 
an author’s engaging with literary creation and has everything to do with ideological 
demands made of the work of art in the cultural world of byt.  By taking the complex 
and paradoxical relationships active within the work of literary art as his starting 
point, Tynianov effectively argues that human intention and verbal function can be 
reappraised, and thereby conceptualized as being pervaded by the same dialectical 
confrontations active in the literary work.  As a result, the programme for post-
Revolutionary cultural construction becomes a generic site of collision active in the 
Formalist praxis of critique.  Accordingly, authorial intention is indeed a vital part of 
this process, but it is an entirely brainless intention that must be allowed free reign to 
interrogate the paradoxical and defamiliarize the conventional.  As Tynianov 
concludes his positive review of Zoo, fulfilled orders [zakazy] have no business in 
literature.  Tynianov wryly notes that the official order to discover a route to India 
resulted in the discovery of America (Tynianov 1977: 166).  Soviet culture must be 
granted the same free reign to make such productive, unintentional mistakes and, 
pace Zenkin, theory must be engaged in the world of literary byt. 
In line with Tynianov’s position, Shklovsky’s preface to Zoo can be productively 
conceptualized as such an intentional Formalist mistake.  Shklovsky’s submission to 
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the constructive function and the deliberate absence of plot can be figured as 
varieties of intentional pronouncements, but it is important to recall how, in his 
critique of Tristram Shandy, Shklovsky explicitly addresses how the preface is itself 
a device of literary fiction (Shklovsky 1929: 177-204; 1991: 147-170).  It is possible 
to expand on Shklovsky’s discussion of Sterne’s novel and refer to Robinson 
Crusoe, Gulliver’s Travels, Clarissa (perhaps the ultimate epistolary novel), 
Frankenstein, The Narrative of Arthur Gordon Pym of Nantucket, Vanity Fair, and a 
Hero of Our Time [Geroi nashego vremeni] as examples of how the preface 
functions as a device.  By extension, even intentional prefatory pronouncements to 
novels such as The Pilgrim’s Progress or Tom Jones are, despite their ostensible 
lack of irony, no less devices that equally pertain to the text and its verbal function, 
asserting the author’s will as unifying force that holds the text together and grant the 
subsequent status a degree of veracity.  Neither the ironic preface of Robinson 
Crusoe nor Fielding’s intentional pronouncement in Tom Jones are any more 
conventional than each other, only the ironic preface of the former serves to lay bare 
the device of the preface.   
Shklovsky’s preface to Zoo is particularly curious, in that it appears to be exemplary 
of both varieties of preface simultaneously, at once asserting the veracity of 
authorial commitment and the ‘true’ status of art as material devices.   Over the 
course of the novel, it becomes apparent that the author’s plan is rapidly unwinding, 
and the submission to the will of the material has all manner of implications 
regarding Shklovsky’s ‘real’ correspondence with Elsa Triolet and the novel’s ‘real’ 
status as material devices.  Accordingly, the preface can be said to exemplify 
Formalism’s paradoxical and dialectical conceptualization of material.  The so-called 
intentional preface affirms a veracity where a living author intentionally creates a 
work of art according to her particular agenda.  Her intention serves to unite the 
work and provide a basis upon which to account for meaning.  The second, laid-bare 
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preface also establishes the veracity of art, but its veracity resides in its being a real 
material device that is governed by impersonal objective laws.  In both cases, the 
boundary between art and life is crucial.  In the former, the preface is a non-fictional 
pronouncement from the field of life where the author reflects on her literary creation 
and justifies compositional decisions.  In the latter, the work of art is a material 
presence in life, but its composition maintains no deterministic relationship with the 
extra-literary series.   The sublation active in this dialectic  is provided in 
conceptualizing authorial intention and its concomitant life / art boundary as 
themselves potential devices set in motion by a dialectical constructive force.  If a 
cultural act is to take place at the boundaries of genres, then it has to incorporate 
elements of that which it is not, and authorial intention therefore requires of 
necessity a finite element of brainlessness in all literary creation.  But, it is crucial to 
note, without either component of this opposition, the dialectic ceases to function.   
Veracity, the ‘truth’ of a work of art, must require the dialectical presence of the 
falsehood that it is not.  Accordingly, Formal method itself requires its own negation 
if it is to function in the post-Revolutionary cultural field and, with a programme of 
non-recognitions and non-commands, facilitate its construction.  
Zoo exploits the ambiguity of this dialectic of literary material, and develops the 
Formalist poetics of impersonal authorial creation beyond Tynianov’s 
acknowledgement of the ‘catalyst’ that sets the more significant constructive function 
in motion.  The Formal method invoked in the preface to Zoo is exemplary of how 
method is itself device, or, to return to the definition used in the second chapter of 
this analysis, a trajectory towards its negation.  As noted in the first chapter, at times 
both Kant and Hegel seem to contradict a structure of oppositions with a unitary 
schema of ‘reciprocally expeditious’ correspondences:  Kant’s paradoxical 
conditions of possibility were contradicted by such correspondences between art 
and the human subject; Hegel’s dialectical concept of the absolute idea with his 
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crudely schematic division between form and content at the beginning of his lectures 
on aesthetics.  In Zoo, the contradictions of the Formalist method are altogether 
more sophisticated than a retreat to mere unitary closure.  At the simplest of levels, 
Formalism’s need for negation is served by the now customary dismissal of any of 
the ‘metaphysical’ understandings of art, whereby art affords access to a truth 
beyond its material limits.  In the twenty-second letter, Shklovsky asserts that there 
are two ways of looking at art.  The first, broadly analogous to the Potebnian 
schema of thinking in images, is that art is a window onto truth.  Artists express what 
lies beyond words and communicate what lies beyond the window.  Artists of this 
kind, whatever the content of their ‘symbolist’ or ‘realist’ beyond, are, according to 
Shklovsky, ‘translators’ [perevodchiki].   The more authentic artist strives to create 
new things out of the knowledge of how words, image and devices are inter-
connected and in conflict with one another.  Irony and divergence are the stuff of 
real material art, so Shklovsky argues.  The window onto truth is, in reality, nothing 
but a sketched window, a device for the creation of art according to a particular 
methodology (Shklovsky 2002: 315-317; 2001: 80-1). 
In Shklovsky’s critique of method in Zoo, it is apparent that Bely’s anthroposophic 
paradigm is in fact just another textual object of devices strung in sequential 
arrangement towards their negation.  By way of an example, Shklovsky again turns 
to the anthroposophic paradigm under which Andrei Bely wrote Kotik Letaev, The 
Baptized Chinaman, and the other examples of the infamous epopee project.  In 
The Theory of Prose and Hamburg Account, Shklovsky the brainless knight gleefully 
rides a coach and horses through these works, mocking Bely’s claim to be able to 
remember his early childhood and the mythical state prior to his birth.  In Zoo, 
Shklovsky is more measured in his criticism.  He expresses an interest in the two 
opposing compositional layers in Kotik Letaev, where, within the world of the novel, 
reality exists on two planes: that of the real, and that of transcendent anthroposophic 
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truth beyond.  Of this second layer, Shklovsky insists that: ‘There is no reality of soul 
in the one or in the others: there is only method, a means of deploying things in 
rows’ [real΄nosti dushi net, ni v toi, ni v drugikh, est metod, sposob raspologat΄ 
veshchi riadami].   This method of placing things in rows and the resulting 
contradictions, oppositions and irony – the very knowledge of how Don Quixote is 
made – are entirely impersonal in their material functionality.  In remarks that are 
strongly reminiscent of Tynianov’s treatment of intention and constructive function, 
Shklovsky says of method that it is the product of human activity, but it has now 
taken on a life of its own (Shklovsky 2002: 292; 2001: 36).  
Zoo proffers another opposition to the Formalists’ method beyond their frequent 
dismissal of ‘metaphysical’ aesthetics; an opposition that was hinted at in 
Eikhenbaum’s implied convergences between the grotesque and the fledgling 
science of literary theory.  Tynianov’s observation that Zoo is perched at the 
periphery between the genres of sentimental novel and literary theory does not 
contain any specific examples from the novel.  Given the Formalists’ frequent 
bullishness in asserting the validity of their method over other varieties of literary 
study, it is perhaps surprising that the discussion of method in Zoo provides just 
such a collision between theory and the sentimental.  According to the narrator, 
method may be manmade and total, but it has only resulted in ever-increasing 
problems and doubt. The old certainties of previous eras have collapsed in the face 
of its relentless impersonal power: ‘Once there was a top and a bottom, there was 
time, there was matter.  Now nothing is certain.  Method reigns supreme’.  The 
previous certainties of time and matter have been replaced by impersonal things, 
which are complex and ambiguous, constituted by method.  Science, ‘the most 
complex’ of all things, is now over-running the earth (Shklovsky 2002: 291; 2001: 
34).  By extension, knowing how the brainless knight Quixote is made is, for the 
writer, a programme of not knowing how to write and powerlessly witnessing the 
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constructive function spiral out of any intentional control.  Accordingly, the material 
contingency of the complex literary thing requires a finite author who must recognize 
the futility of writing in accordance with a unitary ideology that regards art as a 
window on to the alienated realm of truth.   
Zoo consistently implies that this acknowledgement of human finitude is not 
necessarily a source of positive empowerment, and suggests that the loss of 
previous certainties – whatever their conceptual shortcomings – has proved 
traumatic, almost as if the vitalizing sensation of defamiliarization has shifted into a 
somatics of pain.  Ivan Puni’s muscles ache from the effort of creating khaltura, Alya 
expresses her sickening estrangement from the everyday things that populate her 
apartment, and the narrator painfully acknowledges that the Formalist poetics 
elaborated in the preface demand that his creative and amorous intentions are 
doomed to mis-recognition and failure  (Shklovsky 2002: 303-5, 306, 321-23; 2001: 
57-8, 59-60, 129).  And in addition to this determinate thematization of pain, 
Formalist poetics requires the accompanying non-recognition of such pain and 
suffering as impersonal devices, where the ‘truth’ of human suffering is asserted 
through its material negation in art.  Whilst Zoo may lack any Gogolian skaz, 
mocking laughter and a fantastic resolution, the novel exhibits the same tension 
between a sentimental, moral discourse of human suffering and its negation in 
literary form that, so to say, ‘haunts’ Eikhenbaum’s essay on Gogol΄’s The Overcoat.  
In contrast to the post-Belinskian reception of the novel which had focused on the 
moral-humanist compositional layer of Gogol΄’s short story, Eikhenbaum argues that 
the structure of The Overcoat was in fact more complicated and immanently 
contradictory.  Upon identifying two contradictory layers in the text’s composition 
(pathetic-realist and ironic skaz), Eikhenbaum insists these two layers are in tension 
with one another.  Eikhenbaum terms the tension between these two compositional 
layers grotesque, and emphasizes how the performative layer of the structure has a 
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tendency to mock and parody the first, pathetic-realist layer.  Yet, as already noted, 
those pathetic realist elements must have a force equivalent to the mocking laughter 
of the performative, otherwise the grotesque would lack its affective power.     
The implications of Eikhenbaum’s essay are potentially disquieting.  That such moral 
content as the suffering little man can be mocked with derisive laughter raises 
problems for still on-going debates over art’s essential morality and concomitant 
commitment to progressive social change. Potentially more disturbing still is the 
implication that, if humanism and a moral commitment to suffering are present in art, 
they can only be so as devices in objective structures, that is, in an alienated form.  
As already noted in the third chapter, Eikhenbaum’s calibration of the grotesque 
tension between skaz and sentimental, morally engaged realism parallels his 
critique of Gogol΄’s authorship, with the author effectively serving as an illusionary 
device that unites the text and, with regard to the act of writing, a human subject 
who is alienated from the resulting work of art, his intentions thwarted and frustrated 
by the objective properties of literary art.  Zoo provides a further Formalist treatment 
of this problematic, where the objective critique of literary art is accompanied by the 
traumatic intuition that previous moral certainties have been lost.  Correspondingly, 
the Formalists’ iteration of dialectical materialism, whereby authorial intention 
emerges as both brainless and ideologically compromised, is in no way a resolution 
of the moral debates that pervade the boundary between art and life, literary 
material and creative intention.  Indeed, as Shklovsky, Eikhenbaum and Tynianov all 
imply, the relationship between art and life that pervades this dialectic is multivalent.  
Despite the somatics of pain resulting from alienation from objective literary art, that 
very alienation facilitates a critique of certain aspects of life beyond method.  
Accordingly, the narrator of Zoo is able to cast himself as the suffering little man-
theoretician, whose impersonal conceptualization of art provides both the knowledge 
of how Don Quixote is made and oppresses himself with a concrete affirmation of 
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his finite limitations.  This ethical dialectic is in no way opposed to moral 
commitment and social change.  On the basis of Tynianov’s work, embracing 
literature’s paradoxical conditions of possibility is perhaps the key to facilitating a 
vibrant social culture, where there is a relentless ethical drive towards collision and 
conflict in literary art. However, in both the narrator’s suffering at the loss of previous 
certainties and Tynianov’s ethical demand for an authentically revolutionary culture 
there is a further negation of Formalist method where the boundary between life and 
art looms large: the oppressive demands of the Soviet state.   
III 
The narrator’s intention to go beyond the novel’s conventional frame and realize 
something new resides at the very heart of Zoo’s thematization of the contentious 
boundary between life and art.  The narrator informs Alya that their personal 
correspondence is to comprise a novel titled Zoo…Or Letters Not About Love.     
This remark is, in the context of the current discussion, richly ambiguous, and 
exemplifies the tension between the autonomous Formalist text of concrete devices 
and that text’s more complicated engagement with life.  It is exemplary of the 
Formalist credo of evolving the literary series through deforming and defamiliarizing 
devices which have become automated, and engaging disparate genres in complex 
interaction.    Yet, as Tynianov notes in ‘Literary Fact’, innovation in literary art is 
driven through the literary’s encounter with the extra-literary series, and therefore 
going beyond the framework of the novel entails going beyond conventional  generic 
frameworks, and dialectically engaging life with literary art.   
As already noted, Shklovsky offers his most ambiguous conceptualization of 
material in literary art in his essay on Rozanov and plot-less literature.  Like 
Tynianov in ‘Literary Fact’, Shklovsky states that art’s materials are potentially 
endless.  Whether they are aesthetic or non-aesthetic has no innate significance.  It 
is the immanent constructive relationship between materials that drives literary art, 
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and which must be freed from any ideological demands.  Prior to the writing of Zoo, 
Shklovsky himself had already expressed an interest in the possibilities of non-
aesthetic materials in the fragment ‘In a Loud Voice’ [O gromkom golose] written for 
the journal Life and Art, and included in Knight’s Move.  This fragment is a highly 
negative review of ‘Towards an International Commune’ [K mirovoi kommune], a 
massive spectacle of some 4000 performers held in honour of the second 
Kommintern Congress in 1920.  As part of a parade, the vast quantity of participants 
performed an enslaved and rebellious people, and the physical backdrop of 
Petersburg was incorporated into the performance.  Regarding this parade, 
Shklovsky praises its interesting duality [interesnaia dvoistvennost΄], which arises 
through the juxtaposition of the production’s aesthetic elements with the extra-
aesthetic.  For Shklovsky, the incorporation of a performance of enslaved and 
rebellious peoples in the parade was a mistake, as their organized movement is 
equated with the essentially utilitarian aims of troop movements, their enslavement 
and rebellion accordingly rendered prosaic: ‘‘Artistically’, that is, according to the 
laws of aesthetics, the structured movement of the masses, performing the enslaved 
and rebellious people are equated with the ‘prosaic,’ that is, according to the laws of 
usefulness by the structured movements of the troops’ (Shklovsky 1990: 91-2; 2005: 
51-3, translation amended).  
For Shklovsky, this parade is an excellent example of how extra-aesthetic material 
functions in a work of art, and he praises the talent of the un-named individual who 
thought up the idea.  The irony of Shklovsky’s remarks is not difficult to discern, and 
it is highly unlikely that Shklovsky is praising an artist who has created a 
performance that endorses the Formalist insistence on strict differences between 
ideological demand and the aesthetic.  The ‘In a Loud Voice’ fragment is entirely 
consistent with Knight’s Move’s most frequently cited moment of non-recognition: 
the flag of art can never reflect the colour of that flown above the city fortress 
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(Shklovsky 1990: 79; 2005: 22).  This statement is all too frequently deployed as an 
example of art’s total autonomy from life.  However, this typical moment of non-
recognition is far more ambiguous than its conventionalized reception allows, and is 
far more likely a differentiation between the statist ideological unity conveyed by the 
image of the flag flying above the martial fortress, and the resolutely non-unitary and 
paradoxical properties of art.  Shklovsky’s famous pronouncement is suggestive not 
of one relationship between art and life, but relationships.  On one level, there is the 
usual ‘metaphysical’ demand that art should reflect or represent a state of affairs 
other to itself.  Yet, there is also the relationship of autonomy from life in the 
immanent and contradictory laws which govern literary form.  These laws come to 
determine life’s relationship with art, and, in this particular instance, it is through 
dialectical inter-determination with art that life emerges as martial and teleological, 
and art the domain of autonomy.  With regard to ‘Towards an International 
Commune’, Shklovsky’s implicit argument is that the juxtaposition between extra-
aesthetic material and the aesthetic has totally undermined the intention of the 
performance.  Instead of glorifying a triumphant parade of the rebellious masses 
celebrating the overthrow of their oppressors, the effect is one of mundane utility.  
Shklovsky sarcastically praises the talent who has unintentionally exposed this 
unfortunate juxtaposition and totally failed to glorify a grand expression of 
revolutionary power.  These utilitarian troops are all too obviously stationed in that 
same city fortress above which Shklovsky demands the flag of art must never fly.  
Shklovsky might even be understood as warning those who wish to deploy the 
aesthetic for ideological ends that the ambiguous properties of the aesthetic will only 
serve to undermine their teleological agenda.  It is not insignificant that Shklovsky, 
Tynianov and Eikhenbaum do not differentiate between Bely’s mystical 
anthroposophic ideology, the ideology of an author’s social class and that of the 
social demand.  These iterations of the ideological image are inadmissible precisely 
because they are inadequate to literature’s conditions of possibility and both, in their 
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own way, imply a reified relationship between art and life that is clearly inadequate 
to these very conditions. 
This insistence on strict limits between the aesthetic and ideologically inflected 
instrumentality does not, however, undermine Shklovsky’s desire to go beyond 
traditional frameworks in literary art.  ‘In a Loud Voice’’s critique of the incorporation 
of material into art notes that there are more interesting possibilities available than 
the mere juxtaposition (intentional or otherwise) of the aesthetic with the extra-
aesthetic.  Art can be created in this manner, but ‘it would have been much more 
daring to use juxtaposition, to find the aesthetic relation not between the aesthetic 
and the non-aesthetic object, but between two non-aesthetic objects, directly 
between things of the real world’ (Shklovsky 1990: 92; 2005: 53).  
Whilst Knight’s Move shares the dialectical relationship between art and life, it lacks 
the conflict between the impersonal method of Formalist science and the moral, 
emotionally bruised human subject who has been left behind by modernity.  In 
Knight’s Move, understanding the Formal method and how Don Quixote is made are 
ultimately empowering, and grant the narrator the right to ruthlessly criticize (and 
occasionally praise) other works of art, as well as instruct others in how to write 
correctly.  At the beginning of the ‘In a Loud Voice’ fragment, Shklovsky insists that 
speaking In a Loud Voice is only possible when groups and collectives are formed 
with a view to formulating the coherent principles of literary science.  Only then is it 
possible to speak In a Loud Voice and expose the limitations of contemporary art.  
With a typically ironic lack of modesty, Shklovsky provides an ambivalent non-
recognition of himself, who he likens to Tom Canty in Mark Twain’s The Prince and 
the Pauper.   Having declared himself king, Tom proceeds to crack nuts with the 
royal seal (Shklovsky 1990: 91; 2005: 51). The nuts which Shklovsky implies he is 
cracking are the inferior works of art created by lesser artists, with Formalist method 
the authority that grants him the ability to do so.  In dialectical terms, the Formalist 
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method overcomes its ideological negation through the sublation of ideology as 
device.  With Zoo, as already suggested, the Formal method encounters a more 
rigorous negative force, be it that of ideology or the sensation of pain and suffering 
to which modernity and method give rise.  Shklovsky has fled the fortress of life in 
the Soviet Union, and himself has become a nut that is cracked by the Formal 
method and the forces of state power beyond his control in post-Revolutionary 
Russia.  Intentionally or not, he himself has become material to the impersonal 
forces of method beyond his authorial control and the martial forces of the fortress.     
The novel is not entirely without Eikhenbaum’s nostalgia for a degree of writerly 
autonomy in the ‘Literary byt’ essay, where Eikhenbaum encourages the writer to 
disband publicistic activities and cease all involvement in artistic groups and circles.  
As has already been discussed, Eikhenbaum draws attention to the classless 
writer’s professional difficulties in Soviet literary byt, and appears nostalgic for a 
degree of Romantic autonomy that will allow the writer to get down to the business 
of writing literature.  Zoo thematizes a similar Romantic anxiety over the contingent 
status of the artist in early Soviet modernity.  Shklovsky says of the artist that his de 
facto status is that of a nomad.  This image of the nomad is ambivalent.  At one level 
it evokes the authentic artist’s sensibility towards the creation of new things, and her 
constant drive to innovate and realise the new through defamiliarizing the 
automatized artistic forms of the past and engaging with the present through a 
heightened sensory experience.  Shklovsky demands of the artist that ‘our business 
is the creation of new things’, and describes his own intention to go outside the 
ordinary frame of the novel with Zoo itself (Shklovsky 2002: 289-90; 2001: 23).  Yet 
on another level, there is the implication that this nomadic Russian diaspora in 
peripheral Berlin have not become nomads by choice, and there is a variety of ‘real’ 
human hardship and moral un-freedom that has caused them to flee beyond the 
frame of their homeland for Berlin.  Going outside the ordinary frame of the novel, as 
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already noted, is potentially to stage an encounter between life and art at the 
periphery where personal correspondence and the epistolary novel meet.  The 
literary and artistic personalities which populate the novel have had to go outside the 
conventional framework of Russia’s geo-political and cultural boundaries and are 
thrust into an encounter with another, alien national culture.  The engagement of this 
parallel structure affords the possibility of inter-determining the life world of the 
Russian diaspora with the conventions of literary genres. The engagement of these 
parallel structures affords the possibility of inter-determining the life world of the 
Russian diaspora with the conventions of literary genres.  To return once more to 
Tynianov’s concept of the verbal function, this dialectical encounter between art and 
life has an apparent orientation – albeit a necessarily impersonal one – of opposition 
towards whatever statist demands or oppression have led to artistic nomads being 
thrust into exile. 
The possibilities initiated by going outside the ordinary frame of the novel are 
apparent immediately after the ‘intentional’ preface.  This strangest of epistolary 
novels does not proceed from its preface to the first letter, and instead provides an 
early moment of collision between two genres.  Between the preface and the first 
letters lies a long poem, Velemir Khlebnikov’s Menagerie [Zverinets] from the 
Futurist collection A Trap of Judges [Sadok sudei].    The depiction of an exotic 
menagerie of rare animals evokes the zoo of Shklovsky’s own title and, by 
association, implies the phenomena depicted in Khlebnikov’s poem and those of the 
novel are what Shklovsky terms a parallel structure.  Towards the beginning of the 
poem, Germans are shown selling their beer in the menagerie, where ‘the iron is like 
a father reminding brothers to be brothers and stopping their bloody grapple… 
Where the eagles sit, like an eternity finished with this day that still lacks evening’   
[Где железо подобно отцу, напоминающему братьям, что они братья, и 
останавливающему кровопролитную схватку…Где орлы сидят, подобны 
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вечности, оконченной сегодняшним, еще лишенным вечера днем]. Towards 
the end of the poem, the lines are increasingly populated with specifically Russian 
imagery and themes, asserting a uniquely Russian inverted destiny of failed 
potential and restricted actions, culminating in simile where the animals in captivity 
are likened to The Lay of Igor’s Campaign being imprisoned in a monastery text: 
‘Where the animals lose their marvellous potentialities, like the Lay of Igor’s 
Campaign embedded in a Book of Hours’ [Где в зверях погибают какие-то 
прекрасные возможности, как вписанное в Часослов Слово Полку Игореви] 
(Khlebnikov in Shklovsky 2002: 273-75; 2001: 5-8).   
The implications of Menagerie being embedded in Zoo are wide-reaching, 
particularly with regard to the text’s treatment of genre, the Russian diaspora in 
Berlin and statist oppression.  Within the context of Zoo, Khlebnikov’s long poem 
can be read as a call to liberate a repressed, restricted and conventionalized 
Russian national identity from its limited, automatized forms and realize its collective 
humanist potential, where brothers cease grappling with each other and realize their 
own marvellous potentialities.  In other words, Menagerie already sets in motion the 
novel’s thematization of a sentimental-moral discourse that conflicts with the 
impersonal forces of method and state, the latter of which is implicated in 
Khlebnikov’s death in the novel’s fourth letter.  After Menagerie has established 
Khlebnikov as a moral device calling for national unity and cultural achievement, the 
fourth letter recounts Khlebnikov’s death from disease after living in abject poverty in 
Soviet Russia; his suffering and death are explicitly likened to the suffering and 
death of Christ.  Menagerie has already established Khlebnikov’s humanity, with its 
call to end all wars and for humans to love and embrace one another. These words 
of compassion are compounded by the sense of prophecy that the poem’s ‘stringing 
together’ within the narrative of Zoo evokes, where Khlebnikov’s poem appears to 
have anticipated the Russian diaspora’s mingling amongst Germans, drinking their 
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beer and blooming in health.  Letter four recounts examples of Khlebnikov’s 
compassion, recalling how he imagined a utopia for the journal Took where every 
individual has the right to a glass room in any city.  The epigraph on Khlebnikov’s 
gravestone, ‘President of the globe’ is recounted in parallel with the epigraph on 
Christ’s own cross: ‘Jesus Christ, King of the Jews.’ The letter continues: ‘It is 
doubtful, Velemir, that you would want to be resurrected to walk the earth again.’  
Shklovsky even asks Khlebnikov for forgiveness for fleeing Russia to enjoy the 
warmth of fires in foreign countries, whilst Khlebnikov himself perished in abject 
poverty (Shklovsky 2002: 278-82; 2001: 16-20).   
The tone of the letter is not entirely confessional, and is equally accusatory towards 
the Soviet state that the artistic diaspora of Berlin have fled: ‘Foxes have their holes, 
the prisoner is given a cot, the knife sleeps in its scabbard, but you [Khlebnikov] had 
nowhere to lay your head’.85  Shklovsky’s words are bitterly ironic on this theme in 
Zoo: ‘The state is not responsible for the death of human beings.  During the time of 
Christ, it did not understand the Aramaic language and it invariably fails to 
understand the language of humanity. The Roman soldiers who pierced the hands 
of Christ are no more guilty than the nails.  All the same, those being crucified feel 
much pain’ (Shklovsky 2002: 279; 2001:17).  The accusation here is that the 
autonomous, profoundly Romantic figure of the artist-genius who spoke the 
authentic moral idiom of humanity, who envisaged a utopian future world where 
everyone is entitled to lodgings, and who called for all who are held captive to be set 
free, has been crushed by the material reality of the modern state which, and Zoo is 
emphatic here, does not understand the language of humanity.  
                                                          
85 Veniamin Kaverin’s Unknown Artist [Khudozhnik neizvesten] features the character Arkhimedov, for 
which Khlebnikov is accepted as serving as the prototype.  Kaverin’s Khlebnikov is entirely consistent 
with that of Shklovsky’s in Zoo, albeit without the sophisticated interrogation of the multiple 
boundaries between art and life and literary genres.  Arkhimedov is engaged in struggle with 
Shpektorov (the name itself a comment on the illusory properties of statist dialectical materialism?), a 
crass materialist with whom the artist engages in struggle over symbolic control of a woman and her 
child.  Arkhimedov is emphatically defeated, his ambitions for a radical revolutionary culture crushed 
(Kaverin 1964). 
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In Zoo’s criticisms of the Soviet state, there is clearly something genealogical in how 
it invokes the devices of Christ, the Romantic artist, an exile’s guilt and moral-
sentiment provoked by human suffering.  Menagerie itself follows a genealogical 
narrative, proceeding back through history from a confused present of cultural 
incarceration to a foundational text of Russian cultural identity (The Lay of Igor’s 
Campaign) being imprisoned in a copy-book.   After Foucault, it could be said that 
there is an apparent historical ontology between Christ, artist-genius, imprisoned 
cultural potential and an author’s guilt that serves to naturalize opposition towards 
the Soviet state and its early tendencies towards oppression.  Yet it is important to 
emphasize that Shklovsky does not exempt the Formalist method of objective 
literary science from that modernity which gave birth to an oppressive state that 
does not understand the language of humanity.  The devices of Christ, Romantic 
artist, guilty author and sentimental pathos are just devices.  Whilst it is true that, in 
Zoo’s collision of genres, the negation of these devices is effectively served by the 
incorporation of the device of the oppressive state, the reality of these devices is 
that they are threaded together in rows, impersonally strung together into a complex 
literary thing.  It is once again doubtful that the Formalists’ ethics of knowing how 
Don Quixote is made and the concomitant valorization of going beyond the 
conventional confines of literary tradition amount to understanding, let alone 
speaking, this moral language of humanity.  As Shklovsky notes dryly in Knight’s 
Move, ‘I don’t believe in miracles.  That’s why I’m not an artist’ [Ia ne veriu v chudo, 
ottogo ia i ne khudozhnik] (Shklovsky 1990: 100; 2005: 68).   
IV 
It would likely be wrong to conclude, however, that Zoo is effectively establishing a 
correspondence between Formalist literary theory and the inhuman attributes of the 
early Soviet state.  As will become apparent presently, Shklovsky’s Third Factory 
[Tret΄iaia fabrika] appears to differentiate between statist commands and literary art 
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that incorporates the Formal method.  Menagerie itself is not entirely without certain 
tenets of Formalist critique.  The loss of marvellous potentialities brought about 
through an artistic work such as The Lay of Igor’s Campaign being embedded in the 
automated forms and repetitions of a copy-book has obvious similarities with 
Shklovsky’s desire for the defamiliarization of the habitual through ostranenie and 
laying bare the device.  It could even be said that the humanity of Menagerie 
depends upon the opposition it stages between captivity and the human drive of 
cultural liberation and fraternal peace.  The Formal method, in its insistence upon an 
impersonal negation of the human, affirms and even requires the human in order to 
function.  The state, by implication, does not grant that element of the human 
immanent to itself.  It merely does not understand the language of humanity.   
To return once again to Tynianov’s critique of the novel’s collision between the 
genres of sentimental novel, feuilletons and literary theory, there is one aspect of the 
sentimental that has not yet been addressed which demonstrates Formalism’s 
immanent negation by the human: the prohibition of naming love.   In the account of 
Khlebnikov’s life, the narrator includes a sad sketch of Khlebnikov’s unrequited love 
for a woman, hinting that it was this love that compounded the poet’s suffering and 
eventual death.  The emotional pain and Christ-like suffering endured by Khlebnikov 
are therefore ‘real’ material suffering and, in the context of the narrator’s attempts to 
woo Alya, the banal, melodramatic gestures of a clumsy suitor, ineptly pleading for 
his love to be requited and using his letters as a vehicle for self-aggrandizement.   
The narrator’s self-aggrandizing motivation, both in terms of his desirability as a 
lover and for promoting his own version of literary theory, is clearly discerned by 
Alya.  In letter twenty-eight, she notes that for all his boasting about knowing how 
Don Quixote is made, the narrator does not know how to write a love letter.  All 
Shklovsky’s self-aggrandizing displacements and non-recognitions are not the 
letters of someone who is truly in love.  Alya tersely observes that ‘One doesn’t write 
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letters for one’s own satisfaction, since no real lover thinks of himself when he’s in 
love’ (Shklovsky 2002: 327-8; 2001: 102).  Whereas Shklovsky accuses the state of 
not knowing the language of humanity, and neglecting the suffering Khlebnikov, Alya 
retorts that the Formalist has neglected the human at the expense of method and 
fulfilling his own desires.  The dialectical tension between Khlebnikov’s moral-
humanist programme for art and Formalism’s impersonal ethics is replicated in the 
contrast between Alya’s straightforward expression of personal suffering and 
alienation and Shklovsky’s letters, with their complex allusions and contradictory 
Formalist poetics.  In the moving nineteenth letter, Alya recounts her childhood 
experiences and fondly recollects her wet-nurse Stesha.  A rock of integrity, Stesha 
would visit Alya even in adulthood, delighting Alya with her informal conversation, 
her emotional warmth and her cheerful disposition.  Perhaps in retort to the 
narrator’s moving depiction of Khlebnikov, she recalls Stesha’s piety and moral 
probity.  Implicated in the robbery of a household where she was serving as a maid, 
Stesha refused to confirm to the police that she had an alibi (at the time she was 
visiting a nun at the Novodevichii monastyr΄ and feared she would implicate her in 
the plot), and remained in prison until the police captured the real thieves.  After the 
Revolution, she refused to vote in elections as that would require returning to a 
police station.  Alya claims her love for Stesha is so great that she cannot sleep, and 
serves as a device of ‘genuine’ or ‘authentic’ pathos that counters the narrator’s 
tendency to self-aggrandize and indulge in rhetorical games  (Shklovsky 2002: 312-
4; 2001: 71-74).  
Beyond the manifest similarities between Khlebnikov’s resentment at the loss of 
marvellous potentialities and defamiliarization active in going beyond conventional 
frames, the narrator is potentially (and pathetically) attempting to establish himself 
as the alienated and oppressed Romantic artist, who suffers a terrible and lonely 
death because the object of his affection does not return his love.  The ‘humanism’ 
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of the Formal method lies in the complex thematization of Khlebnikov’s literary 
personality, whereby the device of Khlebnikov serves simultaneously as an 
affirmation of the pain endured under an inhuman state and impersonal modernity 
hostile to moral ideals; and an affirmation of risible khaltura, where a banal suitor 
attempts to win the affections of his beloved with clichés and literary theory, using 
the suffering of a Romantic poet as a device to elicit pity and admiration.  This 
astonishing juxtaposition – saturated with Formalism’s dialectical treatment of 
literary material – may be evocative of a traumatic modernity deprived of previous 
certainties, but is not this contradiction exemplary of literary art’s marvellous 
potentialities, whereby ‘yes’ and ‘no’ are affirmed on the same page, and the 
expression of the human triumphant through its negation?  On this basis, it is not 
difficult to ascertain why Tynianov should discern so much in the novel that was both 
adequate to and exemplary of the then on-going ‘quiet war’ in post-Revolutionary 
literary culture, and, by extension, a novel far more adequate to the post-
Revolutionary epoch than the flawed and unsuccessful Russian adventure novel 
which was undergoing forced introduction into a material reality with which it was 
largely incompatible. 
Tynianov ends his critique of then contemporary literature in a manner reminiscent 
of the questions with which the ‘Literary Fact’ essay begins: ‘And what on earth is 
next? Where is literature headed? [A shto zhe dal΄she? Kuda poidet literatura?].  
Tynianov’s now familiar rhetorical strategy is to argue that the ‘what on earth’ and 
‘literature’ are far more complex phenomena than the conventional, popular 
understanding of these terms can apprehend (Tynianov 1977: 166).  As already 
noted, Tynianov insists that it is incorrect to make demands of literature, as such 
demands will (and indeed must) only ever result in further paradoxes and mistakes. 
Nevertheless, given that these questions were uttered in 1924, the impersonal 
‘stringing together’ in the course of history has burdened them with a complex 
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resonance that, in a way, replicates the three genres which collide in Zoo.  That 
Tynianov’s demands were not acknowledged is undeniably grounds for emotional 
pathos, and the marvellous potentialities of a literary culture of brainless mistakes 
and non-recognition were to be repressed in Stalinist Soviet culture and beyond.  
There is also a polemical element of confrontation and a lingering theoretical 
problematic that, retrospectively, reads as a challenge not only to demands for a 
statist literature and a monologic method, but also to how the English language 
reception of those statist demands has accordingly perpetuated its own monologic 
readings of both statist art and its corresponding dissident culture.  However, before 
the advent of Stalinism, Shklovsky authored a work that would push generic 
collisions, resistance to statist demands and the encounter between art and life to 
yet further extremes, effectively pushing beyond complex epochal resonances into 
fraught dialectical dissonance.    
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7: Dialectical Materialism 
‘Writing books is hard… It’s hard to know how to write—or what…’ (Shklovsky 2002: 
268; 2001: 31) 
I 
As noted in chapter six, it is difficult to summarize Shklovsky’s Zoo succinctly.  
Looking back from afar at Third Factory from the Stalinist 1930s, Shklovsky himself 
pronounced the third volume of his autobiographical prose completely 
incomprehensible (Shklovsky 1990: 32).  Third Factory is, to some extent, no less 
autobiographical than the memoirs Shklovsky would write some thirty to forty years 
after the novel’s composition, recounting, or at least purporting to recount, significant 
stages in Shklovsky’s life that informed his then current conceptualizations of life, 
art, history and their complex inter-determination.  The novel is divided into the three 
stages (or ‘factories’) of Shklovsky’s life up to the age of 33, each of which appears 
to have been beset by material hardship and failure.  The first two stages of 
Shklovsky’s life form an odd and profoundly pessimistic anti-Bildungsroman, as if 
they are two sides of the most negative of dialectics.  The first chronicles an early 
childhood in a family beset by ill health and a descent into material hardship, poor 
academic performance and cheating at school; the second, his fledgling interest in 
the scientific study of literature and the foundation of OPOIAZ in Petersburg.  The 
third ‘synthesis’ stage of this autobiography deals with his then present situation in 
Soviet Russia, working for the Third Kino Factory in Moscow and piecing together 
the fragments of film into coherent narratives.86  For various reasons the films 
produced in the Third Kino Factory often fail, in the sense that the individual 
fragments of close-ups, long shots and scenes cannot be assembled into a coherent 
                                                          
86 For the English collection of some of Shklovsky’s writing on film, see his Literature and 
Cinematography (Shklovsky 2008), a translation of Literatura i kinematograf (Shklovsky 1923).  I 
agree with Alastair Renfrew that Shklovsky’s writing on film is not consistent with his literary theory, 
and do not pursue the relationship between these two currents in his thought here.  See (Renfrew: 
2007: 157-8).   For further discussion of Shklovsky’s role in Soviet cinema with particular reference to 
how he theorizes genre, see (Levchenko 2013b: 407-31); and, for a discussion of Tynianov’s role, see 
(Levchenko 2013c: 270-77).  
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narrative sequence.  Such failures are placed on the shelf and are not released to 
the public.  Like Zoo, this ‘novel’ mixes sentimental pathos, ‘real-life’ 
correspondence between individuals and literary theory; but the pathos has shifted 
away from the tropes of exile and unrequited love towards the sense of failure felt by 
an individual who is isolated from the dominant currents of epochal life, and whose 
theoretical programme has been proved an irrelevant failure.  It is as if the Goskino 
‘third’ factory is a totally inadequate synthesis for its preceding two terms of 
childhood and OPOIAZ, and, like the films Shklovsky describes, this oddest of 
autobiographies is itself a failed moment of assemblage that should not see the light 
of day. 
In comparison to Third Factory, Shklovsky’s later memoirs are the sober, mature 
reflection upon a radical youth full of experimentation, struggle and literary theory.  
Located in opposition to the more conventional prose of Zhili byli, Third Factory is 
certainly challenging.  If Shklovsky’s memoirs can be said to frame his earlier life 
within the comfortable confines of a cinematic establishing shot and measured 
chronological progression, Third Factory is a chaotic montage of close-ups shot on 
inconsistent film stocks, disjointed elements which resist any attempt to string them 
into a coherent, unitary structure.  Simultaneously a chronological narrative from 
early life to the then present, and a fractured, discontinuous structure of conflicting 
words, sentences and episodic fragments of personal correspondence, 
autobiography, literary theory and fictional allegories of Russian Revolution, Third 
Factory is another novel of contradictory structural planes.  Indeed, the novel can be 
said to maintain Zoo’s poetics of contradiction and negation and develop them to 
extremes.     Third Factory begins with a small fragment entitled ‘I continue’ 
[prodolzhaiu] and ends with the author abandoning himself to impersonal material 
forces of the epoch, refusing to make any gestures towards recognition or 
reconciliation.   
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Third Factory has been variously labelled as a betrayal of Russian Formalism and a 
passionate defence of the movement.  In both instances, the ‘betrayal’ of Formalism 
and its defence depend upon a misguided understanding of how the Formalists 
conceptualize the relationship between ‘form’ and ‘content’.  For Viktor Erlich, Zoo 
and Third Factory mark Shklovsky’s abandonment of the Formalist insistence that 
art is pure formal convention, and that it does not manifest any relationship to the 
‘content’ of the life world, only immanent formal relationships (Erlich 1955: 135-6).87  
For Richard Sheldon, Third Factory manifests a passionate defence Formalism 
precisely because it insists upon the importance of form in artistic creation at the 
expense of content.  Accordingly, Sheldon insists that the contradictions which 
pervade Shklovsky’s work are examples of such ‘formalism’ at work.  When 
Shklovsky asserts that ‘existence determines consciousness’, that life determines 
art, and that to be human is to be material for impersonal productive forces, he is 
merely providing a series of artistic devices with which to contradict his insistence 
upon aesthetic immanence, and thereby assert the validity of his overbearing 
emphasis on pure ‘form’ in literary art.  What is more, Sheldon insists that such 
‘formalism’ is typical of Shklovsky’s resistance to any ‘civic’ demands made of art, 
and his accompanying insistence that art must remain free from ideology (Sheldon 
in Shklovsky 2002: ix-xxxvii).  At this stage of this analysis, it is hopefully apparent 
that this dualistic understanding of the relationship between ‘form’ and ‘content’ is 
entirely inadequate to the thought of Eikhenbaum, Tynianov and Shklovsky.  ‘Life’ 
and ‘art’ cannot in any way be opposed to one another in accordance with such a 
dualistic paradigm.  These Formalists’ treatments of a truly radical and dialectical 
                                                          
87 Erlich says of Third Factory that: ‘On the methodological plane Third Factory was clearly an attempt 
to reach beyond ‘pure’ Formalism towards a position more inclusive and more congruent with the 
‘social demands’ of the time’.  Erlich is particularly scathing in his appraisal of the novel, noting its 
‘slipshod phrasing’ and suggests that it conveys a degree of cynicism on Shklovsky’s part: ‘[Third 
Factory] was designed to perform a double function.  On the one hand, it provided an excuse for 
recourse to certain ‘non-literary’ criteria in critical analysis.  On the other, like most of Shklovsky’s 
critical generalizations, the new formula was to serve as a rationale for the trends in current literary 
practice with which Shklovsky chose to associate himself’ (Erlich 1965: 120). 
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materialism in literary art are entirely dependent upon the inter-relationship and 
inter-determinacy of the two terms in a given generic-epochal context.  Formalism is 
a poetics of non-recognition, and does not know dualistic binaries.   Art is at once 
material and immaterial, ‘yes’ and ‘no’, epochal and universal, khaltura, sentimental 
pathos and literary theory.   
However, for all its incongruous juxtapositions, there is no denying that out of all the 
texts critiqued here, it is Third Factory that risks the Kantian retreat from a 
paradoxical system of contradictions to a unity of ‘mutually expeditious’ 
correspondences.  The text’s tendency towards closure is to be found in that 
element which prompts Erlich to cry betrayal, and Sheldon to rally to Shklovsky’s 
defence: the thematization of the relationship of art and life.  In an unusually direct 
statement, Shklovsky declares that if Tolstoy had not fought as a gunner in the 
Russian army, he would never have written War and Peace [Voina i mir] (Shklovsky 
2002: 369; 2002: 51).  With this and many other remarks, Shklovsky proceeds to 
‘contradict’ the central tenet of OPOIAZ Formalism: that art is independent of life 
and there are in no way causal relationships between art and life, particularly with 
regard to art’s ‘content’.  Shklovsky then proceeds to argue that an epoch must live 
up to the demands of art, or, in other words, that an epoch must meet art’s demand 
for material:  ‘What art needs now is material’ [Segodnia iskusstvo nuzhdaetsia v 
material].   Hence, on the most simplistic of levels, the everyday byt of Shklovsky’s 
work at Goskino is entirely inadequate to his demand that life must furnish him with 
a destiny and grief as heavy as red corals (Shklovsky 2002: 349; 2001: 25).  
Instead, in an oft-noted remark, Shklovsky complains that the greatest excitement 
life furnishes him with at present is his cup of morning tea (Shklovsky 2002: 377; 
2001: 63).    Shklovsky insists that the artist must now surrender herself to her age, 
and recognize her own status as material for processing in the production of art and 
epoch.   Taken in isolation, is not this act of surrender Shklovsky’s tacit acceptance 
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that the artist is now, like Bely, merely a translator, providing a window onto the truth 
of epochal reality?  Be it under the aegis of symbolism or anthroposophy, Bely’s 
literary art requires harmonious correspondences between a symbolic order of 
aesthetic norms and life itself.   And in obliterating the boundary between art and life 
through the demand that life provide material adequate to the aesthetic, is not 
Shklovsky demanding the avant-garde act of life-creation, where life and artistic 
lives are constructed in accordance with aesthetic norms, thereby overcoming the 
mundane reality of byt? 
Were this actually the case, Shklovsky would certainly have been a poor reader of 
Tynianov’s ‘Literary Fact’, which Shklovsky (to whom the essay is dedicated) singles 
out for high praise in the novel.  Shklovsky approves of Tynianov’s observation that 
literature is dynamic, and is forever expanding outwards into the extra-literary series:  
literature thrives on borders and edges, and the understanding of just what literature 
is constantly changes.  As has been repeatedly stated, Tynianov’s central example 
of literature’s expansion into the extra-literary set is the letter.  In the first half of the 
eighteenth century, so Tynianov argues, the letter pertained to personal 
correspondence.  At that time, the great-form of the poetic ode reigned, only to be 
displaced by lesser genres closely linked with life, at each turn a new constructive 
principle dialectically intuited, eventually culminating in the letter becoming a literary 
fact.  Tynianov says of the letter that: 
Letters turned out to be the handiest, the easiest, the most needed phenomena, and 
here the new principles of construction were displayed with unusual emphasis: 
leaving things unsaid, being fragmentary, hinting, the ‘domestic’ small form of the 
letter motivated the introduction of trifles and stylistic devices quite the opposite of 
the ‘grandiose’ devices of the eighteenth century.  This much-needed material lay 
outside literature in everyday life.  And the letter was lifted out of everyday life where 
it had functioned as a document into the very centre of literature (Tynianov 1977: 
265; 2000: 41). 
In light of this brief critique of the epistolary form, an immediate response to Third 
Factory’s appraisal of the essay could be to assert Tynianov’s influence upon 
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Shklovsky, who has clearly accepted the essay’s dialectical evolution of the 
Formalist school and its method.  Art was held to be autonomous from life, only for 
Tynianov to argue that this is not the case.  Shklovsky absorbs the remarks about 
the letter’s close proximity with life, and peppers his critique of Tynianov with hints 
and trivial domestic matters.  The likely unviability of Formalist critique in the 
aftermath of the Party Resolution on policy in the Field of Imaginative Literature of 
June 192588 is hinted at when Shklovsky remarks that ‘The situation is very serious’ 
and underlines the importance of maintaining a clear theoretical approach, despite 
the external pressure [Polozhenie ochen΄ ser΄eznoe, nuzhno dumat΄ — khot’ na 
khodu, a vse ravno dumat΄] (Shklovsky 2002: 375; 2001: 61).  Seemingly banal and 
trivial details such as putting on weight, Boris Eikhenbaum’s violin playing and 
melting ice cream are also included.  Shklovsky’s critique of Tynianov is even made 
in a letter to Tynianov, and constitutes one of the many fragments that fail to 
coalesce into a coherent whole.  Accordingly, Formalism has decisively evolved and 
the movement’s ‘earlier’ claims to aesthetic autonomy that refuted the ‘metaphysical’ 
understanding of ‘representation’ or ‘content’ in literary art have comprehensively 
failed.   
Yet this immediate response is problematized in other parts of the letter.  Shklovsky 
insists that art is still very much its own master, complete with its own immanent 
laws.  Like Eikhenbaum’s earlier essay on The Overcoat and Tynianov’s later ‘On 
Literary Evolution’, there is another Formalist attack on any unmediated 
understanding of authorial intention.  Shklovsky is insistent that the proponent of 
literary science has no business reading an author’s diaries, for this can only ever 
lead to the laboratory of the creative genius.  Instead, Shklovsky demands that the 
                                                          
88 Richard Sheldon argues that ‘This resolution grew out of the attempts of the proletarian writers, 
through their organization Oktiabr΄, to be recognized by the Party as the sole legitimate voice of 
Soviet literature.  The party rejected their appeal not as incorrect but merely as premature, indicating 
in the resolution that ‘leadership in the field of literature belongs to the the [sic] working class as a 
whole, with all its material and ideological resources’ (Sheldon in Shklovsky 2001: xiv). 
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literary scientist focus on the work of art as material thing: ‘Moreover, diaries lead us 
into the psychology of the creative process and the question of the laboratory of the 
genius, when what we need is the thing.  The relation between the thing and its 
creator is non-functional’ (Shklovsky 2002: 375-6; 2001: 60-1). 
Sheldon might argue that the seemingly irreconcilable nature of this contradiction 
between two varieties of materialism (life-content as material opposed to 
autonomous art as material thing) is only possible in aesthetic ‘form’, and therefore 
this letter to Tynianov amounts to a passionate defence of Formalism and its 
preference for ‘form’ over ‘content’.  Yet this is clearly not the case.  Shklovsky is 
advancing his own deeply ironic twist on the dialectical materialism manifest in his 
theory as well as that of Tynianov and Eikhenbaum, and implicitly engages with the 
problem of how to unintentionally construct a culture adequate to the post-
Revolutionary context.  The central move towards this end in Third Factory is the 
dialectical sublation of contradictory positions.  In the case of this letter to Tynianov, 
the irreconcilability of these two materialisms rests upon the problem of evolution in 
the so called Formal method, where ‘early’ immanentism has been replaced with a 
historical approach mindful of literature’s expansion in life.  The English translation 
of Shklovsky’s appraisal of Tynianov’s essay (‘The study is very important—it may 
be a turning point’) risks exaggerating the suggestion that a dramatic evolution has 
occurred in Formalist science.  A more accurate translation of Shklovsky’s words 
might be ‘The essay is very important—it may be of decisive significance’ [Stat΄ia 
ochen΄ vazhnaia, mozhet byt΄, reshaiushchaia po znacheniiu].  This remark is 
followed up with: ‘I’m no good at paraphrasing other people’s thoughts.  You’ll write 
me yourself about the implications of your study, while I write you about my art of 
not making ends meet’ [a ia napishu tebe o svoem iskusstvo ne svodit΄ kontsy s 
kontsami] (Shklovsky 2002: 374-5; 2001: 60).   
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Shklovsky’s concluding pun hints that the decisive significance that Tynianov’s 
article may provide is more ambivalent than a turning point.  In yet another instance 
of non-recognition, Shklovsky puns on the everyday expression of financial and 
material want, implying that he is adept at not making ends meet.  Yet, in 
Shklovsky’s resolutely paradoxical art of contradictions the material ends of devices 
and plots literally do not meet.  The pun therefore makes the relationship between 
art and life far more problematic and non-functional than the direct causal chain of 
Tolstoy writing War and Peace because he was a gunner, or the autonomous 
sanctity of art free from outside ideology or any ‘ethnographic’ contingency.  Like the 
letters in Zoo, this pun operates in conflicting generic planes simultaneously, where 
the letter at once pertains to material art and the ‘real-life’ correspondence between 
two beleaguered friends.  In Zoo the dialectical sublation of these two conflicting 
terms is the implication that life itself is device.  In Third Factory life is once again 
device, only the sublation is deployed in its historical aspect, whereby Formalism’s 
evolution from immanent autonomy towards engagement with life is figured in a 
similar sublation, where (material)-ism’s ends resolutely do not meet in happy unity. 
Shklovsky asserts that, like art itself, Formalist science must contradict itself if it is to 
remain vital.  Tynianov’s contradiction of this method, whereby extra-literary material 
is incorporated into the purview of objective literary science, is therefore the 
prototypical Formalist gesture adequate to the demands of objective art and its 
many paradoxes.  As noted previously, Tynianov’s ‘Literary Fact’ replicates the 
same dialectical relationships between materials that, for Eikhenbaum and 
Shklovsky, constitute literary art.  This variety of objective Formalist science 
effectively maintains Tynianov’s insistence that negation is always active in a given 
genre, and that a genre always incorporates an element of that which it is not in 
order for it to exist.  Similarly, Formalist science is dynamic, defamiliarizing itself and 
incorporating elements and materials which it is not in order to remain a dynamic 
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force active in the struggle for post-Revolutionary culture.  In ‘Art as Device’, art is 
explicitly linked with the drive towards innovation and the accompanying intuition of 
creativity provided by not recognizing phenomena as they are in and of themselves.  
Accordingly, if art is to remain vital the stasis implied by aesthetic autonomy requires 
its negation.  Shklovsky identifies these relationships in Tynianov’s knight’s move 
towards life, which is no less exemplary of a poetics of non-recognition than 
Shklovsky’s ‘early’ Formalist theory:  
We demonstrated that a work of literature is a unified edifice.  Everything in it is 
subjected to the organization of the material.  But the concept of literature changes 
all the time.  Literature extends its boundaries, annexing non-aesthetic material.  
This material, and the changes which it undergoes through contact with material 
already aesthetically processed, must be taken into account (Shklovsky 2002: 375; 
2001: 60).  
The potentially ‘decisive significance’ of Tynianov’s article, so Third Factory implies, 
is how it formulates a non-recognition of literary evolution as ‘yes’ and ‘no’ 
simultaneously, and demonstrates art’s many contradictions and paradoxes in their 
dynamic historical aspect.  Tynianov’s knight’s move towards life and history has, if 
anything, enhanced the scope of paradox in Formalist thought, and provided a 
conceptual means with which to apprehend the constructive relationships that 
constitute literary art.  Entirely appropriately, the letter to Tynianov concludes with 
the plea: ‘Answer my letter, Yurii, just don’t lure me into the history of literature.  
Let’s stick to art.  Keeping in mind that all its magnitudes are magnitudes of a 
historical nature’ (Shklovsky 2002: 376; 2001: 61). 
II 
Like Tynianov, Shklovsky’s suggestion that art’s magnitudes are historical is 
resolutely anti-genealogical: ‘Art fears successors.  It craves destruction’ (Shklovsky 
2002: 367; 2001: 49).  In ‘Literary Fact’, Tynianov argues that the history of literary 
genres is a broken line, and in no way a sequence of peaceful successions.  
Tynianov implies that these defamiliarizing moments of rupture that pervade the 
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boundary between art and life are how we intuit historical change in the present.  
There is, therefore, a constitutive moment between the relentless drive for 
innovation and contradiction in epochal culture.  Shklovsky notes how Anna 
Karenina is no longer regarded as being decadent, whereas at the epochal moment 
of its first publication Tolstoy’s novel became something of a scandal.  The Formal 
method cannot allow itself to calcify into a unitary approach to art and deprive itself 
of controversy and struggle.  Objective method, Shklovsky implies, must strive to 
contradict itself and actively demand its negation: ‘The inertia of art—that which 
makes it autonomous—is not needed today’ (Shklovsky 2002: 367; 2001: 49).    In 
the ‘Literary Fact’, Tynianov also invokes the topos of need in his description of how 
the letter came to be a literary fact: ‘Letters turned out to be the handiest, the 
easiest, the most needed phenomena, and here the new principles of construction 
were displayed with unusual emphasis’ (Tynianov 1977: 265; 2000: 41).  This need 
that comes to be constitutive of epochal shifts is nowhere explained in the literary 
theory of Eikhenbaum, Shklovsky and Tynianov.  Like Kant refusing access to the 
roots of the Tree of Knowledge, the Formalists refute any ‘metaphysical’ explication 
of ‘why’ literature is as it is.  Like Kant, they merely observe and elaborate 
literature’s conditions of possibility in their dynamic, paradoxical richness. 
As noted previously, both ‘Literary Fact’ and Eikhenbaum’s essay ‘In Search of 
Genre’ imply that this ambiguous, indeterminate drive for innovation is being 
frustrated in the post-Revolutionary cultural field, and that, at the time of their writing, 
a contradictory and paradoxical novel worthy of post-Revolutionary material had not 
yet been written.  In ‘The Literary Today’, Tynianov suggests that the inadequacy of 
post-Revolutionary culture can be attributed to statist teleological demands upon 
literature that hamstring the creative act by predetermining its outcome.  Shklovsky’s 
demand in Third Factory that life provide him with material for art is an ironic 
inversion of Tynianov’s and Eikhenbaum’s concerns.   Once again, an immediate 
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reaction to the nominal terms of both positions would be that Shklovsky is directly 
contradicting Eikhenbaum and Tynianov.  Pace Tynianov, Shklovsky appears to be 
making a teleological demand, albeit of life and not art.  Shklovsky insists that life 
must provide him with material events worthy of art, whereas his colleagues insist 
that art is currently inadequate, and has not as yet furnished the post-Revolutionary 
world with a culture worthy of its name.  However, like Tynianov’s ‘evolution’ of the 
Formal method in ‘Literary Fact’, Shklovsky’s purported switch from aesthetic 
autonomy to an extreme iteration of contingency is merely a further expansion of the 
contradictions and paradoxes that Formalism regards as constitutive of the aesthetic 
object.  On this basis, the demand that art provide material adequate to the 
aesthetic is not one of harmonious correspondences between art and life, but one of 
dialectical conflict where the sublation of art and life should be a violent post-
Revolutionary culture of struggle and suffering.  In Third Factory, Shklovsky provides 
a further non-recognition of art as the sharpening of the knife: ‘It doesn’t matter 
whether we lie in the field, whether we suffer or rejoice.  What matters is the 
sharpening of the knife, i.e. art’ (Shklovsky 2002: 349; 2001: 25).  In the original 
Russian, this last sentence is: ‘delo v ostrenii nozha v iskusstve’.  ‘Ostrenii nozha’ is, 
potentially, phonetically evocative of both ostranenie and obnazhenie priem, the 
defamiliarization and laying bare the device that Shklovsky argues are literary art’s 
core devices. ‘Art as Device’ argues that automatization eats away at ‘our fear of 
war’, Tynianovian genres facilitate the intuition of epochal struggles in the past and 
the then present ‘quiet war’ in contemporary literature.  The sharpening of the knife 
at once affirms the need for this struggle for new material against epochal life, and 
the no less important need of not recognizing that struggle in reified times.   
It would be incorrect, however, to assert that such proclamations amount to the 
Formalists’ joyous acceptance of their increasingly tense struggles with those 
‘Marxists’ who unwittingly replicated Formalist critique while purporting to criticize it 
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as anathema to the objectives of statist literature in the Soviet Union.  Shklovsky’s 
dialectical materialism, like that of Tynianov, argues that the simultaneous collision 
of genres is analogous to the simultaneous collision of art and life manifest in the 
letters in both Zoo and Third Factory.  This contradictory construction is of an 
entirely different order to the ‘Marxists’’ contradiction of Formalist literary theory as 
idealist and bourgeois.  These teleological programmes burden literary art with 
ideological, representational or even ‘metaphysical’ baggage that it is incapable of 
bearing.  They are accordingly forces of reification and automatization that art must 
overcome.  In Third Factory, such stasis is very much the force of byt, and by 
demanding that life provide him with material worthy of art, Shklovsky subtly asks for 
a life that is capable of adequately contradicting and conflicting with art’s invasion of 
the extra-literary series.  The then current situation is one where it is byt that is on 
the offensive, and, with the aesthetic on the back foot, Third Factory demands that 
art sharpen its knives and resist the city fortress and its demands for a statist 
culture. 
III 
In another moment of generic ambivalence in Third Factory, Shklovsky dryly 
observes that when you engage in argument, the very act of contradiction partakes 
of your opponent’s argument.  On one level, this is merely Shklovsky engaging in a 
polemic with his ‘Marxist’ opponents who, so Shklovsky believes, criticize the tenets 
of the Formal method whilst using many of Formalism’s scientific terms in their own 
‘Marxist’ literary polemics.  Yet, on another level, it is apparent that Shklovsky is 
contradicting his own ‘early’ literary theory and, like Tynianov’s ‘Literary Fact’, this 
contradiction expands the scope of objective Formalist paradox through its 
conceptualization of the relationship between art and life in non-functional, non-
causal terms.  Whilst some may argue that this constitutes Shklovsky’s 
abandonment of his supposed insistence on aesthetic autonomy and a shift away 
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from ‘form’ to ‘content’, the move is one of sublation, whereby life, through its 
dialectical opposition with art, ceases to possess the power of functional or 
determinist relationships with art.  In Shklovsky’s letter to Tynianov, the incidental 
details evocative of the genre of personal correspondence take on a profound 
ambivalence.  Is Shklovsky merely asserting that he has put on weight, or is there 
another subtle pun at work?  The Russian for ‘I’ve put on weight’ (‘potolstel ia’) hints 
at Shklovsky’s long-enduring interest in Tolstoy, perhaps comparable to 
Eikhenbaum’s monograph on The Young Tolstoy, which critiques Tolstoy’s use of 
biographical material in his fiction.  Towards the end of the letter, Shklovsky 
paradoxically asserts that writing monographs on single authors is impossible and, 
perhaps, implies that a focus on a single author is analogous to the physical decline 
of becoming overweight (Shklovsky 2002: 374-5; 2001: 60-1).    
Shklovsky’s non-recognition of epochal malaise through the punning on ‘become 
over-weight’ is fittingly physical and material in its connotations.  The unease over 
life’s inability to furnish him with the material necessary for great art is pervaded by 
what might be termed a dialectic of absence.  Shklovsky’s body manifests a 
corpulent excess of material, yet the longed for excitement and material worthy of 
the aesthetic is absent, his corpulent materiality only serving to emphasise the 
absence of vital material worthy of art and its many objective paradoxes.    In 
‘Literary Fact’, Tynianov emphasizes the shear scope of material and the 
constructive function in literary art with the example of blank spaces [belye mesta] in 
verse: 
Pushkin, for instance, has recourse to blank spaces in poems with a particular 
stanza structure.  (These are not ‘omissions’, because the lines are omitted in this 
case for constructional reasons, and in some instances the blank spaces are 
completely without a text, as, for instance, in Eugene Onegin…) 
These are not pauses, but actually verse without speech material; the semantics are 
what you will, ‘anything’; as a result the constructive factor, the metre, is laid bare 
and its role emphasised. 
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The construction is here worked out on zero speech material.  The frontiers of the 
material in verbal art are so broad; such deep cleavages and ruptures are 
admissible – the constructive factor welds them together.  The leaps over the 
material, this zero-material, only emphasise the tenacity of the constructive factor 
(Tynianov 1977: 262; 2000: 38). 
Tynianov’s suggestion that such blank spaces are ‘verse without speech material’ 
could, potentially, be understood as yet another example of the Formalists’ rejection 
of content and their valourization of Futurist zaum.  The semantics of these 
absences are, Tynianov insists, insignificant, as the blank spaces only serve to lay 
bare the constructive role of metre.  Yet it is important to note how Tynianov’s 
critique of genre insists that the breaks and ruptures in constructive function are 
incontestably constitutive of epoch, for an epoch selects all needed materials, and 
the use of these materials characterizes only the epoch itself  (Tynianov 1977: 259; 
2000: 36).  In Third Factory, Shklovsky is all too aware of the potentially damning 
implications art can have for how epochal culture is understood.  His ostensible 
surrender to the processing forces of epochal construction and, concomitantly, the 
demand that life provide material worthy of art, allows that same allusive, constantly 
changing constructive function that orchestrates Pushkin’s poetry to make of post-
Revolutionary byt what it will.  Accordingly, the mundane reality of putting on weight, 
banal private life and its morning cups of tea are, potentially, material for art, but a 
material absence that manifests the inadequacy of post-Revolutionary culture and 
its teleological demands for literary art.  The genius of Shklovsky’s dialectical 
materialism resides in his ability to simultaneously assert the oppressive materiality 
of everyday life and how such material is, in effect, a zero where the banality of 
epochal life only serves to emphasise the tenacity of the aesthetic constructive 
factor, complete with its many paradoxes and failure to make material ends meet.     
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IV      
If indeed it was ever in doubt, Third Factory confirms the practical status of Formalist 
critique, and a strongly held civic commitment to take responsibility for the arts, and 
thereby facilitate a dynamic post-Revolutionary culture.  The poetics of non-
recognition, the resolutely dialectical treatment of material in literary art and history, 
and the suggestion that the attributes of post-Revolutionary literature are suggestive 
of deficiencies, inadequacies and absences are implicitly and explicitly exemplary of 
what Tynianov termed the verbal function, and a willingness to engage in this 
struggle.  There is no distance between abstract theory and the praxis of everyday 
life and writing that life.  Any worthwhile work of literature is, in this post-
Revolutionary world, constitutive of the boundary between life and art and has the 
power to determine and inter-determine both fields.  In a remark addressed to Lev 
Yakubinsky, Shklovsky acknowledges that Formalist critique makes the act of 
writing hard, and the writer often does not know what to write.  Yet the novel is 
suggestive of an urgent motivation to impart the wisdom of brainless writing and 
brainless objective method, even though this very brainlessness is denied the very 
directness of exposition that facilitates unambiguous explication of writing and 
method.   In the letter to Yakubinsky, Shklovsky warns his colleague against 
becoming a committed Marxist: 
Friend, I am not about to become a committed Marxist [posledovatel΄nyi marksist] 
and I advise you likewise.  In our field, it’s much better not to follow, but to research 
[V nashem dele luchshe ne posledovat΄, chem issledovat΄].  A pun, needless to say.  
And what is a pun? The intersection of two semantic planes at one verbal sign.  
(Shklovsky 2002: 378; 2001: 64) 
In this particularly dense example of Shklovsky’s punning, objective method is 
fraught with practical expectations.  These words of advice are followed up by 
trenchant criticism of Yakubinsky’s adherence to Marrist linguistics, and what 
Shklovsky implies is its untenable reified schemas.  Marr’s crass duplication of the 
base-superstructure ‘dialectic’, that most reductive and un-Marxist element of 
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Marxist thought, whereby all languages relate back to an originary ‘proto-language’; 
and the concomitant ‘dialectical’ banality that a doublet gives rise to a new concept 
are subject to Shklovsky’s witheringly ironic critique.89  This latter point concerning 
the doublet is incisively demolished in the letter’s opening remarks on puns.  In the 
Russian, ‘posledovatel΄nyi’ [committed follower], ‘posledovat΄’ [to follow] and 
‘issledovat΄’ [research] all contain the common ‘root’ element of ‘sledovat΄’.  It is 
apparent that the Formal method of non-recognition both constitutes this opposition, 
and pertains to the autonomous activity of research, and not the un-thinking 
following of a ‘Marxism’ that had little, if anything, to do with the fundamental tenets 
of Karl Marx’s philosophy.  Yet this ‘root’ ‘sledovat΄’ is itself more ambiguous, and, in 
addition to denoting ‘following’ is also suggestive of the ‘ought’ and the ‘should’, that 
is, of duty.  Yet how should one figure such an ‘ought’ in the Soviet 1920s?  Richard 
Sheldon’s translation of Shklovsky’s opening pun on ‘posledovat΄’ and ‘issledovat΄’ 
is rendered in English with the bold: ‘the firing line is preferable to the Party line’.  In 
Sheldon’s problematic departure from the Russian, the implicit and coercive 
‘should’, where the Party serves to oppress and establish conformity (Yakubinsky 
was a member of the Communist Party at the time of writing), is made explicit in the 
English, and the accompanying, more Kantian, ‘ought’ is the moral and ethical 
demand for autonomy from such oppressive forces constituted by Formalist critique 
and its punning non-recognitions. 
Like Eikhenbaum, Shklovsky then proceeds to demonstrate how the ‘social’ terrain 
of ‘content’ thought to be rejected by the Formalists is in fact totally mis-construed 
by the committed Marxists, and is far more productively conceptualized by the 
Formalists themselves.  Accordingly, the Formalists emerge as more Marxist than 
their ‘Marxist’ opponents: 
                                                          
89 For critical discussion of Marr’s contribution to Soviet linguistics, see (Apatov 1991), (Slezkine 
1996, 826-62) and (Brandist 2002, 109-11).  Brandist acknowledges the manifest limitations of proto 
language and ‘linguistic paleontology’, but nevertheless provides a much more positive reception of 
Marr’s contribution to Soviet linguistics than that offered by Shklovsky.  
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What am I driving at? I’ll tell you.  We need to study not protolanguage or even 
language in general, but language in connection with its production—above all, in 
those places where the phenomena in question survive [po preimushchestvu tam, 
gde iavleniia eshche zhivy].  That is a rather brash statement for a non-linguist.  You 
are studying protolanguage, but are you certain that the attitudes toward the word, 
the aural conditions, the substance of the laws of the word are not themselves 
changing?  It is not just words that change: so do the attitudes toward them.  I am 
certain, for example, that a word, in the course of its life, passes through a stage 
when the orientation is toward form and cases; likewise, the loss of cases was in its 
time a game resembling the phenomenon of humorous slang (Shklovsky 2002: 378; 
2001: 64-5).  
This passage, with its insistence on the living, social situation of the word, and its 
constant evolution through history, could almost be the work of the Bakhtin Circle.  
Threaded together with his explanation of literary puns, the implication is that the 
supposed Marxism of Marrist linguistics is in fact guilty of the very same abstraction 
of which Shklovsky, Eikhenbaum and Tynianov were often falsely accused, and it is 
the oppressive conformism that is serving to repress creative and autonomous 
research into literature’s objective properties.  The letter to Yakubinsky replicates 
the same parody of crass dialectics discernible in the novel’s tripartite structure, 
where the banal reality of the novel’s third factory is simultaneously an inadequate 
synthesis of the preceding two terms (factories one and two), and an oppressive, 
coercive synthesis of Shklovsky’s life enforced upon him by the banal power 
structures then active in intellectual life.   Shklovsky inverts the ‘dialectical’ logic of 
Marr’s doublet which gives rise to a synthesis.  In this instance, the concept arising 
from Shklovsky’s complex punning is that the conformist ‘Marxism’ then active in 
intellectual life is entirely without intellectual basis, and a betrayal of the 
Revolutionary ideology from which it ‘stems’.  
V     
This hostility to the mundane ‘proto’ episteme of institutionalized Marxism is entirely 
consistent with the Formalists’ hostility to ‘metaphysics’, ideology and genealogy.  In 
Third Factory, Shklovsky addresses the difficulty the Formalist alternative 
encounters when faced with the need to institutionalize itself.    Throughout the 
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novel there is a manifest anxiety over the institutional status of literary science.  In 
the First Factory’s closing remarks, Shklovsky asks his friends to hang his portrait 
on the walls of the university building.  This is not, however, the sad resignation of 
the one-time radical who wishes to relent and become a graduated flunkey in the 
tedious habitus of homo academicus.  Shklovsky implores his friends to: ‘[h]ang my 
portrait in the university corridor, friends.  Tear down the vice-rector’s study, 
establish a window on the Neva and sail past me on your bicycles’ (Shklovsky 2002: 
347; 2001: 19).  Consistent with his wish to vandalize the rector’s study, Shklovsky 
is also witheringly critical of the norms of established scholarship and profoundly 
hostile to the conventionalized norms, regulations and rituals of the academy.  In a 
letter to Roman Jakobson, Shklovsky expresses exasperation at the idea of 
becoming an academic.  For Shklovsky, academics are dull, conservative and, like 
the Romanov’s celebrating the 300th anniversary of their existence in 1913, 
preserve automatized regularity at the expense of disruption and upheaval.  
(Shklovsky 2002: 361-2; 2001: 41).  This peaceful genealogy is anathema to 
Shklovsky, obviously lacking the dynamism and excitement of Formalist critique, 
worthy art and the life material with which these elements are engaged.  To 
authentically engage with modernity is to create something, and therefore be fragile, 
finite and to risk being brainless and broken.  For Shklovsky, the mundane 
scholarship of the academy merely processes data which perpetuates its own 
existence, and it does not create any material structures worthy of critical attention 
through risk and adventure.  The Formalist preference for method is, for Shklovsky, 
infinitely preferable to the reifications of academia and is better conceptualized as a 
desire for objective knowledge independent of the restrictions of university 
discipline.  The first of the three factories recounts a narrative of Shklovsky’s 
academic failure, where he is forced to move from institution to institution and learns 
nothing of interest throughout this anti-Bildungsroman, and he is only able to pass 
an examination by cheating.  The teacher, who allows Shklovsky to correct his own 
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spelling mistakes once the exam has finished, asks in return that Shklovsky 
dedicate his future master’s thesis to him; a promise which the anti-institutional 
Shklovsky never fulfils (Shklovsky 2002: 346; 2001: 16-17).  
It is intriguing that Shklovsky singles out, albeit briefly, erstwhile Moscow Linguistic 
Circle member Grigorii Vinokur as a representative of humdrum academe.90  In a 
letter already mentioned, Shklovsky complains that Roman Jakobson is so 
interesting and useful, capable of useful contributions to the evolving science of 
literature, yet he is absent, working abroad.  The Third Factory of Shklovsky’s life 
can only offer Vinokur: ‘We have to make do with Vinokur, celebrating his 300th 
anniversary’.  Vinokur, in his contemporary Biography and Culture [Biografiia i 
kul΄tura], provides an early intervention on the topos of biographical life as life 
creation in the Russian and Soviet context: ‘…we gain the right to speak of personal 
life as creation.  The personal here is like an artist who models and mints his life in 
the form of experience from the material of surrounding reality.  To experience 
something means to make a corresponding phenomenon an event in one’s own 
personal life’ (Vinokur cited in Dobrenko 2008: 148).  Such scholarly interest in 
biographical life creation has yet to celebrate its 300th anniversary, but it currently 
shows no signs of abating.  One recent intervention which has taken inspiration from 
Vinokur is Evgenii Dobrenko’s Stalinist Cinema and the Production of History.  
Dobrenko describes Vinokur’s approach to biography as ‘Formalist’ and endorses 
Vinokur’s argument that there is an unavoidable tension in the closely related 
genres of autobiography, hagiography and biography.  All contain, so Dobrenko 
argues, an element of representation and depiction (a graphia); yet the genres are 
equally predicated upon an element of objective experience, where a subject 
experiences an event in reality, material that is then subsequently processed into a 
                                                          
90 Viktor Erlich observes how Vinokur had criticized the OPOIAZ members for their obsessive 
emphasis upon the break between themselves and previous schools of literary criticism, to the point 
where the intellectual credentials of OPOIAZ were damaged by their ignoring accepted norms of 
academic writing.  See (Erlich 1965: 253) and Vinokur’s ‘Poeziia i nauka’ (Vinokur 1925: 21-31). 
189 
 
given graphia, and thereby elevating the objective into potentially mythical 
dimensions.  It is only by becoming an object of experience that historical fact gains 
biographical meaning.  The prime example of such generic biographical writing is, 
so Dobrenko argues, Gorky’s autobiographical trilogy Childhood [Detstvo], My 
Apprenticeship [V liudiakh] and My Universities [Moi universitety].  This approach to 
biography and biographical writing is, for Dobrenko, a valuable insight into life-
writing and an alternative that contrasts with the ideological production of both 
history and biographical life in Stalinist culture (Dobrenko 2008: 70 & 148). 
On this basis, Vinokur’s theory of life creation is at once entirely consistent and 
entirely inconsistent with Third Factory, and its demand that life provide Shklovsky 
with the material he needs for great art.  The suggestion that a material event is 
experienced in reality and then processed according to the laws of a given graphia 
is akin to Shklovsky’s occasional definition of ‘material’ as an event or idea that is 
processed into an aesthetic narrative, the laws of which are entirely independent of 
the extra-literary material.  Yet, following Dobrenko’s summary, is not Shklovsky’s 
Formalism resolutely anti-mythological, and does it not deny any such ‘mythological’ 
correspondences between artwork and objective experience, and that art itself can 
ever possess any mythological properties?  In addition, Vinokur formulates the 
practice of life creation in decidedly intentional terms, with the author selecting 
relevant events in her personal life which are formed and minted into her literary 
biography.  In Third Factory, Shklovsky insists that the author has no such 
intentional control over events.  In the novel’s most famous remark, Shklovsky 
claims that ‘We are all flax in the field’ awaiting processing, and it is the impersonal 
constructive forces of art and epoch which process the material events of 
biographical life into one structure or another.  Crucially, the many letters, puns and 
dialectical paradoxes of Zoo and Third Factory insist that the encounter between 
objective experience and graphia is a far more problematic and conflicted encounter 
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than Vinokur implies, and, like Tynianovian genres, a place where conflicting planes 
of materiality exist simultaneously, and which cannot be reduced to any mythological 
moment of closure. 
It is not without interest that Dobrenko discerns the absence of Vinokur’s schema of 
literary biography (best exemplified by Gorky’s trilogy) in Socialist Realism.  In Third 
Factory, Shklovsky’s highly fraught and ambivalent conceptualization of the 
relationship between art and life, and his astute parodies of institutionalized 
‘dialectics’, imply that there is already a narrowly determined and conformist graphia 
that limits both the paradoxes of the aesthetic and life itself.  Rather than granting 
full reign to the paradoxes and struggles which Revolutionary culture is, in 
Shklovsky’s eyes, so deserving, the mundane, abstract and reified culture of 
mythological correspondences between ‘proto-’ and language, ideology and art, and 
life and art all serve to limit both art and biographical experience.  A consistent 
refrain throughout the novel is the nature of freedom in literary art.  Freedom, for 
Shklovsky, is a largely Kantian freedom, in that the writer-subject is only ever free 
within the limits of objectively determined laws that must exist, and can assert that 
freedom through breaking those laws and advancing both experience and 
knowledge.  And this freedom is, in the face of oppressive forces, a duty that entails 
creating art in accordance with the tenets of objective critique, and it is indeed the 
practice of that freedom through the struggle to take civic responsibility for the arts.91  
The brainless knight’s freedom is accordingly provided for by the laws of aesthetic 
material and the breaking of those laws; and that freedom is therefore, of necessity, 
a non-recognition of itself and the objective phenomena around it.  This paradoxical 
                                                          
91 Svetlana Boym does not address the Kantian nature of freedom in Shklovsky’s thought, but her 
remarks are broadly parallel to my argument here: ‘One of the central parallelisms that Shklovsky 
explores in Third Factory is the unfreedom of the writer caught in the play of literary convention and 
the unfreedom of the writer working under the dictate of the state, specifically an authoritarian power.  
The two deaths of the author—one a playful self-constraint and the other the acceptance of the state 
telos—are not the same.  Inner freedom and the writer’s space of creative exploration are shrinking in 
the context of public unfreedom’ (Boym 2009: 107). 
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freedom contrasts with what Shklovsky terms a ‘negative unfreedom’ in Third 
Factory.  This unfreedom is the official ‘dialectical’ materialism that contrasts with 
Shklovsky’s and Tynianov’s radically dialectical materialism in literary art; an 
unfreedom where the outcome of dialectical synthesis is either predetermined in 
advance, or the preceding terms of thesis and antithesis are determined post factum 
by the desired synthesis. 
This drive towards teleological closure is revealed in the novel’s afterword: 
Take me, third factory of life! 
But don’t put me in the wrong guild. 
Whatever happens, though, I have some insurance: good health.  So far, my heart 
has borne even the things I haven’t described. 
It has not broken: it has not enlarged (Shklovsky 2002: 394; 2001, 86). 
 
In these closing remarks, Shklovsky once more returns to the device of absence: 
certain events of his life – events worthy of suffering and pain – have not been 
included in the narrative.   The negative unfreedom of statist ‘dialectical’ materialism 
requires that these events cannot be included in the narrative of a life.  The anti-
Bildungsroman which constitutes the first of the novel’s two factories is, purely in 
terms of the events and the life it describes, a highly banal sequence of events.  
Childhood poverty, mediocrity and cheating at school and in creating art are hardly 
worthy of such a tumultuous epoch as that lived in by Shklovsky.  A Sentimental 
Journey and Zoo both recount grand themes of war, Revolution and exile, yet these 
potentially formative events are entirely absent from Third Factory because, 
implicitly, the increasingly oppressive ‘dialectical’ materialism of statist culture 
requires their absence.  As ever, it is with emotive affect that Shklovsky makes his 
final stand.  The heart which bears the injuries of both art and epoch remains 
defiant: it has succumbed neither to objective non-recognition nor to a medical 
condition. 
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8: A Philosopher in the Soviet 1920s 
I 
In the seventeenth letter of Shklovsky’s Zoo, the narrator describes the sensation of 
propulsion felt by steamship passengers and motorcar drivers.  Passengers aboard 
a steamship do not sense movement per se, but rather forward propulsion and its 
potential.  The motorcar driver experiences the same sensation: she depresses the 
throttle and feels the pleasant sensation of force pushing against her back.  Every 
internal combustion engine has its own propulsive character, and the very best 
create an effect comparable to a singer’s voice as it rises in a crescendo.   The 
emotional life of the automobile driver is never static and always plural: the driver 
feels calm and a sense of propulsion; the driver feels anxious and a sense of 
propulsion.  The narrator claims never to have travelled on a steamship, but he 
nevertheless proclaims that he loves and understands them.  He imagines dancing 
on a moving vessel, exchanging kisses with a partner; his thoughts lagging slightly 
behind the ship’s propulsive force.   After declaring his love and empathy for the 
steamship, the narrator recounts a meeting with Boris Pasternak.  After recalling 
Pasternak’s observation that contemporary life is lived as if all are aboard a 
steamship, the narrator laments the Revolution’s propulsive force which caused so 
many non-conformists to flee (Shklovsky: 2002, 306-8; 2001, 61-3).   
This brief discourse on steamships and the sensation of propulsion touches upon 
many of this analysis’s recurrent topoi: anachronism, objective method, ethical 
commitment and dialectical planes of movement and meaning.  The steamship is 
likely an allusion to the manifesto ‘A Slap in the Face of Public Taste’ [Poshchechina 
obshchestvennomu vkusu], where the Russian Futurists famously called for 
Pushkin, Dostoevsky and Tolstoy to be thrown overboard from the steamship of 
modernity (Vorob΄ev: 2008, 99-100).  Whilst it is true that Zoo’s seventeenth letter 
shares some of that manifesto’s excitement at the dynamic movement and 
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innovation which characterise modernity, the use of the steamship metaphor is more 
ambiguous in Shklovsky’s epistolary novel.  If contemporary life was being lived as if 
on board a steamship, then one accordingly risked being designated an 
anachronism and thrown overboard.  Khlebnikov proved to be an anachronism in 
post-Revolutionary Russia and died alone and unwanted by the new state.   It would 
be wrong to argue that Shklovsky is merely criticizing the political aftermath of the 
Russian Revolution, and lamenting the fate of those non-conformist refugees who 
were propelled into exile as the Revolution’s emancipatory momentum failed to fulfil 
so many of its promises.    As already noted, Shklovsky’s ethics of commitment to 
writerly freedom are accompanied by a deeply ambiguous reaction to modernity’s 
many impersonal attributes, particularly where objective method prevails and 
meaning is necessarily plural, and emotional life riven with violent tensions in a 
world deprived of its previous certainties.  Kant objectively calibrated consciousness 
as finite, contradictory and necessarily anachronistic, with knowledge only coming 
after the sensory intuition of the world and the praxis of critiquing both intuition and 
conventional understanding.   This practical activity of knowledge is itself in constant 
motion, and sustains its paradoxical trajectory upon the opposing force of elements 
both immanent and other to itself.  Shklovsky’s objective conceptualizations of 
device and plot, Eikhenbaum’s discussion of the grotesque and Tynianov’s 
elaboration of genre and literature’s various functional relationships have all been 
shown to be trajectories of negation, where a paradoxical relationship exists 
between any given materials, their negation and the accompanying sensory impacts 
felt by the human body. These tensions have been shown to be not merely 
sequential or historical trajectories towards negation, but simultaneous struggles 
between conflicting planes of meaning.  Tynianov said of Zoo that theory, 
journalism, personal correspondence and popular trash all co-exist and struggle with 
one another in a single text.  The steamship of modernity in Shklovsky’s Zoo is at 
once a dynamic example of technological progress, dynamic propulsive force and a 
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tired anachronism which exemplifies much that is cruel and impersonal, 
overthrowing the very Futurists who sang its praises just a few years previously.       
In Vaginov’s novel The Goat Song there are no steamships.  Nevertheless, 
Vaginov’s narrator uses an alternative mode of transportation as a metaphor for 
modernity.  Some of the novel’s characters are aboard a steam train.  They are 
travelling back to the newly renamed Leningrad after a brief stay in the countryside 
where they gathered together at ‘the tower’, a dacha rented for the summer by the 
group’s leader Teptelkin.  Teptelkin’s ‘tower’ could, in our present terms, be 
regarded as one of the novel’s many moments of non-recognition.   For Teptelkin, 
the tower is a gathering point for an elite group of like-minded intellectuals; a 
symbolic refuge from the world around them where they have failed to find 
institutional and professional security.  In this place of retreat they will valiantly 
preserve classical high-culture from the onslaught of modernity before its eventual 
rebirth in the epoch of the Third Renaissance.   Vaginov’s novel is largely consistent 
with Shklovsky’s withering critique of Bely’s Kotik Letaev, and provides a ruthless 
parody of a group of pseudo-intellectuals who interpret the world around them on 
the basis of an outdated, totalizing world view.  This group of pseudo-intellectuals, 
would-be-poets share a symbolic worldview that mixes Spengler, Nietzsche and 
antiquarian myth; and interprets the mundane and quotidian as harbingers of 
immanent cultural collapse and eventual rebirth.92  On the train journey back to 
Leningrad, two of the characters (Kostia Rotikov and the Unknown Poet) pledge to 
continue their struggle to uphold high cultural values.  Ekaterina Ivanovna sits at one 
end of the train, blowing the seeds off a dandelion.  She is playing the childish game 
of ‘loves me – loves me not’ with each breath, even though she has no idea who 
might love her.  At the opposite end of the train sits a philosopher (his name is never 
                                                          
92 For critical discussion of this world-view and its thematization in the novel, see: (Chukovskii: 1989, 
92, 97-114); (Anemone 1985) and (Anemone 1998: 631-6); (Shepherd 1992: 108-110); (Gerasimova 
1990: 141) and (Anemone and Martynov 1989: 92). 
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given in the novel), and he repetitively ponders the philosophical problem that ‘the 
world is posited, not given; reality is posited, not given’ over and over, as if in time 
with the childish game played by Ekaterina Ivanovna (Vaginov: 2002, 71-2). 
Like Teptelkin’s tower, the train itself is a moment of non-recognition.  On one rather 
obvious level, it is metaphorical of modernity’s destructive capacity for progress.  As 
Kostia Rotikov and the Unknown Poet pledge to struggle on, the train is 
symptomatic of the advance of modernity that has rendered this band of intellectuals 
an anachronism.  They are effectively helpless as the train’s momentum sweeps 
them along towards the re-named city.  As with so many Russian intellectuals, 
Petersburg held particular significance as the capital of Russian culture, and its 
renaming as Leningrad affirms the supremacy of a rival cultural ideology that has 
rendered their values obsolete.  The inevitability of the train’s journey to the city has, 
if only on this level, a significance of tragic proportions.  As with Shklovsky’s 
discourse on the steamship, this dissident interpretation of the novel’s cultural 
orientation in the face of Bolshevik cultural hegemony fails to account adequately for 
the novel’s ambiguity.  Claims that the novel’s depiction of a group of intellectuals is 
essentially tragic are problematized by its very title, which plays on the ancient 
Greek for tragedy.  The ‘goat song’ is a banal rendering of the ancient Greek 
semantics of a chorus of satyrs (Shepherd 1992: 110).  
As noted in the discussion of Third Factory, Shklovsky wrote to Yakubinskii extolling 
the virtue of puns, whilst at the same time warning his erstwhile Formalist colleague 
not to become a committed Marxist and follow the then contemporary vogue of 
Marrist linguistics.   Shklovsky’s punning barbs against Marrist proto-linguistics deftly 
critiques its flaws, exposing them as inadequate in the face of the vital struggles that 
beset contemporary social life.  Indeed, it could even be said that in doing so 
Shklovsky exposes Marrist linguistics as an anachronism, just as he had previously 
critiqued Potebnianism, ethnography and Andrei Bely as inadequate to the task of 
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conceptualizing literary art in all its paradoxical, objective complexity.   The title of 
The Goat Song and its parodic depiction of a group of intellectuals convinced of their 
own tragic existence in the post-Revolutionary world imply that such a totalizing, 
tragic ontology is inadequate to the complexities of art and the post-Revolutionary 
life-world around them.  Their high minded tragedy is in fact mundane, and indeed 
highly anachronistic when figured against the background of that life-world.  As 
pledges are made to struggle on, dandelion seeds scattered and ontological 
propositions repeated the steam train makes a rhythmical sound: ‘chivo, chivo… 
chivo, chivo’ (Vaginov 2002: 72) .  This noise is far more than an onomatopoeic 
‘chuff, chuff’, and enunciates the informal Russian for ‘what?’ [chego].  On this level, 
the train responds to the characters with the question ‘what?’, and is therefore 
symptomatic of a modernity which rejects the totalizing tragic ontology proffered by 
the novel’s characters and maintains the uncertainty of a question in the face of 
high-minded seriousness.  The train is, like the steamship in Zoo, the absolute 
symbol of modernity’s destructive and tragic powers of progress and that same 
modernity’s capacity to render finite, uncertain and paradoxical.   
These similar treatments of modernity in Zoo and The Goat Song thematize two 
problems which have pervaded this thesis, and both of which pertain to the status of 
the anachronism in early Soviet modernity and beyond.  Firstly, and most 
paradoxically, some elements of Kant, Hegel, Russian Formalist theory and 
Vaginov’s novel can be said to assert the topicality of being an anachronism.  
Across this thesis, it has been argued that all knowledge and its objective 
formulation is of necessity anachronistic, and requires its subsequent moment of 
negation in the praxis of critique.  In Zoo and Third Factory, Russian Formalism and 
Russian Futurism have encountered that moment of negation with an oppressive 
and deeply conservative force in post-Revolutionary intellectual culture.  In The Goat 
Song, the profound conservativism of a reductive world-view and culture’s future 
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trajectory has been laid bare by modernity’s resistance towards absolute claims to 
meaning.  In both instances, the state of being rendered an anachronism is where 
modernity’s trajectory is manifested, laying bare the predicament of those who have 
been excluded or left behind.   However, given the dynamic and finite nature of 
knowledge in modernity, this sense of being left behind is not absolute and 
counterposed with an alternative deployment of anachronism.  In Hegel’s dialectical 
conceptualization of objective knowledge, any incorrect interpretation of phenomena 
is anachronism.  It is only with the dialectical conceptualization of reality at a given 
point in history that reality emerges in its fullest iteration.  In Shklovsky’s theoretical 
novels, these two iterations of anachronism are by no means mutually exclusive.  
Indeed, the suggestion of being abandoned by one’s age is used to underline the 
validity of how Shklovsky conceptualizes that age itself.  Thus in Third Factory and 
Zoo Shklovsky is capable of designating himself and Russian Formalism an 
anachronism cast aside by modernity, whilst simultaneously denigrating crude, 
statist dialectical materialism and Marrist linguistics as theoretical anachronisms that 
are inadequate to complexities of contemporary cultural life .  It can therefore be 
said that there is clearly a higher order of anachronism in Russian Formalist thought, 
with the concept directed both at the movement itself and its inadequate theoretical 
rivals with a view to assert the validity of Formalist critique.    The designation of 
anachronism is accordingly a historical ontology of power, and inherently 
genealogical.   
It is with this problematic conceptualization of anachronism that I wish to turn to 
Mikhail Bakhtin, the Bakhtin Circle and their reception of Russian Formalist thought 
in the Soviet 1920s and beyond.   As noted, Bakhtin and some members of the 
Bakhtin circle served as the prototypes for characters in The Goat Song, with 
Bakhtin himself understood as the inspiration for the Philosopher.  It must be stated 
that, despite his personal preference for the title of ‘philosopher’, Bakhtin is not the 
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Philosopher in Vaginov’s novel and, given the previous discussion of material and 
the relationship between art and life, I do not wish to assert a unitary 
correspondence between literary character and its ‘real’ historical referent.93  Craig 
Brandist has argued that, whatever the fundamental accuracy of the novel’s 
depiction of the Bakhtin Circle, it is true that the novel’s characters share some of 
the values and beliefs held by the group at the time (Brandist 2002: 31).  Brandist 
also argues that, at the time of Bakhtin’s early philosophy, the Circle can be 
understood as perpetuating the post-Kantian understanding of the subject’s unitary 
relationship with the natural world guaranteed by art.94  It shall be argued here that 
Bakhtin’s understanding of the aesthetic’s unifying authority is to no small extent 
articulated through his many criticisms of Russian Formalism, and that Bakhtin’s 
aesthetic philosophy and Formalism’s literary theory effectively restage the tension 
in Kant’s work, whereby Kant retreats from the liberating – albeit alienating – 
conditions of possibility that constitute the praxis of critique in The Critique of Pure 
Reason and The Critique of Practical Reason.   In opposition to this alienation, Kant 
proffered a unitary discourse, whereby objective scientific inquiry (no matter how 
paradoxical) was abandoned in favour of indeterminate and disinterested aesthetic 
judgements that, as a condition of their very indeterminacy, programme a unitary 
relationship of reciprocally expeditious correspondences.  According to this 
reductive schema, the natural world cannot be reduced to the status of an objective 
thing that can be dominated and exploited by mankind. 
It is one of the enduring paradoxes of Kant’s thought that it is precisely the 
necessarily anachronistic quality of objective knowledge which drives the actual, 
historically grounded aspects of Kant’s entire ontological programme in the first two 
                                                          
93 Whatever the similarities and differences between prototype and fictional character, it is important 
to note that Bakhtin’s early philosophy is critical of some aspects of Oswald’s Spengler’s thought.  
See K filosofii postupki (Bakhtin 2000: 51). 
94 Brandist productively argues that the work of the Bakhtin Circle during this period is exemplary of 
what Eagleton terms ‘the ideology of the aesthetic’, whereby art provides a unitary relationship of the 
emergent European bourgeoisie and the natural and social world around them (Brandist 2002: 29). 
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Critiques.  Our finite knowledge of reality must always come after the act of critique, 
which must itself contradict the accepted status quo through the speculative activity 
of the imagination, and which must in turn be contradicted by further sensory 
intuitions and further fights of speculative fancy.  Yet with Kant’s suggestion of the 
unitary, ‘reciprocally expeditious’ correspondences he effectively programmes an 
always-already into historical reality, and the aesthetic becomes an anachronistic 
site of permanent value that cannot be critiqued by the objective activity of the 
subject.  In other words, it becomes a given that the aesthetic is always-already 
moral, and the historically grounded practice of contradictory critique can do nothing 
to alter these fundamental attributes.  As will be demonstrated here, this problematic 
is fundamental to the contrasting conceptualizations of literary art advanced by the 
Formalists and Bakhtin in the Soviet 1920s, where Bakhtin argues that Formalism’s 
emphasis on material structures and laws of plot formation are anachronistic and 
profoundly ahistorical, yet nevertheless exempts the aesthetic and its values from 
questions of historical contingency.   
It is, however, by no means a given that the Bakhtin Circle should be regarded as 
providing an inadequate conceptualization of historical reality in the Soviet 1920s, 
and that their work can be regarded as profoundly anachronistic, be it in terms of 
their being left behind by the dominant trends active in early Soviet intellectual life, 
or their inability to formulate a programme for the adequate conceptualization of 
modernity and the literary art in which that modernity is revealed.  It could no doubt 
be argued that by establishing the Bakhtin Circle through the unflattering 
comparison with Vaginov’s depiction I am effectively convicting them before any act 
of trial by critique.  This is not the case.  It is particularly interesting that the problem 
of voice is present in both the examples from Zoo and The Goat Song mentioned 
above.  Shklovsky likens the excitement of the motor’s propulsion to a singer’s 
voice; and Vaginov gives the steam train a voice, whereby it responds with the 
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endless questioning: ‘what, what; what, what’.   I therefore conclude this encounter 
between Bakhtin and Russian Formalism with a brief discussion of Bakhtin’s 
conceptualization of voice in his genre theory from the 1930s and beyond, and 
consider whether Bakhtin’s later philosophy reveals many similarities with the 
Formalists whom he had criticised in the 1920s, and therefore provides a more 
appropriately anachronistic conceptualization of literary art and its surrounding 
epochal reality.    
II  
In the Soviet 1920s, Bakhtin’s aesthetic theory manifests a dislike of thingly objects.  
In contrast to the Formalists’ tendency to speak of the work of art as a thing, Bakhtin 
proposes that art should be termed an ‘aesthetic object’.  This aesthetic object is 
held to be indeterminate, and transcends its objective existence as a thing through 
aesthetic embodiment.   Bakhtin’s dislike for the material thing in literary art is 
articulated in ‘The Problem of Content, Material and Form in Verbal Art’ [Problema 
formy, soderzhaniia i materiala v slovesnom khudhozhestvennom tvorchestve].  In 
this extended essay, Bakhtin’s disappointment with Russian Formalism is clear, a 
disappointment which to no small extent depends upon their treatment of literary art 
as a material thing, which Bakhtin apophatically uses to advance his alternative 
concept of the aesthetic object.  Renfrew, in an extended discussion of Bakhtin’s 
criticisms of the Russian Formalists, has perceptively noted that Bakhtin does not 
address the different iterations of the term ‘material’ in Formalist thought (Renfrew 
2006: 21-31).  Bakhtin concentrates on the Tynianovian position in The Problem of 
Verse Language that the literary work of art is itself an objective accumulation of 
verbal material.  Bakhtin shares the Formalists’ demand that literary studies be 
undertaken on an objective, universally valid basis, but he is apprehensive that such 
objectivity be misconstrued as scientism.  There is a clear risk, according to Bakhtin, 
that literary studies will become another manifestation of positivist science, and 
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facilitate an analysis of the division, isolation and classification of empirical literary 
phenomena: ‘In its effort to form a scientific judgment about art independently of 
general philosophical aesthetics, art study has found material to be the firmest basis 
for scientific consideration.  After all, an orientation toward the material creates a 
seductive closeness to positive empirical science’ (Bakhtin 2003: 270; 1990: 261). 95  
As a consequence of his focus on this one iteration of the Formalists’ treatment of 
material, Bakhtin is unable to fully account for the Formalists’ incorporation of the 
somatic into their poetics, and, as a result, his treatment of Formalism’s drive to 
empirical science is glaringly inadequate, and torn between designating the 
Formalist ‘thing’ as a material object in the physical world and dismissing this 
scientifically constituted object as a theoretical abstraction removed from social 
reality.   Bakhtin suggests that the Formalists’ interest in the somatic reveals their 
empirical goal of rendering the literary work a tactile, material thing of the real world.   
Bakhtin argues that feeling deprives a literary work of meaning, and reduces it to a 
mere factual state that is isolated from its broader cultural surroundings.   Bakhtin 
seems to argue that pure somatic pleasure is an inauthentic mode of being, typical 
of the most crude materialism, where material stimuli exist in order to provoke an 
instrumental response in the human body:  ‘A work of art, understood as organized 
material, as a thing, can have significance only as a physical stimulus of 
physiological and psychological states or it must assume some utilitarian, practical 
function’   (Bakhtin 2003: 276; 1990: 269).  On this basis, judgements concerning 
the aesthetic can indeed be properly scientific and, to Bakhtin’s dismay, be 
                                                          
95 For a summary of contemporary discussion of Formalism’s proximity to natural science’s positivistic 
episteme, see the editors’ ‘Kommentarii’ (Bakhtin 2003: 768-770).  On the basis of the my current 
analysis, it is difficult to agree with the editors’ view that the Formalists were blind to how the 
conceptual devices of mathematics and the natural sciences methodologically pre-determine the 
content of their object.   For Tynianov’s explicit refutation of ‘statistical’ approaches to literary science, 
see ‘Literary Fact (Tynianov 1977: 255-6); and Eikhenbaum  explicitly acknowledges how method 
determines its object in ‘Literary Environment’ (Eikhenbaum 1987: 428-436; 1971: 54-65); and 
Shklovsky, with typical irony, had already acknowledged the problem in Zoo…. 
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demonstrable mathematically, but the fundamental properties of the aesthetic object 
are lost.96   
The inadequacy of this account of the Formalists’ conceptualization of material is 
revealed in Bakhtin’s contradictory assertion that their desire for a science of literary 
art leads them away from reality and into theoretical abstraction.  Bakhtin is, at 
times, sympathetic to the Formalist drive to specify the attributes of literary 
constructions, and gives cautious endorsement of the study of technique [tekhnika] 
in art, which entails a consideration of the novel’s and poetry’s compositional forms, 
and what he regards as the complementary linguistic emphasis on nominal 
determinacy.  Bakhtin says of technique that: ‘To avoid misunderstanding, we shall 
provide here an exact definition of technique in art: by the technical moment in art, 
we mean everything that is absolutely necessary for the creation of a work of art in 
its natural-scientific or linguistic determinateness (this includes the entire makeup of 
a finished work of art as a thing [kak veshch΄])’ (Bakhtin 2003: 303; 1990: 295).  In 
outlining the technical, material properties of the work of art, Bakhtin appears to be 
arguing that all these elements are external theoretical abstractions, and do not 
pertain to the reality of the aesthetic object as it exists in embodied inter-personal, 
social reality.  As Brandist notes, Bakhtin sees such a material thing as ‘another 
manifestation of ‘theoretism’: the meaning of the work of art as a composed whole is 
split off from the moment of intentional engagement with the ‘already cognised’ 
aspects of reality in life in which the aesthetic object is ‘achieved’’ (Brandist 2002: 
43).  On this basis, Bakhtin not only contradicts his suggestion that the Formalist 
material object is a physical thing instrumentally deployed to trigger the somatic, but 
also appears dangerously close to confusing these determinate material things as 
yet another manifestation of the Kantian thing-in-itself, as it is only this one 
                                                          
96 Bakhtin does not, however, address the apparent similarities between Formalism’s insistence on 
the somatic, and Kant’s use of the term ‘feeling’, which denotes the self’s awareness of its own mental 
activity, and the self’s productive activity when it perceives a work of art and produces a sensation 
entirely separate from its material referent. 
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component of Kant’s thought that remains at an equivalent level of abstraction.  It is 
significant that Kant’s thing-in-itself remains totally beyond the knowledge of human 
consciousness, and as such should not be confused with the literary work of art’s 
determinate, material properties that are accessible to human cognition.   
Regardless of these apparent inconsistencies in Bakhtin’s reception of Russian 
Formalism, it is important to note that Bakhtin’s concept of the aesthetic object 
shares a great deal with Kant.97  It has often been noted how this aesthetic object is 
exemplary of Bakhtin’s drive to ground Kantian morality and ethics in the objective, 
inter-personal reality of social life (Brandist 2002: 27-52) (Renfrew 2006: 54) 
(Hitchcock 2000: 7).98  For Bakhtin, the aesthetic object cannot be expressed in the 
positive terms of the natural sciences or linguistics; its factual validity resides in its 
inability to be articulated with any specific determinacy.  Accordingly, the material 
attributes of the work of art, that is, all that makes it a thing, are intentionally 
overcome in artistic creation, and attain a state of indeterminacy (Bakhtin 2003: 302; 
1990: 294).  It is worth recalling that Bakhtin designates the abstract, determinate 
attributes of the artwork-as-thing as ‘absolutely necessary’, but also totally 
insignificant in terms of the full meaning of the aesthetic object.   Bakhtin’s Formalist 
faux-science apophatically facilitates an understanding of the aesthetic object 
through its complete inability to articulate the latter’s fundamental attributes.  
Accordingly, the aesthetic object offers an incredibly condensed re-iteration of 
Kantian thought as it moves through the three Critiques.  In The Critique of Pure 
Reason, Kant’s agenda is twofold: to provide a justification for empirical perception 
                                                          
97 For an alternative account that argues for Bakhtin’s hostility to Kant’s ‘canonical formulation of 
European rationalism’, see Wlad Godzich’s ‘Correcting Kant: Bakhtin and Intercultural Interactions’  
(Godzich 1991: 5-17).  Galin Tihanov has argued that Bakhtin’s dislike of Formalism’s tendency 
towards positivism is a further iteration of Kant’s founding division between culture and civilization 
(Tihanov 2000: 22-4).  For further discussion of Bakhtin’s reception of Kantian thought, see: (Holquist 
and Clark 1984: 299-314); and (Scholz 1998:141-72). 
98 It should be noted that Brandist, Renfrew and Hitchcock all see Kant as formulating the ethical and 
the moral purely at the level of transcendental abstraction, and paint Bakhtin as grounding such 
abstractions in the social world of everyday life.   Accordingly, they ignore the extent to which moral, 
ethical reason is already a practical activity in Kant. 
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and the natural sciences and account for the human subject’s a priori moral 
autonomy.  With regard to autonomy, Kant insists that it cannot be explained in any 
determinate formulation, otherwise we would cease to be free and it is, according to 
the second Critique, a fact of reason’s practical activity.  By the third Critique, Kant’s 
retreat from the natural sciences and their destructive capacity for domination is 
accompanied by the ‘reciprocally expeditious’ relationship between moral reason, 
beautiful art and the natural world.  Through this ‘reciprocally expeditious’ activity 
and the figure of the genius artist, Kant implies that the harmony of the natural world 
is in accordance with the properties of consciousness itself, and thereby hints at a 
possible alternative to the limiting, paradoxical alienation of the subject from the 
thing-in-itself.  In the succinct words of Terry Eagleton, Kant argues that ‘the 
aesthetic holds out a promise of reconciliation between nature and humanity’ 
(Eagleton 1990: 11).  With the exception of his narrow treatment of the somatic, 
Bakhtin’s aesthetic object replicates these fundamental attributes of Kantian 
thought.  The aesthetic object, like the Kantian fact of reason, cannot be articulated 
in positive terms, but Bakhtin nonetheless demands that it is the fullest reality of the 
work of art.  Bakhtin’s insistence that art’s thingly qualities are simultaneously 
‘absolutely necessary’ – yet totally inadmissible – recalls Kant’s desire to provide an 
objective account of empirical knowledge, yet also deny that knowledge its 
destructive capacity to determine and isolate all empirical phenomena.  And like 
Kant, Bakhtin desires that it is art that affects the reconciliation between humanity 
and the natural world, and thereby limits the destructive, reifying power of empirical 
knowledge. 
Whilst the Formalists were denied the possibility of refuting Bakhtin’s misguided 
criticisms, their response would likely have discerned a whiff of Potebnian 
‘metaphysics’ in this attempt to locate meaning beyond the text’s material 
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parameters99, and scoffed at Bakhtin’s attempt to ground art in a philosophical 
discourse of a priori morality.  Bakhtin’s reconciliation with art and the natural world 
exemplifies the tradition in post-Kantian metaphysics where art’s harmony with the 
cognitive activity of the mind is accompanied by the presumption that art’s content 
be a priori moral.  That Bakhtin’s aesthetic object provides a reconciliation with the 
natural world is evidenced by his insistence that the problem of content be 
conceptualized as the site of consummation between the domains of art and life.  As 
has already been noted, Tynianov’s concepts of the literary personality and verbal 
function provide a tantalizing glimpse of an open, contradictory relationship between 
life and literary art.  Initially, Bakhtin hints at a similarly rich relationship, arguing that: 
‘It must be remembered once and for all that no reality in itself, no neutral reality, 
can be placed in opposition to art: by the very fact that we speak of it and oppose it 
to something, we determine it and evaluate it in some way.  One must simply come 
to see oneself clearly and understand the actual direction of one’s evaluation’.  
However, Bakhtin chooses to sum up this position with the following succinct 
formulation: ‘reality can be contraposed to art only as something good or something 
true in opposition to beauty’ (Bakhtin 2003: 284; 1990: 276). 
It is apparent that Bakhtin’s suggestion that there is no neutral reality is definitely not 
made in the spirit of Tynianov’s conceptualization of the literary personality, and its 
awareness of ideologically and politically motivated uses of an author that constitute 
art’s verbal function.  Bakhtin, in contrast, makes the post-Kantian move of insisting 
                                                          
99 Tihanov perceptively argues that ‘The Problem of Content, Material and Form’ is pervaded by a 
stark dualism in how it conceptualizes the material thing and its aesthetic embodiment (Tihanov 2000: 
67).  In contrast, Renfrew’s discussion of this extended essay finds early traces of Bakhtin’s (and 
Medvedev’s) subsequent tendency to argue that the intrinsic and the extrinsic are held to be 
immanent in Bakhtinian thought (Renfrew 2006: 21-40).  I am of the view that Bakhtin’s opposition 
between the material thing and its aesthetic embodiment is indeed dualistic; and, prior to his later 
work on the novel, Bakhtin is clearly what Shklovsky terms a ‘translator’, whereby the supposedly 
transcendent art-object manifests that universal, always-already truth to which reality is held to 
conform.  
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that all reality is a priori ethical and good.100  Similarly, the relationship between life 
and art is nothing like the paradoxical contradictions that inform Shklovsky’s and 
Tynianov’s accounts of literary constructions, and Kant’s account of consciousness 
in the Critique of Pure Reason.  After acknowledging the ‘opposition’ between 
beauty and the good or truthful thing, Bakhtin almost immediately goes on to argue 
that: 
The basic feature of the aesthetic that sharply distinguishes it from cognition and 
performed action [postupka] is its receptive, positively accepting character, which 
enters into the work (or, to be exact, into the aesthetic object) and there becomes an 
indispensable constitutive moment.  In this sense, we can say that in actuality life is 
found not only outside art but in it, within it, in all the fullness of its value-bearing 
weightiness—social, political, cognitive, and so on  (Bakhtin 2003: 286; 1990: 278). 
 
Bakhtin’s ‘opposition’ between art and life, where life is shown to be both outside art 
and within it, is all too obviously analogous to the Potebnian opposition between two 
planes of meaning that is overcome through their harmonious, unitary 
correspondence:   
The characteristic of the aesthetic noted above—its positive acceptance and 
concrete unification of nature and social humanity—also explains the distinctive 
relationship of the aesthetic to philosophy.  We observe in the history of philosophy 
a constantly recurring tendency toward a substitution of the yet-to-be-achieved unity 
of cognition and action by the concrete intuitive, and as it were given, present-on-
hand unity of aesthetic vision… The reality of cognition and ethical action that enters 
(as an already identified and evaluated reality) into the aesthetic object is subjected 
there to concrete, intuitive unification, individuation, concretization, isolation, and 
consummation i.e., to a process of comprehensive artistic forming by means of a 
particular material—this reality we call (in complete agreement with traditional word 
                                                          
100 See Ken Hirschkop’s Mikhail Bakhtin: An Aesthetic for Democracy (Hirschkop 1999: 146-57; 163-8 
& 197-225).   
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usage) the content of a work of art (or to be exact—of the aesthetic object) (Bakhtin 
2003: 288-9; 1990: 280-1). 
What Bakhtin terms the ‘already identified and evaluated reality’ within the work of 
art is a moral discourse that he demands be present as the necessary condition of 
social life, and which is welcomed into the indeterminate aesthetic object where it 
undergoes artistic consummation.  To return to Brandist’s words mentioned earlier, 
the ‘already cognised’ aspects of reality in life are a priori ethical, and the aesthetic 
object provides the guarantee of a harmonious relationship between life’s already 
cognised, determinate ethical content and art’s capacity for unitary transcendence.  
Accordingly, Bakhtin offers the following examples of artistic content:  Ivan 
Karamazov’s thoughts on the suffering of children in Brothers Karamazov [Brat΄ia 
Karamazovy]; Prince Andrei Bolkonsky’s ruminations on the absurdity of war and 
the historical role of the individual in War and Peace [Voina i mir]; and Pushkin’s 
treatment of memory, recollection and remorse in the poem Remembrance 
[Vospominaniia].  Bakhtin’s insistence that such ethical content cannot be articulated 
in positive terms is manifested in his discussion of the Pushkin poem: 
The ethical event [eticheskoe sobytie] of recollection and remorse has been 
aesthetically formed and consummated [esteticheskoe oformlenie i zavershenie] in 
this work (artistic forming includes the constituent of isolation and fiction, i.e., of 
incomplete reality), but not words, not phonemes, not sentences, and not semantic 
series.  All these lie outside the content of aesthetic perception, that is, outside the 
artistic object, and they may be needed only for the secondary, scientific judgment 
of aesthetics, insofar as the question arises as to how and by which constituents of 
the extra aesthetic structure of the external work the given content of artistic 
perception is conditioned (Bakhtin 2003: 304; 1990: 296, translation amended). 
 
With these remarks, Bakhtin makes clear the extent to which he is prepared to 
embrace Formalism and its ‘scientific’, abstract configuration of the literary thing that 
resides outside the aesthetic object.  Such a science can account for individual 
elements as words and semantics, but any evaluation of the artwork on these terms 
is of secondary importance and, as Bakhtin notes elsewhere in the essay, risks 
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enfeebling the indeterminate ethical content as it manifests itself in the aesthetic 
object.  Renfrew has suggested that Bakhtin’s response to Formalist science, and 
his figuring of content as the overcoming of the relationship between art and life, 
demonstrates a counter-intuitive convergence between Bakhtin and Tynianov’s 
conceptualization of material in ‘The Literary Fact’ (Renfrew 2006: 26-31), but 
Tynianov does not insist that art’s materials be always already ethical, and 
maintains a constructive, dialectical relationship of negation and struggle with those 
materials.  For Bakhtin cognition, ethics and positivistic science are all predicated 
upon linguistic determinacy, and therefore must be regarded as simultaneously 
within and without the aesthetic object.  As such, it is important to differentiate 
between the two varieties of ethical demands which Bakhtin makes in the essay.  
First, he adheres to Hegel’s ethical demand that art be objectively analysed in 
accordance with its universal properties, but what Bakhtin identifies as these 
universal properties requires a further demand that art is unitary, and must not be 
explicated in positive terms.  This second demand constitutes a kind of transcendent 
ethics that are only possible in the consummated aesthetic event, where the 
linguistic determinacy of objective phenomena is overcome in an indeterminate 
aesthetic event. In contrast, the Formalists’ response to the Hegelian demand for 
objectivity does not require the automatic designation of art as a priori moral and 
unitary.  For the Formalists, the ethical resides in the demand to objectively account 
for art and its materials, thereby asserting the finitude of the authorial subject, to 
which the material work is radically other.  For Bakhtin, such alienation from the 
aesthetic object is inadmissible, and this ethical demand for objectivity and human 
finitude is mis-construed as brutal, self-interested empiricism.101  
                                                          
101 For example, see Bakhtin’s remarks that: ‘We shall be able to understand how form is, on the one 
hand, really material, and how it is realized entirely in a given material and is bound to it; and, on the 
other hand, we shall understand how form takes us axiologically beyond the bounds of the work as 
organized material, as thing’ (Bakhtin 2003: 281-2; 1990: 273-4).  In contrast to my own argument 
here, Tihanov has argued that Bakhtin’s treatment of form in his early aesthetic philosophy is one 
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Whilst the essay ‘The Problem of Material, Content and Form’ displays manifest 
similarities with Kant’s gesture towards unitary closure between world and the 
subject in the Critique of the Power of Judgement, it is apparent that Bakhtin’s 
historically grounded ‘dialogue’ with Kant is with an altogether different Kant to that 
outlined in the first chapter of this analysis.  The Kant Bakhtin presents in his early 
philosophy is consistently more akin to that ‘idealist’ Kant identified by Lenin in 
Materialism and Empirio-criticism, that is, it is an entirely ‘subjective’, dualistic Kant 
who is denied all knowledge of the thing-in-itself and, more significantly for Bakhtin, 
cut off from the historically grounded world of ethical deeds.  Thus, for example, 
Bakhtin argues in ‘Towards a Philosophy of the Act’ [K filosofii postupka], that no 
one could possibly argue that Kant’s variety of transcendental reasoning in any way 
carries the ethical weight of a practical act for which the subject is held responsible.  
Kant’s philosophy limits the world and human reason to the mind, whereas Bakhtin 
requires not merely such conceptual activity, but an actual, real embodied person in 
historical life (Bakhtin 2003: 10-1).  As already noted, however, Bakhtin has a clear 
hierarchy regarding what such embodied activity in life is to be.     In a lecture given 
in 1924, Bakhtin addresses the ‘dead’ forms of culture which can result from Kantian 
reason.  Proceeding from an astonishingly literal and reductive understanding of 
Kant’s elaboration of time and space in the Transcendental Aesthetic, Bakhtin 
ponders the quandary of how to evaluate systemic philosophy by going outside that 
philosophy.  Bakhtin expresses concern that, despite its immanent division, unitary 
‘subjectivity’ is, for Kant, only ever a technical means for the intuition of the world of 
objective culture.   The principle danger philosophy poses is forgetting that any 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
element of his demand that art must be conceptualized in terms of its ethical value and its ‘impact on 
the formation of social judgement’ (Tihanov 2000: 32-3).  However, I find it difficult not to agree with 
Brandist, who has argued that the Bakhtin Circle are exemplary of what Terry Eagleton terms the 
‘ideology of the aesthetic’ (Brandist 2002: 29).  Indeed, it could be argued that Bakhtin’s reaction to 
the Formalists’ treatment of material is exemplary of a key element of modern European aesthetics 
since its Kantian inception: ‘With the birth of the aesthetic, then, the sphere of art itself begins to suffer 
something of the abstraction and formalization characteristic of modern theory in general; yet the 
aesthetic is thought nevertheless to retain a charge of irreducible particularity, providing us with a kind 
of paradigm of what non-alienated cognition might look like’ (Eagleton 1990: 2). 
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projections of unitary knowledge are merely images of objective culture (Bakhtin 
2003: 330-2).  Accordingly, Bakhtin can be regarded as insisting that the ethical 
demands for objectivity made by Kant, Hegel and even the Formalists always result 
in reification, and do not facilitate the vitalizing paradoxes of contradiction and 
historical change.   
Whatever the manifest limitations of Bakhtin’s early aesthetic philosophy it would be 
wrong, I think, to dismiss both it and indeed the profession of this category of 
philosopher as anachronisms in the Soviet 1920s.   As stated above, the topos of 
anachronism is tightly interwoven with conceptualizations of modernity, the validity 
of critical methodologies and accompanying genealogical ontologies.  Eikhenbaum 
criticised a then contemporary interest in authors’ social class as an anachronism in 
literary history, as social class had never been a literary fact in Russian culture.  It 
would be invalid, I think, to make the same mistake in reverse here and accuse 
Bakhtin of being an anachronism who was steadfastly holding on to an outdated 
philosophy in a present where such values had all to clearly been thrown off the 
Soviet steamship.  It has been shown that Bakhtin’s hostility towards thingifying 
literary art and ‘dead forms’ is, to some extent, symptomatic of a broad trend in early 
20th century intellectual life where the Lebensphilosophie of, inter alia, Georg 
Simmel manifests a profound disquiet over the supremacy of civilization over culture 
(Tihanov 2000: 1-4).102  According to this view civilization and its material interests 
are understood as destroying the values of high culture.  Whilst I have no interest 
whatsoever in any positivist accounts of intellectual influence, it is important to 
acknowledge that such attitudes were indeed contemporary to early Soviet 
                                                          
102 Galin Tihanov provides a thoughtful discussion of Bakhtin’s reception of Simmel’s thought (Tihanov 
2000: 93-4).  Following Tihanov, Craig Brandist argues that Bakhtin’s dislike of objective culture is 
shared with Simmel, whose ‘life-philosophy’ argued that the dead, ‘objective’ formations of culture 
were disconnected from life, and could be counter-posed with the vitalizing properties of art (Brandist 
2002: 41-4). 
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intellectual culture and not merely the last drops of antiquated Kantian wine in a new 
bottle.     
Yet it is absolutely imperative that Soviet intellectual culture be conceptualized not 
as a unitary phenomenon, but rather as plural phenomena.  Whatever Bakhtin’s 
(and his fictional projection’s) pretensions toward the profession of philosophy, the 
Kultur of Simmelian Lebensphilosophie is exemplary of how ‘culture’ was the 
preserve of an educated elite.  In the quietly polemical introduction to his critique of 
Bakhtin’s thought Renfrew depicts Bakhtin’s actions around the time of the 
Bolshevik Revolution, when Bakhtin would stay at home and read, and occasionally 
go to the library when the heating was turned on.     For Renfrew, the Revolution 
signalled the start of a process whereby the Bolsheviks set about creating a 
revolutionary culture, which in turn had important implications for culture and how it 
was understood: ‘The ambit, if not the apparatus, of culture was not only 
transformed from its former status as the exclusive preserve of a relatively small 
educated elite and, increasingly, an aspirant bourgeoisie, its forms and functions 
were subjected in the process to a thoroughgoing redefinition.  Culture, in more 
senses than one, was everywhere, not just in the library’ (Renfrew 2006: 1).  It is in 
this profoundly genealogical sense that Bakhtin’s thought can indeed be regarded 
as a highly topical anachronism in the Soviet 1920s, and it is imperative that this 
aesthetic philosophy be conceptualized in broader terms than elitist philosophy 
‘proper’.  Renfrew’s insistence on the plurality of ‘culture’ in the Soviet 1920s 
foregrounds how the Bakhtin Circle’s thought can be regarded as simultaneously 
contemporary yet, for some, grossly outdated.  Vaginov’s parodic depiction of some 
of the Bakhtin Circle in The Goat Song (and indeed the novel’s hostile reception in 
the pro-Bolshevik press),103 where its elitist characters’ unitary discourse serves to 
explain all cultural phenomena in their trajectory of collapse, is particularly pertinent 
                                                          
103 For a discussion of The Goat Song’s hostile reception, see (Shepherd 1992: 110-11).  
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here.  The novel thematizes a historical moment when a cultural elite are gradually 
becoming aware of the anachronistic status of their unitary world view; a moment 
when no one unitary schema can claim authority in cultural life, and which in turn 
engenders a modernity  of parodic and paradoxical finitude.  This tension is indeed 
no less pertinent to any subsequent period which seeks to critique early Soviet 
intellectual history and its key participants.  Eikhenbaum’s anxiety over the 
anachronistic use of class criticism in literary studies is once again worth 
considering here as, given the intricacies and plurality of the early Soviet cultural 
field, it is no less anachronistic to focus on ‘philosophy’, ‘positivism’, ‘politics’, 
‘intellectuals’ and ‘scholars’ as limited by the determinate focus of their intellectual 
labour, or the determinate ‘class’ to which they are held to belong.  Vaginov’s novel 
attests that these problematics were, in more senses than one, a fact of early Soviet 
intellectual culture. 
At this stage of this analysis, it will come as no surprise that I prefer the Formalist 
critique offered by Shklovsky and Tynianov, where such facts of literary and 
intellectual culture are conceptualized in their paradoxical and objective conditions 
of possibility, and where no one discourse can lay claim to an authoritative 
programme for culture and its significations.  It is well known that Bakhtin’s work on 
the novel genre in the 1930s and beyond can be understood as a turn away from 
the aesthetic philosophy of the previous decade.  However, before addressing 
Bakhtin’s apparent similarities with some Formalist doctrine, it is necessary to turn 
once more to the question of authorship in Bakhtin’s aesthetic theory and then Pavel 
Medvedev’s reception of Formalist thought in The Formal Method in Literary 
Scholarship.  
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III 
In many respects the author is the crux of Bakhtin’s whole programme of 
transcendent ethical aesthetics, as it is the term ‘embodiment’ that encompasses the 
overcoming of objective ethical content into that trans-ethical moment of the 
aesthetic object (Bakhtin 2003: 289-90; 1990: 281-2).  As noted in the previous 
analysis of Eikhenbaum’s Gogol΄ essay, Bakhtin’s embodied author is resolutely 
historical and an intentional, individual subiectum whose will forms the aesthetic 
object.  The author, so Bakhtin argues, must struggle with the determinate 
properties of language, reality and cognition as if he or she is the first author, and 
therefore is deprived of the recourse to literary history, genre or narrative.  Just as 
‘life’ and ‘content’ are a priori ethical for Bakhtin, so is the individual author, and the 
struggle to form the aesthetic object must be her own responsibility.  This process of 
formation, which Bakhtin describes with the ambiguous metaphor of the author 
entering into the aesthetic object [vkhodiashchaia v esteticheskii obekt], is one of 
struggle as the author fights with the objectifying properties of language, and forces 
determinacy to overcome itself.  It is through this embodying activity of the author, 
and the embodied activity of the hero of the literary work that the aesthetic object 
ascertains its freedom from determinacy, with the author effectively creating his life, 
that of the hero and the harmonious, unitary moment of aesthetic being.  As Bakhtin 
serenely asserts: 
The individual subiectum experiences himself as a creator only in art.  A positively 
subjective creative personality is a constitutive moment in artistic form; here its 
subjectiveness finds a distinctive objectification and becomes a culturally valid, 
creative subjectivity.  And it is here as well that the distinctive unity of the organic—
corporeal and inner man, his soul and his spirit—is realized, but a unity that is 
experienced from within.  The author, as a constitutive moment of form, is the 
organized activity, issuing from within, of the integral whole human being, who 
realizes his task completely, without presupposing anything external to himself for 
the consummation.  It is an activity of the entire human being, from head to foot: he 
is needed in his entirety, as one who breathes (rhythm), moves, sees, hears, 
remembers, loves, and understands (Bakhtin 2003: 323; 1990: 316). 
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The task of this embodied author is, to some extent, made easier by the choice of 
which ‘form’ he or she chooses to create.  Bakhtin’s tendency to differentiate 
between the objective form of a phenomenon and its aesthetically embodied trans-
form is present in his own terms of immanent analysis of compositional forms.  In 
keeping with his Belinskian programme of ethically engaged realism, the novel is 
described by Bakhtin in his early aesthetic philosophy as the artistic consummation 
of either a historical or social event, where the reality of the present receives its epic 
consummation.104   Consistent with this preference for classical forms when 
differentiating the trans-forms of composition from mere compositional forms, 
Bakhtin argues that tragedy is just such a trans-form, or, in Bakhtin’s own terms, an 
architectonic form.  The architectonic forms aid the author’s choice of compositional 
forms, but only in the sense that the tragedy of a social event or of a particular 
character cannot be known to negative cognition, just as the ‘good’, ‘ethical’ and the 
‘beautiful’ cannot be known to cognition, they are subsumed into cognition, only for 
the embodying and embodied activity of author and hero to realize architectonic 
form in its concrete social reality.  It must be noted that this ‘value’ of the aesthetic 
object ‘does not admit of any object-related differentiation and any limitation by a 
determinate, stable concept’. The a priori moral activity of the author, and the 
resulting aesthetic object are actualized, but in a manner which is indeterminate, 
and cannot ‘be expressed and cognized in an adequate concept’ (Bakhtin 2003: 
274; 1990: 266).105 
Such an author is radically different to the Formalist figures of Pushkin and Gogol΄, 
frustrated with their own inability to create a work of art that conforms to their own 
intentions.  Bakhtin clearly believes that the volitional subject can overcome what 
                                                          
104 Bakhtin provides an alternative discussion of the epic in his well-known essay ‘Epic and the Novel’ 
[Epos i roman], where modernity (best exemplified in the genre of the novel) is explicitly differentiated 
from the closed forms of the epic (Bakhtin 1975: 447-483; 2004: 3-40). 
105 Vaginov’s The Goat Song can, I think, be used to refute Bakhtin’s argument that tragedy is an 
indeterminate form that transcends objective, thingly existence.  
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the Formalists identify as impersonal laws that govern literary construction.  In the 
fourth chapter of this analysis, it was apparent how Tynianov’s problematization of 
authorial intention make it impossible to align Formalism with the avant-garde telos 
of life-creation.  There are no such problems with Bakhtin’s authorial figure, who 
appears to be a Nietzschean figure – albeit a moral one – engaged in a heroic 
struggle to create existence on purely aesthetic terms (Nietzsche 1990: 8-9).  
Bakhtin argues that the reality to which art is juxtaposed is already aestheticized, but 
this Nietzschean under-current in Bakhtin’s thought raises awkward questions as to 
the nature of the already aestheticized reality that is, in part, created through the 
aesthetic object and its author’s embodying and embodied activity.  The problem is 
particularly pressing in the context of the early Soviet 1920s, where ‘pre-loaded’ 
figurations of the historical life context risk distorting the more open formulations of 
authorship and epoch afforded by Tynianov’s verbal function and the literary 
personality.  In a highly perceptive and under-appreciated work, David Shepherd 
has questioned the validity of the understanding of authorship maintained by the 
Soviet authorities across the life span of the Soviet Union and scholarly voices in 
Western academia, particularly in the disciplinary field of Russian studies.  In both 
instances, the author is held to be accountable for the ideological content of her 
work, albeit the Soviet apparatus demanded conformity to its statist ideological 
norms, whilst its opponents in the West demanded its mirror opposite: a dissident 
author who conforms to high standards of artistic integrity and individual resistance 
to the Communist regime.  In both cases, the author is held to account for moral 
commitment, with which art is held to be synonymous (Shepherd 1992: 1-27, 191-
203).  Deft as Shepherd’s discussion is, his problematization of these discursive 
regimes is undertaken on the basis of Bakhtinian polyphony, where Bakhtin is 
regarded as providing a historically grounded concept of inter-determinate dialogue, 
where neither side can make an a priori claim to the truth and moral probity.  Yet 
with regard to his early aesthetic writings, Bakhtin clearly cannot be said to provide 
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such methodological framework.  If life is always already aestheticized, and the 
author presumed to be a priori moral and create content that is equally a priori 
moral, Bakhtin risks pre-determining the moral duty of the author-creator in a pre-
determined epochal reality in the Soviet 1920s.     As a result, it is Bakhtin who risks 
formulating the proto-dissident paradigm of authorship, and pre-loading the epochal 
reality of the Soviet 1920s with ethical ‘content’ that awaits its aesthetic 
consummation.     
In ‘The Problem of Content, Material and Form’, some of Bakhtin’s remarks appear 
to counter such a restricted or even ‘monologic’ reading of his own words.  Bakhtin’s 
famous utterances that ‘[h]istory knows no isolated series’ and particularly ‘[o]ne 
must cease to be just oneself, in order to enter into history’ (Bakhtin 2003: 280; 
1990: 272) do, albeit in isolation, appear to resist any suggestion of the ‘always 
already’ in historical life, where history by definition is a succession of differences. 
The idea of one needing to cease to be just oneself in order to enter into history is 
even reminiscent of the Formalist account of an author when faced with her 
objectified literary creation that is of necessity other to herself.  Yet the context of 
their ‘utterance’ is, as the editors of Bakhtin’s Collected Works note, a specific attack 
on Formalism’s tendency towards synchrony.106  Shklovsky’s remarks on 
ethnography implicitly affirm that the laws governing plot formation are universal and 
not particular to any one given historical context (Shklovsky 1929: 25-7).  When 
Bakhtin notes that history knows no isolated series, it is this tendency to isolate the 
literary work from history and the national context of its utterance that he is 
problematizing:  
…an isolated series as such is static, and a change in the elements within such a 
series can only be a systematic articulation or simply a mechanical disposition of 
series, but certainly not a historical process… By isolating within culture not only art 
but the separate arts, and by considering the work not in its artistic life but as a 
thing, as organized material, material aesthetics is able at best to found only a 
                                                          
106 See the editorial commentary in (Bakhtin 2003: 791 n.47). 
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chronological table of changes in the technical device utilized by a given art, 
because isolated art can have no history at all (Bakhtin 2003: 280; 1990: 272).  
When Bakhtin writes that one must cease to be oneself, the implicit demand 
appears to be that ‘one’ requires aesthetic embodiment if ‘one’ is to authentically 
enter into history.  Yet when such aesthetic events are shot through with a unitary 
genealogy of post-Kantian moral-aesthetic discourses, there are clearly limits on the 
extent to which the self stops being itself.  It can be argued that Bakhtin’s authorial 
subject never really enters into history, and that Bakhtin’s unitary understanding of 
the aesthetic is merely his own version of philosophical synchrony.   
IV 
The subtitle of Medvedev’s highly critical study of Russian Formalism signals a 
potential move away from post-Kantian aesthetic philosophy, and a more productive 
engagement with epochal reality: The Formal Method in Literary Scholarship: A 
Critical Introduction to Sociological Poetics.  Despite this determinate orientation 
towards the social, Medvedev totally fails to advance the Bakhtin Circle’s 
conceptualization of literary art beyond a unitary discourse of harmony with art, 
subject and epochal reality.  Indeed, suspicions that a unitary a priori moral 
discourse underpins the Bakhtin School’s understanding of history are largely 
confirmed in The Formal Method in Literary Scholarship.  Like Tynianov, Medvedev 
negotiates the problem of theorizing literary history through the topos of genre.  For 
Tynianov, a dynamic, evolving conceptualization of genre is absolutely fundamental 
to grasping the struggles and contradictions which, through the relationship of 
constructive principle and material, come to constitute the broader struggles and 
oppositions of epochal reality.  Medvedev’s discussion of genre is nothing if not 
ambitious.  Having proclaimed genre the central problem of literary studies, he then 
proceeds to argue that it pertains to questions of composition, the relationship 
between art and life, philosophy, epochal change and even the activity of human 
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cognition.107  Medvedev’s ‘two-fold’ [dvoiakaia orientatsiia] formulation effectively 
reiterates the Bakhtinian aesthetic object, and incorporates the work of art’s 
linguistically determinate formal properties and the inter-subjective ideological 
horizon of a given historical epoch.108  Genre itself is therefore the site of aesthetic 
consummation between all those elements which Medvedev addresses in his study 
(Medvedev 2000: 306-318; 1991: 129-141). 
As with Bakhtin’s treatment of the aesthetic object, Medvedev does hint at some 
genuinely radical proposals for literary study, particularly regarding the relationship 
of art and life and its adequate conceptualization.  For example, Medvedev echoes 
Tynianov’s constructive and verbal functions when he suggests that every literary 
work is simultaneously determined from without and from within.  Medvedev argues 
that immanent determinations arise from literary norms and conventions, and 
external determinations arise from life’s social richness; and that any immanent 
determination is therefore an external determination and vice versa.  (Medvedev 
2000: 211; 1991: 29).    In order to avoid any dualistic or dogmatic understanding of 
this relationship between the social and the immanent, Medvedev insists that 
determination is of necessity dialectical.  Dialectics, so Medvedev argues, provide 
dynamic definitions of genres such as the novel in its historically evolving aspect, 
potentially providing yet further basis for a favourable comparison with Tynianov’s 
                                                          
107 Tihanov provides a useful summary here.  He argues that Medvedev, along with other members of 
Bakhtin Circle, focussed attention on genre because ‘they saw in it the essential mechanism which 
activates language and renders it far more concrete and socially oriented.  Genre is thought of as the 
vehicle which transforms language into utterance.  Literary genres, being specific and, in this sense 
only, also concrete knowledge about the world, and utterances, being concretizations of language, 
prove to be inherently connected and dependent on each other…’ (Tihanov 2000: 60).  However, I will 
argue here that there are some fundamental problems in Medvedev’s argument which belie his claims 
that generic utterances amount to social concretizations of language.   
108 For an alternative (and broadly positive) critique of Medvedev’s turn to genre, see (Renfrew 2006: 
76-89).  Along with Voloshinov’s material treatment of discourse in Discourse in Life, Discourse in 
Poetry, Renfrew argues that Medvedev’s conceptualization of genre is a highly significant 
development in the Bakhtin Circle’s thought: ‘The turn to genre is every bit as significant as the ‘turn 
to language’ and, its promise not only of a reconciliation of the general and the particular that does not 
undermine the uniqueness of the latter, but also of a conceptualization of particularity in its historical 
becoming, is the most methodologically significant proposition we have encountered since 
Voloshinov’s discussion of the material nature of language’  (Renfrew 2006: 87).   
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conceptualization of verbal, literary and constructive functions (Medvedev 2000: 
213; 1991: 31).  Sadly the promise of these introductory remarks is not fulfilled in 
Medvedev’s elaboration of genre and its properties, and his ‘sociological’ poetics are 
strongly reminiscent of Bakhtin’s architectonic forms.   As the unitary site of 
aesthetic consummation, the artist must learn to see reality through the eyes of 
genre (Medvedev 2000: 310-2; 1991:133-5), but only certain genres will lend 
themselves to a certain aesthetic embodiment in the literary work.  With regard to 
the novel, Medvedev says that: 
In order to create a novel it is necessary to learn to see life in terms of the novelistic 
story [fabula], necessary to learn to see the wider and deeper relationship of life on 
a large scale.  There is an abyss of difference between the ability to grasp isolated 
unity of a chance situation and the ability to understand the unity and inner logic of a 
whole epoch.  There is, therefore, an abyss between the anecdote and the novel.109  
But the mastery of any aspect of the epoch—family life, social or psychological life, 
etc.—is inseparable from the means of representation, i.e., from the basic 
possibilities of genre construction… the reality of the genre and the reality 
accessible to the genre are organically related.  But we have seen that the reality of 
genre is the social reality of its realization in the process of artistic intercourse.  
Therefore, genre is the aggregate of the means of collective orientation in reality, 
with the orientation toward finalization (Medvedev 2000: 311-2; 1991: 134-5). 
As much as Medvedev seeks to distance himself from ideological closure, the 
consistent emphasis on unity, harmony and consummation in both his and Bakhtin’s 
thought has a distinctly post-Kantian aesthetic genealogy, where the persistence of 
universal order, harmony and consummation in the ethical literary tradition is 
unchanging. In Foucaultian terms, this manifestation of unitary aesthetics amounts 
to those same historical ontologies of truth and ethics that underpin much of the 
Bakhtin School’s poetics of aesthetic embodiment. Discussing Don Quixote, 
Medvedev implies that it is up to a given epoch to live up to the constant standards 
of unity and harmony of certain generic forms.  By way of a strikingly clumsy attack 
on Shklovsky’s critique of Cervantes’s novel, Medvedev dismisses (and completely 
misconstrues) Shklovsky’s interest in ‘stringing together’ due to what Medvedev 
                                                          
109 It is worth recalling that Tynianov’s conceptualization of the novel genre in Literary Fact is far more 
dynamic than what Medvedev offers here, and Tynianov suggests that the novel is not an absolute 
form that is separated by great distances from other generic forms such as the anecdote.   
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perceives as its inability to account for the stylistic juxtapositions and contradictions 
in the novel’s narrative.   All significant genres, so Medvedev argues, are complex 
systems of means and methods for the conscious control and consummation of 
reality.  The juxtaposition and contradictions identified by Shklovsky are inadmissible 
with regard to consummation, as the latter is only ever possible through unification.  
Consequently, the contradictions of Don Quixote are, for Medvedev, ‘external flaws’ 
which result from an epochal shift, where the perception of reality changes and can 
no longer ‘fit’ inside a novella.   Accordingly, the unifying form of the novel is 
required, and it therefore emerges into existence, consummating the epochal 
ideological horizon which comes into being through the conflicting dialogues 
between the embodied heroes, Don Quixote and Sancho Panza.  As a result of this 
new inner unity, the external flaws are ‘forgotten’ by the reader.  This example 
implies that, whatever Medvedev’s protestations to the contrary, history is the 
continuous return of classical unity and harmony, granting an endless dialogue 
between authors and concrete heroic embodiments (Medvedev 2000: 312-4; 1991: 
125-7).   
It is important to emphasize that Tynianov’s treatment of material and constructive 
function in ‘The Literary Fact’ does not require the kind of unitary relationship which 
Medvedev seems to desire here, where Medvedev understands genre as a 
conservative and normalizing force that imposes harmony and unity on both epoch 
and its works of literary art.  Tynianov argues that the evolution of literary genres 
comes to dialectically determine epochal reality after the fact.  Medvedev, in 
contrast, is providing yet another unitary account of life creation, where the artist 
intentionally consummates the historical reality around her through looking at the 
world through a variety of genre-tinted spectacles.  Medvedev’s ‘dialectical’ account 
of dynamic interchangeability of immanent and sociological evaluations of literature, 
and genre’s being an aggregate of collective orientations is, as with Bakhtin, a mask 
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for a unitary aestheticization of reality that guarantees pre-determined moral content 
as a given.  Medvedev argues that literature is not finizable, never imposes its thesis 
on the reader (Medvedev 2000: 200, 207; 1991: 20, 25), stating that it is a 
generation of a statement and not a statement in and of itself.  Yet his insistence on 
a harmonious accord between literature’s two-fold synthesis of immanent forms and 
historical reality reflects an all too obvious Kantian reciprocity between the human 
and the aesthetic. 
Despite these manifest similarities with post-Kantian aesthetics, Medvedev is 
adamant that art’s unfinizability means it cannot be considered as philosophy 
(Medvedev 2000: 202; 1991: 20).  Historically grounded philosophical ideas can be 
present in art if they undergo finalization in the appropriate generic form, but art’s 
non-finizable properties prevent that idea from receiving positive endorsement in the 
aesthetic form.  For all Medvedev’s interest in ideology and his contempt for the 
Formalists’ attempts to remove the ideological from the artistic series, he himself 
also appears intent on banishing the ideological from the aesthetic.  It is as if 
ideology can be present in the literary work of art, but it is present in a contained 
manifestation and does not receive positive articulation in the literary work of art 
itself.  The unitary wholeness of the aesthetic work is therefore entirely free of 
ideology, even if a given ideology is said to constitute some of its epochal content.  
Medvedev seems to suggest that philosophers come to realize the autonomy of the 
aesthetic from philosophical varieties of discourse, noting that some philosophers 
such as Nietzsche and Schopenhauer were able to express their philosophy semi-
aesthetically through a synthesis between aesthetic form and philosophical 
content.110  Medvedev desires a generic differentiation between the genres of 
                                                          
110 ‘Outside of art any cognitive problem can be interpreted in reference to its possible finalization in 
the plane of the work of art.  This is quite common in philosophy.  The philosophical formulations of 
Nietzsche, Schopenhauer, etc., are semi-artistic in nature.  For these philosophers problem becomes 
theme and functions compositionally in the plane of their actual literary works.  This is the source of 
their great artistic perfection’ (Medvedev 2000: 316-7; 1991: 139-40). Medvedev’s remarks are, given 
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philosophy and art, where art cannot be ideological precisely because ideology is, 
for Medvedev, a determinate formulation.  The entire ideological horizon of a given 
epoch is therefore a broad range of determinate ideological formulations; and the 
aesthetic is an entirely extra-ideological and indeterminate site of meaning, even if it 
is only through the aesthetic that the epoch’s ideological horizon receives its 
consummation.  Yet isn’t the act of banishing ideology from a particular generic set 
the most ideological suspect act, in that it demands that a particular discourse is 
placed beyond the plane of contention?    
Medevedev’s ‘generic’ understanding of ideology is entirely consistent with his 
broader demand for a sociological poetics.   According to Medvedev’s introduction, 
this projected sociological poetics is entirely consistent with Marxism’s base / 
superstructure paradigm.  For Medvedev, the study of ideologies amounts to 
discerning the relationship of a particular ideological superstructure to the socio-
economic base.  Art, science, philosophy, ethics and religion all have their own 
languages, each with ‘its own forms and devices for that language, and its own 
specific laws for the ideological refraction of a common reality.  It is absolutely not 
the way of Marxism to level these differences or to ignore the essential plurality of 
the languages of ideologies’ (Medvedev 2000: 186-7; 1991: 31).  As with his 
suggestion that an immanent determination is also an external determination, 
Medvedev’s insistence on the plurality of all languages and their capacity for 
ideological refraction hints at the workings of a  dialectical conceptualization of art 
and how it should be related to the social world of life.  Indeed, Medvedev declares 
that:  
The dialectical method provides it with an indispensable instrument for the 
formulation of dynamic definitions, i.e., definitions adequate to the generating 
system of the development of a given genre, form, etc.  Only dialectics can avoid 
both the normativisim and dogmatism in definitions and their positivistic atomization 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
their proximity to Medvedev’s attack on Shklovsky’s conceptualization of the novel, potentially a 
criticism of Tynianov’s review of Zoo.   
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into a multiplicity of disconnected facts only conditionally connected (Medvedev 
2000: 186-7; 1991: 31). 
However, as already noted, Medvedev’s supposedly dialectical treatments of genre 
and art’s refraction of ideology are indeed normative in how they seek to determine 
and preserve a unitary, harmonious understanding of the aesthetic that is not tainted 
by ideology. Medvedev’s use of the visual metaphor ‘refraction’ to describe art’s 
relationship with ideology is crucial here.  In a certain limited sense it implies that an 
ideological ray passes through the work of art, changing direction as a result of the 
material through which it is refracted.  On this basis, the immanent is indeed 
extrinsic and vice versa.  Yet, on another level, this ideological ray is held to 
originate at a determinate point beyond the work of art, and therefore remains 
fundamentally extrinsic to the work of art and allows Medvedev to perpetuate the 
post-Kantian norm whereby the aesthetic is ultimately exempted from any inter-
determinate or co-constitutive relationship with ideology.   Again, it is important to 
stress that Medvedev’s whole project for a sociological poetics is underwritten by an 
adherence to the ‘Marxist’ base / superstructure dualism, where it is the base that 
determines the superstructure.111  Medvedev’s above quoted remarks regarding 
how ethics, art and religion each have their own language, and how Marxism is 
aware of the essential plurality of languages and ideologies are followed with the 
subsequent caveat: ‘[t]he specificity of art, science, ethics, or religion naturally 
should not obscure their ideological unity as superstructures of a common base, or 
the fact that they follow the same sociological laws of development.  But this 
specificity should not be effaced by the general formulas of those laws’ (Medvedev 
2000: 186-7; 1991: 3).  Accordingly, there are obviously clear limitations regarding 
                                                          
111 For a discussion of Medvedev’s treatment of Marxism and his attempts to combine it with Neo-
Kantianism, see (Brandist 2002: 67-8).  Unlike some supporters of The Formal Method, Brandist 
perceives the extent to which this combination is not realized in an entirely satisfactory manner. It is 
definitely a Neo-Kantian iteration of culture which predominates, and which allows the very content of 
that Neo-Kantianism to go unquestioned: ‘It is significant that by ‘ideology’ Medvedev repeatedly 
refers to the ‘ethical’, cognitive and other contents of literature’, that is, to the ‘good’, the ‘true’, the 
‘beautiful’ and so on that constituted ‘universal validity’ as defined by the neo-Kantians.  Ideology 
becomes simply the content of culture, and literature draws from this in the process of its creation in 
‘life’ (Brandist 2002: 73).   
224 
 
how Medvedev is prepared to accept a dialectical conceptualization of the extrinsic 
and intrinsic, that is, the economic base and the immanent specificities of the 
aesthetic.112  Medvedev wants to preserve the uniqueness of the aesthetic 
‘language’ whilst simultaneously insisting that such this language is, in reality, a re-
iteration of a determining ‘master’ language that governs all phenomena.  Neither 
Medvedev’s insistence that, as a language, the aesthetic is social nor his strong 
emphasis on the historical development of this language are sufficient to overcome 
the manifest limitations of his crude base superstructure binary or his naive 
exemption of the aesthetic from any ideology.   In the theory of Tynianov, Shklovsky 
and Eikhenbaum dialectical contradictions exist on the immanent level of any 
discursive art.  For Medvedev, as with Bakhtin, the contradictions only arise through 
the juxtaposition of two distinct determinate genres, and the ontologies of positivist 
causal determinism and post-Kantian aesthetic unity co-exist alongside one another 
in unrecognised and decidedly unresolved tension.      
Such a view, whilst undeniably topical in the Soviet 1920s, is entirely consistent with 
Shklovsky’s contempt for ‘translators’ such as Bely, who hold that art is merely a 
window onto a posited metaphysical truth that lies beyond its material boundaries.   
Medvedev’s own use of the term translation belies his conformity to the pattern of 
artistic creation derided by Shklovsky, and which Medvedev likely sees himself as 
overcoming.  Medvedev’s remarks on the task of literary criticism are particularly 
                                                          
112 I disagree with Shevtsova’s assessment that The Formal Method provides an alternative to 
simplistic treatments of ideology and its use in cultural studies. ‘An interpretation of Bakhtin/Medvedev 
that gives due weight to their explanation of form with respect to social evaluation, on the one hand, 
and to their separation of social evaluation from ideology on the other (any thought system is, in their 
view, an ideology), allows us to avoid the oversimplifications, at once conceptual and methodological, 
brought about by the idea of ideology in favour today’ (Shevtsova 1990: 69).  Shevtsova criticises 
then contemporary Marxists for their separation of ideology from the literary text, an error which 
merely replicates the form / content dualism.  The alternative, for Shevtsova, is to celebrate The 
Formal Method’s insistence that all determinations are socially situated.  However, this argument 
does not address the text’s endorsement of the base / structure dualism and its restaging of the 
aforementioned dualism.  From the perspective of this analysis and its preoccupation with objective 
critique, Žižek’s evolution of Marxist, Althusserian and Lacanian theories of ideology remains the most 
persuasive account of ideology, particularly with regard to its insistence that ideology amounts to a 
moment of mis-recognition.  See (Žižek 2012: 1-30 and 296-330).   
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telling, and he makes the Belinskian demand that literary criticism informed by 
sociological poetics must serve as a guide for an author: 
Competent and serious literary criticism must give the artist his ‘social assignment’ 
in his own language, as a poetic assignment.  In an artistically developed culture, 
society itself, the reading public, will naturally and easily translate its social demands 
and needs into the immanent language of poetic craftsmanship.  It is true that this is 
only possible under the comparatively rare conditions of complete class uniformity 
and harmony between the poet and his readers.  But criticism, in any case, must be 
a competent translating medium between them (Medvedev 2000: 189-90; 1991: 36.  
Emphasis added). 
By preserving the art work’s extra-ideological, post-Kantian purity and that art work’s 
unique ability to embody the epochal moment in a unitary aesthetic work, Medvedev 
is all too clearly maintaining the Bakhtinian line, whereby the aesthetic unites the 
human and the social with the material world of life and, like Bakhtin, brings a great 
deal of unacknowledged ideological baggage within his determinations of both life 
and art.   It is particularly telling that Medvedev boldly declares his praise of 
dialectics because they resist normative and dogmatic definitions, yet he is clearly 
expounding a normative agenda here, be it for the literary critic or the writer, who 
must be finely attuned to the social demands of a given epoch.  Medvedev does 
concede that there are epochs in history when the ruling class and artists have not 
understood each other.  In such epochs, the authority is therefore unable to 
translate its social order into the language of art, effectively demanding a non-art of 
art.  In response, so Medvedev argues, the artist does not understand life’s social 
assignments and ‘tries to fill them with formalistic experimentation or school 
exercises.  But this happens only in epochs of sharp and deep social disintegration’ 
(Medvedev 2000: 191-2; 1991: 36).  As with Medvedev’s crass appraisal of Don 
Quixote, there is the latent expectation that order and harmony are the pre-requisite 
of historical epochs and their historically grounded artworks.  Accordingly, it is 
Medvedev, and not the Russian Formalists, who provides a profoundly anachronistic 
theory of literary art that lives outside of history.  The modernity that Shklovsky and 
Vaginov proffer in Zoo and The Goat Song is a far more paradoxical trajectory than 
226 
 
the timeless sequence of restored moments of aesthetic harmony envisaged by 
Medvedev, who is bent on overcoming difference and alienation in the name of a 
harmonious correspondence between the aesthetic and its epochal enunciation.   
On the basis of his own ‘sociological’ poetics, Medvedev would likely argue that 
Shklovsky’s and Vaginov’s novels are exemplary of two artists who do not 
understand the social demand placed upon them, and therefore resort to ‘formalistic 
experimentation’ and ‘school exercises’ caused by deep social disintegration.  
Vaginov and Shklovsky, it would appear, are far more attuned to a modernity where 
such absolute statements on an epoch and its social culture are impossible. 
V 
In the 1930s and beyond, Bakhtin himself would turn and return to the question of 
genre and socially situated languages.  Perhaps not unlike Medvedev, Bakhtin’s 
treatment of genre maintains an inconsistent attitude to Formalism.  In Discourse 
and the Novel [Slovo v romane], Bakhtin makes a qualified acknowledgement of 
Eikhenbaum’s and Shklovsky’s work on skaz and plot, which he broadly terms 
‘stylistics’.113  Perhaps unsurprisingly, Bakhtin swiftly denigrates their work as being 
entirely inadequate to the genre of the novel, as it isolates particular elements from 
the novel as a whole (Bakhtin 2012: 19; 2004: 266).  If indeed it needs repeating, 
Bakhtin understands the novel as a sight of interaction between discursive voices or, 
in other words, between different others.114  Bakhtin demands a reappraisal of how 
                                                          
113 As already noted above, Renfrew has argued that Bakhtin’s thought provides some 
unacknowledged convergences with the thought of Tynianov.  Tihanov has also argued that Bakhtin’s 
work exhibits some converges with Tynianov’s and Shklovsky’s thought, particularly Bakhtin’s 
conceptualization genre and the concomitant relationship between art and life in Discourse in the 
Novel.  Tihanov makes the bold claim that: ‘The discovery of the spoken word and of everyday life in 
their relation to literature is of invaluable significance for the entire scene of literary and cultural theory 
in inter-war Russia, not least for Bakhtin’s theoretical project.  In the realm of literary theory, it can be 
matched only by the Formalists’ path-breaking invention of the idea of immanent literariness’ (Tihanov 
2000: 132-6).  As will be argued presently, Bakhtin’s formulation of genre is indeed comparable to 
some aspects of Formalist theory, but the extent to which both share a similar understanding of the 
spoken word or ‘voices’ in literary art is by no means as direct as Tihanov appears to imply.    
114 As Brandist notes, Bakhtin understands the novel as being ‘made up of a variety of social 
discourses or ‘heteroglossia’ [raznorechie], and sometimes it includes a variety of languages 
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poetic discourse is conceptualized, and attempts what he regards as a much 
needed reappraisal of poetic discourse that will no longer adhere to strict stylistic or 
rhetorical categories.  For Bakhtin ‘[t]he novel is an artistic genre.  Novelistic 
discourse is poetic discourse, but one that does not fit within the frame provided by 
the concept of poetic discourse as it now exists’ (Bakhtin 2012: 23; 2004: 269).  In 
contrast to novelistic discourse, Bakhtin implies that the Formalists’ poetics is 
exemplary of a tendency in European culture to centralize and unify all verbal 
phenomena under the fold of a single language: 
Aristotelian poetics, the poetics of Augustine, the poetics of the medieval church, of 
‘the one language of truth,’ the Cartesian poetics of neoclassicism, the abstract 
grammatical universalism of Leibniz (the idea of a ‘universal grammar’), Humboldt’s 
insistence on the concrete—all these, whatever their differences in nuance, give 
expression to the same centripetal forces in sociolinguistic and ideological life; they 
serve one and the same project of centralizing and unifying the European 
languages.  The victory of one reigning language (dialect) over the others, the 
supplanting of languages, their enslavement… all thus determined the content and 
power of the category of ‘unitary language’ in linguistic and stylistic thought, and 
determined its creative, style-shaping role in the majority of the poetic genres that 
coalesced in the channel formed by those same centripetal forces of verbal-
ideological life (Bakhtin 2012: 24-5; 2004: 271).   
In elaborating the properties of oppressive unitary languages, Bakhtin’s argument 
provides a contrasting echo of the Philosopher sat on the train in Vaginov’s novel: ‘A 
unitary language is not something given [dan] but is always in essence posited 
[zadan]—and at every moment of its linguistic life it is opposed to the realities of 
heteroglossia’ (Bakhtin 2012: 24; 2004: 270).  For Bakhtin, the novel is the site 
where a conflict takes place between different world-views, different languages, and 
where the centralizing forces of unitary language are counteracted by dialogized 
heteroglossia.  The novel is therefore an utterance’s ‘authentic environment’ 
[podlinnaia sreda], where it ‘lives and takes shape’ [v kotoroe zhivet i formiruetsia] 
(Bakhtin 2012: 26; 2004: 272).   It would be wholly incorrect to claim that Bakhtin 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
[raznoiazychie] and of individual voices [raznogolositsa]; all of these are organized artistically’ 
(Brandist 2002: 115).  It is the living stratification of these discourses which renders traditional 
stylistics (which of course, for Bakhtin, includes Formalism) totally unable to account for the novel in 
all its living social complexity.    
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has progressed from the world-view of the Philosopher in The Goat Song, where it is 
the world that is posited and not given, to his position here where it is a unitary 
language that is always posited, and never a given.  Nevertheless, the difference 
between these two utterances is instructive, in that it demonstrates how Bakhtin can 
be seen as moving away from the unitary philosophical aesthetics articulated in ‘The 
Problem of Form, Material and Content’ and Medvedev’s The Formal Method in 
Literary Scholarship, and would certainly appear to be exploring a far more nuanced 
conceptualization of literary art and epoch than the crude base / superstructure 
determinism advocated by Medvedev.  After all, is not the base / superstructure 
paradigm exemplary of a one universal truth in all socio-historical experience?  
As Tihanov has noted, Bakhtin’s choice of the novel genre as the best example of 
an utterance’s ‘authentic environment’ is arbitrary, and Bakhtin is effectively 
elaborating an ethically informed conceptualization of modernity.   For Tihanov, 
Bakhtin’s exploration of the extra- and intra-generic, and the various relationships 
between contrasting voices which exist in opposition to ‘master’ discourses, amount 
to a programme for ‘a rightful and unconditional reality’ (Tihanov 2000: 147).115  In 
the above examples from the theory of Shklovsky, Tynianov and Eikhenbaum 
critiqued across the pages of this analysis, it is apparent that these Russian 
Formalists share a tendency with Bakhtin that allows their particular theoretical 
constructs to permeate beyond the boundaries of art, granting it a constitutive role in 
modernity itself.  Whether it be the image of a steamship, the paradoxical properties 
                                                          
115 For another, if less satisfying, treatment of modernity through Bakhtin’s concept of ‘great time’, see 
(Pechey 1993: 61-85).  Brandist, in contrast, sees Bakhtin’s adherence to moral and ethical ideals as 
a hindrance that prevented Bakhtin from engaging with modern institutions and their role in shaping 
modern culture: ‘In the 1930s, when, in his central writings on the novel and popular culture, Bakhtin 
tried to deal with questions of historical change and to explore the politics of culture, he was 
continually hampered by the autonomous ethical philosophy that he was unable to jettison.  Instead of 
turning his attention to the institutional context of culture, such phenomena as the development of an 
official language were transformed from political questions into inflated ethical concerns which 
transcend questions of social structure’ (Brandist 1999: 237).  However, it has been argued here that 
questions of institutional or social life cannot be separated from the particular methodological 
orientations of Kant, Hegel, the Formalists and Bakhtin.  Bakhtin’s failure to engage with institutional 
discourse in a determinate sense does not require that his early thought or his writing on the novel in 
the 1930s be seen as lacking in this regard. 
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of literary genres and the various functions they engender, or a programme for the 
authorial praxis in terms of cultural construction or dissident critique, the Formalist 
theory discussed here shares Kant’s and Hegel’s tendency to allow paradox, 
contradiction and emancipatory discourses of freedom to become constitutive of 
modernity itself.  For the Formalists, it is the radical problem of objective material 
otherness which generates the problem of historicism and the concomitant problem 
of anachronism.  One is an anachronism if one places oneself outside the dominant 
discourse of one’s epoch, even if that very same insight renders a prevailing master 
discourse as a redundant anachronism that is incapable of adequately 
conceptualizing the very reality in which it is grounded.   It is precisely by 
conceptualizing the aesthetic as ultimately other to itself that it retains the right to be 
a guarantor of freedom, not by a post-Kantian unity between the aesthetic and the 
natural world, but by asserting paradox and finitude as necessary conditions in order 
for freedom to be asserted.  Yet, in order for literary art to be exemplary of 
modernity, it requires some determinate specificity as a particular element of the 
whole.  Indeed, without this crucial and deeply paradoxical tension between 
literature and modernity, their whole project would fail. 
Yet, despite these similarities between the Russian Formalists and Bakhtin in terms 
of their iterations of modernity, there remains a crucial and irresolvable difference 
between these two critical schools.116  Whether it is termed stylistics, rhetoric or 
composition, the Formalists’ interest in such questions as plot, narrative or device is, 
for Bakhtin, totally insufficient and will never facilitate an understanding of what he 
                                                          
116 Given the primary focus of this analysis is a reappraisal of Russian Formalism, a full exploration of 
Bakhtin’s and the Formalists’ treatment of similar theoretical ideas is beyond the scope of the present 
study.  Even within the confines of Discourse and the Novel, Bakhtin hints at an alternative 
conceptualization of Tolstoy’s engagement with his readers and the word’s ‘internal dialogism’ that 
runs counter to Shklovsky’s discussion of defamiliarization and Tolstoy in ‘Art as Device’ (Bakhtin 
2012: 36; 2004: 283).  Towards the end of the essay, Bakhtin’s discussion of the lines of development 
in the European novel explicitly raises the question of defamiliarization with regard to conventional 
pathos, and touches upon Don Quixote and Sterne in a manner that recalls Shklovsky’s early 
Formalist essays, and, as noted in the preface to this analysis, he also raises the depiction of stupidity 
and non-recognition in the passages devoted to the clown (Bakhtin 2012: 157-60; 2004: 402-5).  
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terms ‘actual meaning’ [aktual΄nyi smysl].  In one of the more engaging paradoxes of 
Bakhtin’s thought, the ‘actual meaning’ of a word can only be conceptualized in 
terms of its relationship to other words: ‘The word lives, as it were, on the boundary 
between its own context and another, alien context’ (Bakhtin  2012: 37; 2004: 
284).117 Bakhtin insists that, for this word and the other ‘alien’ context to be actual, 
they must be located in a living environment.  The word must literally live in dynamic 
interaction with other speakers.  It is not sufficient to say that a given word or 
discourse is directed or orientated towards a particular object, for ‘[t]he word is born 
in a dialogue as a living rejoinder within it; the word is shaped in dialogic interaction 
with an alien word that is already in the object.  A word forms a concept of its own 
object in a dialogic way’ (Bakhtin 2012: 33; 2004: 279).118  The Formalist interest in 
structure, plot, genre and device is held to be an interest in ‘neutral significance’, 
that is, in a classification of literature and literary style that is not direct towards a 
speaker.  Bakhtin is adamant that ‘[w]ho speaks and under what conditions he 
speaks: this is what determines the word’s actual meaning.  All direct meanings and 
direct expressions are false, and this is especially true of emotional meanings and 
expressions’ (Bakhtin 2012: 156; 2004: 401).   
                                                          
117 It is particularly telling that Bakhtin’s use of the term orientation [ustanovka] is sharply distinct from 
its use by Tynianov.  Bakhtin sees the term as designating the word’s orientation towards a speaker 
and that speaker’s answer in everyday dialogue (Bakhtin 2012: 34; 2004: 280).  As noted above, 
Tynianov’s dialectical conceptualization of the term moves from an everyday understanding of the 
term towards a reconceptualization of an author’s creative freedom as creative necessity.  Necessity 
for Tynianov is conceptualized as the objectifying properties of literary material that arise through 
literature’s impersonal and functional relationship with life; for Bakhtin, it is the necessary presence of 
a living other with which any speaker’s word can be engaged in dialogue. 
118 Brandist remarks that: ‘[t]erms such as ‘monologue’ and ‘dialogue’, for example, may seem 
innocuous enough, but the sociological and philosophical loads that Bakhtin forces the concepts to 
bear is [sic] quite unusual’.  Accordingly, just what meaning Bakhtin intends by the term ‘dialogue’ is 
appropriately unfinizable.  Recent scholarship has tended to focus on Bakhtin’s intellectual influences 
to the extent that the meaning of a term such as ‘dialogue’ is seen as changing throughout Bakhtin’s 
career (Tihanov 2000:  197-202 and 213-4) (Poole 2001: 109-35).  There is, I think, a consistent 
tendency that runs from Bakhtin’s first study of Dostoevsky through his work on the novel in the 1930s 
and his later revisions of the Dostoevsky book, where dialogue denotes a historically grounded 
speaker engaged in dialogue with another historically grounded speaker.  It is in this sense that I 
understand the term dialogue here.   
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This last quote, where it is an individual embodied speaker who grants the possibility 
of dialogic ‘actual meaning’, demonstrates an impasse between Bakhtin and 
Russian Formalism, for it is clear that Formalism’s objective treatment of Gogol΄’s 
and Pushkin’s alienation from their work, and, for that matter, Tynianov’s concept of 
the literary personality, are clearly incompatible with Bakhtin’s demand for an 
individual, historically grounded speaker in life itself.  It is particularly striking that 
Bakhtin insists that it is the existence of a historically grounded individual and her 
words that is the necessary condition of the paradoxical properties of novelistic 
discourse and its emancipatory potential in modernity.  As noted, Formalism does 
not deny the necessity of an individual author, but that author must be alienated 
from his work if their particular conceptualization of modernity and its many 
paradoxes is to function.  It is important, however, not to lose sight of the fact that 
Bakhtin and the Formalists are arguing towards the same end here.  Taken in 
isolation, Bakhtin’s argument that direct meanings and direct expressions are false 
(particularly with regard to emotional feelings and expressions) could be taken from 
Shklovsky’s warning against the laboratory of the creative personality, or 
Eikhenbaum’s insistence on the device over authorial psychology in his essay on 
Gogol΄’s The Overcoat.  Yet Bakhtin’s much vaunted dialogism requires precisely 
the variety of engaged, responsible author which the Formalists reject outright as 
inadmissible in objective literary science. 
In elaborating his concept of dialogue, Bakhtin is particularly insistent that it is not a 
compositional form that structures speech (Renfrew 2006: 143-5).  Instead Bakhtin 
argues that the word itself, when located as a social utterance, is marked by an 
internal dialogism.  This quality of the word permeates all elements of the word, be it 
semantics or the evaluation of expression.  Any ‘neutral’ interest in the word 
divorced from its actual meaning completely ignores the element of internal 
dialogism that saturates the word.  It cannot, Bakhtin argues, be isolated as a 
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structural feature, neither as a uniquely individual utterance, nor from its orientation 
towards its concept.  In contrast to what he sees as Formalism’s (and the many 
other branches of stylistics or ‘poetics’ he names) interest in a stylistics that 
categorizes the neutral features of the literary work and plots their historical usage, 
Bakhtin regards the question of style as a question of the word’s dialogic trajectory: 
The word, directed toward its object, dialogically agitated and tension-filled 
environment of alien words, value judgments and accents, weaves in and out of 
complex interrelationships, merges with some, recoils from others, intersects with 
yet a third group: and this may crucially shape discourse, may leave a trace in all its 
semantic layers, may complicate its expression and influence its entire stylistic 
profile (Bakhtin 2012: 30; 2004: 276). 
It is this internal relationship to the alien word or utterance that the word enters into 
the ‘positing of a style’.  Style, so Bakhtin argues, is not the uniform and reified 
requirements of lyric poetry or the classification of literary art, but rather the 
intersection of various indices that ‘reach outside itself, a correspondence of its own 
elements and the elements of an alien context’ (Bakhtin 2012: 36-7; 2004: 283-4).  
Stylistics is, therefore, not the neutral discourse or unitary language that categorises 
literary phenomena but is itself, no matter how ‘monologic’ its pretensions, a set of 
living utterances that are riven with the same internal dialogism as the discourse of 
the novel.119  Style therefore manifests an ‘internal politics’, and the supposedly 
immanent analysis of literary art is, in its actual meaning, a manifestation of the 
literary work’s relationship to another, alien discourse.   In its own way, Bakhtin’s 
radical re-conceptualization of stylistics is comparable to Shklovsky’s 
problematization of method in Zoo.  In Zoo method spins out of human control and 
                                                          
119 I agree with Renfrew that Bakhtin’s objections to ‘traditional stylistics’ are orientated towards 
Russian Formalism.  However, Renfrew is sees Bakhtin as ultimately unable to fully accept social 
embodiment as the foundation of his own literary aesthetics: ‘[In Discourse in the Novel] Bakhtin 
remains encumbered… by a broadly Romantic and Neo-Kantian allegiance to the unity of art and, so 
to speak, the transferability of ‘aesthetic activity’’.  Renfrew accordingly concludes that Discourse in 
the Novel is a failure: ‘[it] postulates so vigorously the possibility of a system of genre that is able to 
deal with the full range of literary production and the affective relationship between the literary and the 
broader social environment, only to emphasize its own failure to flesh out such a system by falling 
back into a conventional modal terminology’ (Renfrew 2006: 145 and 151).  I would contend, 
however, that it is Medvedev’s The Formal Method which is more encumbered by Neo-Kantianism 
and that, in ‘Discourse in the Novel’, Bakhtin offers the more viable critique of literature, its 
environment, method and their paradoxical relationship with given historical contexts. 
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deprives all empirical phenomena of absolute certainty.  Bakhtin is also de-
absolutizing method here, depriving stylistics of any neutral meaning and insisting 
that it is one living dialogic discourse orientated towards an infinite number of other 
discourses.  But, again, for Bakhtin it is the necessarily grounded nature of an 
utterance in a particular historical context and that utterance’s unequivocally being 
uttered by a real living speaker that renders method subject to the internal 
dialogism.  Method, for Bahktin, must be personal and human.  For Shklovsky the 
feeling of propulsion in Zoo… is the sensation of the impersonal nature of objective 
method and its alienation from the human.   
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Epilogue 
I 
Kant brings the Critique of Pure Reason to a close with a beginning.  He declares 
that the routes offered by scepticism and dogmatism are forever closed, and only 
the practice of critique provides a path towards the future.  Kant encourages his 
readers to join him on this path in the hope that his path will expand into a highway.  
The grand objective is ‘to bring human reason to full satisfaction in that which has 
always, but until now vainly, occupied its lust for knowledge’ (Kant 1998: 704).  
Hegel ‘ends’ the Phenomenology by exulting in the dialectical tension active in 
Absolute Knowing, or, more specifically, the tension between History (the knowledge 
of all that has been before) and the return to the immediate moment of sense-
certainty that requires a new beginning: 
The goal, Absolute Knowing, or Spirit that knows itself as Spirit, has for its path the 
recollection of the Spirits as they are in themselves and as they accomplish the 
organization of their realm.  Their preservation, regarded from the side of their free 
existence appearing in the form of contingency, is History; but regarded from the 
side of their [philosophically] comprehended organization, it is the Science of 
Knowing in the sphere of appearance: the two together, comprehend History, form 
alike the inwardizing and the Calvary of absolute Spirit, the actuality, truth, and 
certainty of his throne, without which he would be lifeless and alone (Hegel 1977: 
493). 
Both Kant’s and Hegel’s ‘ends’ make use of the device of the path.  Such paths 
towards the future demand a meaningful engagement with the past.  Kant’s 
programme of critique entails critical engagement with what is in the ‘now’ and what 
has been; Hegel’s Absolute Knowing requires that the philosopher (or rather 
‘phenomenologist’) engage with the sensual immediacy of the present and recollect 
History’s becoming towards the present in the present.  These paths are exemplary 
moments of the Formalist preference for non-recognition, where the path exists on 
two planes of meaning simultaneously.  It heads towards the future only as a direct 
movement towards the past.  To revert to the terms of Shklovsky’s well-known 
analogies, the ‘path’ is a paradoxical knight’s move, a rocky road where the walker 
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struggles as she feels out her footing, and it is a dialectical materialism where ‘yes’ 
and ‘no’ exist simultaneously on the same page. 
 Over the pages of this analysis, the brainless theory of Shklovsky, Eikhenbaum and 
Tynianov has emerged as a radically objective aesthetics of literary art.  Whether 
the formalists were preoccupied with devices, narrative, the categories of the 
grotesque and genre, or literature’s problematic relationships with life and 
modernity, their work has been shown to provide literary studies with a paradoxical 
theory of contradictions that is adequate to an ethics of emancipatory critique across 
ever shifting historical contingencies.   It is an objective aesthetics where the 
material world, material art and material modernity emerge in mutually constitutive 
inter-illumination.  It is an objective aesthetics where neither ‘art’ nor ‘life’ can lay 
claim to the (falsely) superior status of causal principle.  And it is an aesthetics 
where art is no longer tasked with the debilitating ideological burden of unifying the 
human subject’s relationship with the natural world.  Like Kant’s and Hegel’s paths 
toward the future, this Formalist variety of dialectical materialism (of which this 
current analysis is also an example) does not lend itself to reified conclusions.  This 
epilogue is therefore not a ‘summing up’, a ‘bringing together of strands’ or a 
‘concluding remark’.  It is rather undertaken on the basis that is an additional word 
(epi + logos) that looks back at this analysis and its present with a view towards a 
possible future.  Hopefully, it will precede an infinite number of subsequent additions 
and (most important of all) contradictions.  
 
II 
Russian Formalism continues to provoke very interesting criticism.  Some scholars 
who have published either predominantly or exclusively in Russian have provided 
very interesting accounts of Formalism and the Formalists in the 1920s and beyond.  
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Among others, Jan Levchenko, Aleksandr Dmitriev and Ilia Kalinin have provided 
stimulating studies of Formalism, albeit from a variety of analytical perspectives that 
do not accord with those of the current analysis.   As already noted, Rabaté argues 
that the only way out of the ‘death’ of theory is more theory.  If Russian Formalism 
provides one of many possible determinate origins of literary theory, then the drive 
to more theory can only be enriched by more studies of Formalism.   The imperialist 
gesture would be to demand that their works are translated into English, and thereby 
enrich English language scholarship with these important contributions.  I shall 
instead demand that English language scholars learn Russian and engage with their 
arguments.  Quantitatively and qualitatively, the level of enrichment will be far 
greater.   
However, as already stated the Russian Formalists provide useful words of caution 
with regard to how we map authors and their relationships with other authors, 
intellectual influences and historical contexts.  An ethically committed dialectical 
materialism of the kind practiced by the Formalists is by definition engaged with the 
material reality of any given historical context, but the suggestion that that context 
had the capacity to determine what a particular author wrote is incompatible with 
such an ethically engaged critique.   Studies of Russian Formalism, I believe, will be 
of greater interest if they practice Formalist critique in addition to merely specifying 
its evolving content.  The treatment of anachronism is, I think, of fundamental 
significance here, particularly if dialectical materialism is to be adequate to an ethics 
of emancipatory critique across ever shifting historical contingencies.  This is neither 
a manifestation of ‘theory’ that avoids the grounding of abstract phenomena in a 
particular historical reality, nor is it a capitulation to the positivist demands of rigid 
historicism.  It is, in the words of Rabaté, a literary theory that remains ‘alert to its 
ethical, political, and historical responsibility’ (Rabaté 2002: 141). 
III 
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For Kant and the Formalists critiqued here, the path of historical responsibility has 
important implications for disciplinary praxis.  Kant asked for full autonomy for the 
philosophy faculty; Shklovsky knowingly asks his younger followers to ransack the 
rector’s study and sail past the window on their bicycles.  Despite its limited offer of 
cathartic release, Shklovsky’s ironic suggestion is not a practical solution to present 
difficulties.  The vast majority of the thinkers critiqued here are of the view that 
scholarship benefits from a lack of restrictions.  For Kant and the Formalists, it is in 
the interest of national and international cultures that a faculty (philosophical or 
otherwise) be encouraged to criticise, and be allowed free reign to critique what they 
will.   If they are allowed to do so, those same national and international cultures will 
be allowed to emerge in their full oppositional and paradoxical richness.  This will, 
however, not be accomplished by an overbearing insistence that academia is a 
‘world leading’ domain of high seriousness that must be closed off to clowns and 
fools, and spared the ruthlessly parodying gaze of non-recognition.  According to 
this Formalist (and potentially Bakhtinian) iteration of disciplinary labour, the 
hierarchies of academia must be problematized and constantly challenged.    This is 
not asking that we jettison footnotes, archival research, and fidelity to texts in their 
historical specificity.  The ethical demand here is that scholarly ethics can at least 
tolerate a clown in its midst and, after Bakhtin, entertain a conditions of possibility 
where the site of philosophical critique is Hegel’s ‘high’ phenomenological throne 
and an altogether lower household device (Bakhtin 2010: 121-2, 345; 1984: 
109,321).   
If, for whatever reason, the contemporary scholar feels limited in any way, Formalist 
theory provides a productive means of contradiction with which to defamiliarize the 
automatized norms of the university and the burdens placed on contemporary 
238 
 
scholars.120  As already stated, Formalism is not in any way dismissive of that which 
it seeks to negate.  On the contrary, the effect of any moment of negation will be that 
much greater if the writer-critic-scholar has the fullest possible understanding of that 
which she is contradicting.  The magnitude of the contradiction should not, however, 
be understood as amounting to the revolutionary overthrow of the academic 
hierarchy.  Indeed, Formalism requires a certain iteration of the rector sat in his 
study if their whole critical praxis is to function.  The scholar familiar with a Formalist 
variety of disciplinary activity is indeed free to contradict an established order whilst 
at the same time being seen to function within that order.  The level of impact will be 
down to the particular situation in question. 
 IV 
The above pun on Hegel’s phenomenological throne is a facetious attempt to 
converge Hegel, Bakhtin’s work on carnival and Formalism into one condensed 
image.121  The comparison I have staged here between Kant, Hegel, Formalism and 
Bakhtin is just one possible path which such an analysis could have taken.  It is my 
hope that in the future it will inspire further comparative analyses of these respective 
thinkers.  The convergences and divergences between these thinkers critiqued 
across these pages offer an unlimited range of perspectives for future studies, which 
will hopefully provide an equally unlimited variety of methods and disciplinary 
practices with which to critique Soviet culture and the present contexts in which they 
happen to be situated.  I hope such studies will be ethically engaged, delight in 
polemical contradiction, and even tolerate the odd brainless knight or clown.        
 
                                                          
120 On the difficulties and challenges of the British university, see (Fender 2011) and (Fuller 1999: 
583-69).  Fender laments that: ‘Heralded as 'the seat of "academic freedom"' in the nineteenth 
century, it is now very difficult to see how the modern (that is, contemporary) university constitutes an 
arena for truly autonomous enquiry when it has become one of the most schematised institutions of 
our time, permeated increasingly by political, social and economic agendas (Fender 2011).  
121 An adequate account of Bakhtin’s engagement with Hegel is beyond the scope of this study.  
However, for an extensive discussion, see (Tihanov 2000: 271-91). 
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